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ABSTRACT 
 
Political Institutions, Public Management, and Bureaucratic Performance: Political-
Bureaucratic Interactions and Their Effect on Policy Outcomes. (August 2008) 
Daniel P. Hawes, B.A., University of Texas – Pan American 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Kenneth J. Meier 
 
This project examines the determinants of political responsiveness to 
bureaucratic performance.  A large literature exists that has examined how bureaucratic 
agencies are responsive to political institutions.  While policy theory contends that the 
reverse is also true – that is, political institutions engage in political assessment of 
policies – there is little empirical literature examining this important question.  Indeed, 
research in public administration suggests that political responsiveness only occurs 
following massive bureaucratic failure or policy crises.  Using data from Texas public 
school districts, this dissertation explores the role of policy salience in determining the 
likelihood of political responsiveness to bureaucratic outputs and outcomes.   
The findings suggest that issue salience is the key determinant of political 
involvement in administration.  Furthermore, this project incorporates the concepts of 
descriptive and substantive representation in examining these questions.  The results 
indicate that policy salience depends on the composition of the interests of political 
institutions.  Furthermore, race and ethnicity work to shape those preferences and, in 
turn, condition what policy makers deem as salient.  The findings suggest that 
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descriptively unrepresentative political institutions are less likely to be responsive to the 
needs of those who are not represented (e.g. Latino students).  Thus, representation is 
central to political responsiveness when the policy outputs or outcomes in question are 
not universally salient.   
Finally, this project examines whether political institutions can influence policy 
outcomes, and, more importantly, what factors – environmental, organizational, 
managerial – either facilitate or constrain the political influence of elected officials.  The 
findings suggest that goal and preference alignment between political institutions and 
bureaucratic agencies is critical in enhancing political influence – a finding that is 
commonly argued in formal models of political control, but rarely tested empirically.  
This research also finds that bureaucratic power or independence can work to hinder 
political influence of policy outputs.    
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION  
Following the Columbia Space Shuttle disaster, NASA’s space program come 
under intense public scrutiny, resulting in Congressional numerous hearings and 
independent investigations.  Similarly, the government’s handling of Hurricane Katrina 
prompted Congress to hold over 30 congressional oversight hearings relating to 
government spending on federal preparedness and responsiveness to disasters alone 
(Project on Government Oversight 2008).  These hearings resulted in significant changes 
in the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) including the resignation of its 
chief administrator.  Similarly, Congress held numerous oversight hearings and created 
an ad hoc committee to review and investigate the Federal Drug Administration’s (FDA) 
1999 approval of the now-recalled drug Vioxx, which allegedly caused heart attacks in 
tens of thousands of Americans.  The committee’s recommendations included the 
introduction of significant structural and procedural changes to the FDA.   
These examples all depict Congress as an institution that is actively involved in 
monitoring and assessing the activities and performance of bureaucratic agencies.  
Indeed, this is arguably the primary role of elected officials, that is, to ensure the public 
goods and services provided by government are in fact consistent with the will of the 
people (e.g. Locke 2004 [1689]: Rousseau 1968 [1762]).  Whether or not political elites  
____________ 
This dissertation  follows the style of American Journal of Political Science. 
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actively or systematically engage in policy assessment is an important question this 
dissertation engages empirically. 
Bureaucratic accountability to the public is a core concern for political scientists, 
public administration scholars and policy-makers alike.  The founding of the scientific 
studies of public administration and political science were both largely rooted in 
questions of governmental accountability (e.g. Wilson 1887).  Thus, examining the 
determinants of governmental responsiveness and accountability is a worthwhile 
endeavor.   
Political Assessment 
Much of the policy literature assumes that public policy is the result of 
interactions among a set of connected actors whose preferences, goals, and choices 
shape policy outputs and outcomes.  These actors are often conceptually arranged by 
hierarchy, functional levels, or temporal stages; yet, regardless of how they are 
organized, the ultimate process is that of a circular system.  That is, decision-makers 
base their current decisions, in part, on their assessment of past outputs.  This process of 
assessment is a key aspect of public policy making in virtually all of the policy literature, 
although it may have different labels.  Figure 1.1 depicts three prominent theoretical 
frameworks of the policy process.  Easton (1965) envisioned the policy process as a 
system where the external environment placed pressures on political systems.  These 
environmental inputs take the form of either demands or support, which then enter the 
political system, resulting in outputs (i.e. the black box model of public policy).   
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Figure 1.1.   
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However, a vital component to Easton’s model is the feedback loop by which 
system outputs then shape the inputs as policy stakeholders and decision-makers adjust 
their policy preferences and choices.  Anderson’s (1990) stages framework also 
explicitly incorporates policy evaluation as a key component to the policy making 
process.  Furthermore, Lynn, Heinrich and Hill (2001) also argue that political 
assessment is a central aspect to governance, in that it informs legislative decision-
making.  
Yet, empirical research on bureaucratic failure argues that political actors 
infrequently pay attention to bureaucratic policy outputs and outcomes; that is, 
systematic assessment of bureaucratic activities and outputs, they argue, is not present 
(e.g., Caiden 1991; Bovens et al. 1999).  Rather, political institutions tend to only 
respond to politically salient policy outputs and outcome, and often only after massive 
failure occurs.  This suggests that the way we theoretically envision political assessment 
may not play out empirically.  Political assessment may be more sporadic than 
systematic and more selectively reactive than comprehensive.    
This project asks three general questions related to political responsiveness and 
bureaucratic accountability.  First, do political institutions actively engage in systematic 
assessment of public policy outputs and outcomes?  When bureaucratic failure occurs, 
do elected officials respond; or do they only respond when the failure is catastrophic?  
Second, to what extent does political assessment occur when the policy in question is not 
politically salient to the elected institution?  Put differently, what role does electoral 
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representation of constituent interests play in the political assessment process?  Finally, 
to what extent do bureaucratic factors constrain or facilitate the ability of elected 
officials to achieve their policy goals? 
These three broad questions are addressed in a governance framework, which 
attempts to incorporate all the levels of governance that are involved in the production of 
public policy goods and services.  Chapter II outlines this theoretical approach.  Chapter 
III examines the first question, namely, to what extent does political assessment actually 
occur.  That is, do elected institutions systematically assess policy outputs and outcomes?  
Do they systematically respond when outcomes deviate from the publics’ will as 
expressed by the preferences of elected representatives?  Furthermore, does a response 
from elected officials result in changes in administrative behavior?  Are administrative 
agencies responsive to pressures from elected institutions?  If so, is responsiveness 
reflected in changes in policy outcomes?  This chapter is innovative in that, rather than 
only examining whether bureaucratic agencies respond to political institutions, it also 
examines whether political institutions are responsive to bureaucratic behavior and 
performance.  
Chapter IV examines whether political institution respond to bureaucratic outputs 
when the policy in question is not necessarily politically salient to the general public.  In 
particular, Chapter IV considers the case where bureaucratic outputs disproportionately 
negatively affect one particular group (Latinos) compared to another (Anglos).  This 
chapter examines the role of political representation in such a case of group-specific 
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failure.  If the interests of the group that is affected are not represented in the elected 
body, do political actors still respond to the bureaucratic failure?  Chapter IV provides 
evidence highlighting the importance of descriptive representation in political 
institutions as a necessary condition for political assessment to occur when the policy 
area examined is not universally salient.  
The final empirical chapter examines the conditional nature of political influence.  
While there is still some debate over exactly how political actors influence bureaucratic 
behavior (e.g. deck-stacking, structure, etc.), the empirical evidence supporting the 
broader claim that political institutions can influence bureaucratic behavior and outputs 
is overwhelming (e.g. Wood 1988; Wood and Waterman 1991, 1994; Moe 1985).  What 
is less clear, however, is what role the bureaucracy plays in either enhancing or 
constraining political influence.  This is an area that is vastly understudied (for some 
exceptions see Whitford 2002a, 2002b; Ringquist, Worsham and Eisner 2003).  Chapter 
V examines a set of bureaucratic and managerial factors that may condition the 
relationship between political preferences and policy outputs or outcomes.   
School Districts as Political Systems 
The units of analysis for this dissertation are Texas school districts.  This project 
treats public school districts as bureaucracies and political systems.  Some may argue 
they are one but not the other, or that they are neither; hence, a brief defense of this 
nomenclature is warranted.  A scholar of bureaucracy would be hard-pressed to find a 
uniform definition in the literature of what a bureaucracy or a bureaucrat is.  Max 
  
7 
Weber’s (1946) conceptualization of bureaucracy entailed hierarchy of authority, 
specialization, procedures and authoritative jurisdiction.  Similarly, Friedrich and Cole 
(1932) argued bureaucracy is an administrative system based on professionalism and the 
formal structure of the organization.  Downs (1965) provides a more specific definition 
where he defines a bureaucrat as “any person who works for a large organization; 
receives a money income from that organization which [sic] constitutes a major part of 
his total income; is hired, promoted or retained primarily on the basis of his role 
performance; and produces outputs which [sic] cannot be evaluated on a market” (440).  
Downs contends that a bureaucrat does not inherently have to work for a bureaucracy; 
rather, it is this set of criteria that defines a bureaucrat.  Thus, while there is not a 
universal definition of what constitutes a bureaucracy, in a preponderance of instances, 
schools do fit the definitional criteria established in the literature.  Indeed, in his book 
entitled Bureaucracy, Wilson (1989) – who does not provide an actual definition of 
bureaucracy – opens the book with a chapter on “Armies, Prisons and Schools” as 
illustrations of bureaucratic agencies in America.  
In his seminal work on bureaucracy, Wilson (1989) classifies agencies into four 
types on the basis of how easily observable policy outputs (the work agencies do) and 
outcomes (the impact of that work) are.  Organizations with easily observable outputs, 
but not outcomes are considered procedural organizations; those with both highly visible 
outputs and outcomes are labeled production organizations.  Organizations where neither 
are easily observable are coping agencies, and those where policy outcomes are readily 
observed, but outputs are more vague are classified as craft organizations.  As 
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bureaucratic organizations, public schools arguably lay somewhere between craft and 
production organizations (with a greater leaning toward craft organizations) in that what 
we predominantly observe are outcomes, although some outputs are also observable.  
Since the primary interest of this project is on examining how political and bureaucratic 
organizations respond to and influence policy outcomes, schools provide an ideal 
bureaucracy to study.   
With few exceptions,1 school boards are not the first thing that comes to mind 
upon the mention of a “political institution.”  However, many public school districts do 
indeed constitute independent governments.  In an American context, far too often only 
federal or state governments are instinctively acknowledged as “governments”; yet, as 
Meier and O’Toole (2006) point out, these governments make up only 51 of the more 
than 85,000 governments in the United States.  Given this reality, more research on these 
largely ignored governments is warranted.   
School districts in Texas are democratically elected legislative bodies and as such 
are political (Tucker and Zeigler 1978).2  Lasswell (1936) concisely defined politics as 
“who gets what, when and how” – a definition that nicely fits with public education.  
Since a large portion of property taxes are used to fund public education, school boards 
possess authority to set local property tax rates – an issue that is highly political in every 
sense of the word.  In the 2006-07 school year, total expenditures for Texas public 
                                                 
1
 Kenneth J. Meier is a likely exception to this generalization (see Meier and Stewart 1991; Meier, 
England and Stewart 1989; Meier and O’Toole 2006). 
2
 All but one Texas school district has an elected school board.   
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school districts topped $43.3 billion, of which over $19 billion (or 48% of total revenue) 
were procured from local taxes (Texas Education Agency, Financial Reports).  Put in 
perspective, Texas public K-12 educational expenditures in 2007 were higher than the 
GDPs of 140 countries – or two-thirds of the world’s nations - in the same year (The 
World Factbook).  When dealing with these levels of money, politics will inevitably be 
involved. 
Political conflict is an inherent aspect to education policy and managing public 
schools.  The position of school superintendent has been said to be a “position born of 
conflict” (Knezevich 1975, 373), and whose nature is “living with conflict” (Blumberg 
1985).  A superintendent’s ability to acknowledge and manage political conflict is 
essential for success within the school district (Hoyle and Skrla 1999).  In his book on 
superintendents and conflict, Arthur Blumberg (1985) quotes a superintendent as saying 
the following in reference to the political nature of the job: 
It’s political, highly political….It’s a terribly political job….In graduate 
school we took a course in the politics of education.  What a joke!  The 
whole [expletive] thing is political (p. 53).    
This illustrates the political nature of modern public education. 
This project proceeds by laying out the theoretical framework for the dissertation, 
namely, the logic of governance.  Chapter III offers the first empirical test of the 
determinants of political responsiveness, paying particular attention to the role of 
bureaucratic failure and policy salience.  Chapter IV replicates the findings in Chapter 
III, but incorporates the concept of representation and its role in recognizing bureaucratic 
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failure and responding to it.  The final empirical chapter (Chapter V) moves the analysis 
to an examination of how bureaucratic factors can moderate the ability of political actors 
to achieve their goals.  This chapter enriches our understanding of the nature of political 
influence by explicitly incorporating the bureaucracy in the theoretical and empirical 
analysis – a consideration that is rarely taken in the traditional political control literature.    
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CHAPTER II  
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Although political control of the bureaucracy is both a normative and empirical 
concern for politicians, public administrators, and scholars alike, research on political 
control has advanced in different ways across different disciplines.  Political scientists 
tend to focus on institutional interactions between elected/political institutions and 
primarily employ formal theoretical models (McCubbins, Noll, Weingast 1989; Moe 
1989; Epstein and O’Halloran 1999).  Alternatively, public administration scholars focus 
on the complexities of bureaucratic organizations, but are largely not concerned with the 
actions and motivations of political institutions and how such actions relate to 
organizational performance.  Unlike public administration scholars, political scientists 
tend to ignore the role and preferences of the bureaucracy.   
This project adopts a broader approach that incorporates both political 
institutions as well as bureaucratic ones.  It examines the motivations of political actors 
and how these motivations relate to political oversight of bureaucratic performance.  
While most literature on political control conceptualizes the relationship between 
political institutions and bureaucratic ones as simply hierarchical, this project views this 
relationship as dynamic and interactive.  Instead of only being concerned with how 
political actions influence bureaucratic ones, this dissertation is innovative in that it also 
examines how bureaucratic actions influence political behavior.   
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The starting point for this project is to adopt a broad framework for examining 
these interactions.  More specifically, this dissertation borrows from the logic of 
governance, as articulated by Lynn, Heinrich and Hill (2001).  However, before this 
approach is put forward, a brief discussion of the prevailing approach is warranted; 
namely, principal-agent theory. 
Principal-Agent Theory and Political Control  
Scholars have paid considerable attention to the issue of political control of the 
bureaucracy employing several approaches and numerous theories attempting to answer 
the question of how political institutions (legislatures, presidents, courts) control 
bureaucratic agencies.  This question has normative implications rooted in notions of 
representation and democratic accountability.  The classic scholarly debate between 
Herman Finer (1941) and Carl Friedrich (1940) explicitly dealt with these normative 
implications.  Friedrich advocated for less political control of the bureaucracy, arguing 
politics is an integral part of implementation and, thus, the only way to achieve good 
policy is to promote administrative responsibility to both the public and to the scientific 
profession.  Herman Finer, alternatively, argued for direct accountability of 
administrators to democratic institutions.  His contention was that it is not the proper 
function of administrators to determine what is in the public’s interest; rather, this is the 
duty of elected officials.  In democracies, the public should have the “power to exact 
obedience to orders” (337).  Thus, he argued the bureaucracy should be responsive 
directly to elected institutions and this would be the measure of moral responsibility.  
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This debate continues today and the normative implications related to bureaucratic 
discretion are implicit in much of the ongoing political control research.  
The principal-agent paradigm (or agency theory) is perhaps the most common 
framework used by political scientists to study political control of the bureaucracy.  This 
approach has its roots in economic theory and, in one early application was examine to 
the relationship between drivers and auto insurance companies (Spence & Zeckhauser 
1971; see Miller 2005 for a review of principal-agent theory and its applications in 
political science).  The principal-agent model is essentially a theory about contracts 
between actors (Waterman & Meier 1998), where one actor (the principal) forms a 
contract with another (the agent) in which the latter engages in some costly action that 
benefits the former.  However, the principal is unable to absolutely enforce the 
agreement and ensure that the agent will act in the principal’s best interest because of an 
informational asymmetry between the principal and the agent.  The principal-agent 
model also assumes that there is also an divergence in the preferences of the two actors.  
Since the agent will likely incur costs when performing the action that benefits the 
principal, the agent will prefer to shirk, but, in order to prevent such shirking, the 
principal can engage in costly monitoring and/or provide the agent with incentives to 
offset the agent’s costs.3   
A great deal of the literature on political control has used this general framework, 
albeit with some modifications made over the years.  Under this approach, elected 
                                                 
3
 For a more detail list of the canonical assumptions of agency theory, see Miller (2005). 
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institutions – most commonly legislatures and/or the president - are the principals and 
bureaucracies the agents.4  Agencies are entrusted with carrying out the wishes of their 
political principals; however, due to informational advantages the bureaucratic agencies 
have over the political principal, the principal cannot be sure if the agent is acting in its 
best interest (i.e., moral hazard).5  To ensure compliance, the principal may employ a 
combination of monitoring, rewards, and punishments.   
For example, Congress may have policy preferences with respect to enforcement 
of environmental protection laws.  However, if the Environmental Protection Agency – 
the agency entrusted with enforcing these laws – has divergent preferences, it may not 
enforce the laws in a manner that is consistent with Congressional wishes.  It is difficult 
for Congress, however, to know with certainty whether the EPA is indeed performing its 
duties.  Congress, in turn, has set up a variety of monitoring and reporting requirements 
in an attempt to ensure the EPA is not shirking.  The effectiveness of these mechanisms 
is, of course, an open question that numerous studies have assessed.  Thus, the principal-
agent paradigm, then, suggests that a political actor’s ability to control the bureaucracy is 
problematic and it raises interesting questions about how political principals can ensure 
that bureaucrats will implement policies in accordance with the intent of the elected 
institution.   
                                                 
4
 Principal-agent theory has also been applied to the relationship between legislators and their constituents 
where legislators are the agent. 
5
 The information asymmetry assumption presumes that the principal cannot readily observe the actions of 
the agent, although it can observe outcomes.  Thus, unless the principal engages in monitoring, he or she 
must rely on outcomes in determining whether the agent is shirking.   
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A considerable amount of research suggests that Congress can and does influence, 
or even control the bureaucracy.6  This literature has theoretically articulated and 
empirically tested multiple means Congress uses to achieve this task and has found that, 
consistent with the principal-agent theory, Congress does offer incentives – both rewards 
and punishments – to bureaucratic agencies (Weingast and Moran 1983).  Weingast 
(1984) argues that Congress uses incentives such as budgetary appropriations as a means 
of eliciting desired bureaucratic behavior.  The effectiveness of incentives, however, is 
questionable, and there is evidence suggesting that bureaucracies are not always 
responsive to political principals (e.g., Wood 1988).  
Congress also monitors bureaucratic activities (Waterman and Wood 1993).  
While, exhaustive monitoring (i.e., gathering complete information on agency behavior) 
is prohibitively expensive, Bendor, Taylor and Van Gaalen (1985) argue that monitoring 
itself – regardless of the quality of monitoring – can reduce bureaucratic shirking due to 
the uncertainty it creates for the bureaucrat.7  Just as the strategic placement of a vacant 
police cruiser at the edge of many small towns in rural American results in a sea of brake 
lights by would-be speeders, so can the possibility of an audit can prevent bureaucratic 
drift and/or shirking.  However, others have argued that Congress does not engage in 
                                                 
6
 The definition of control is often not explicitly defined.  The concept of control can rest on the notion of 
coercive power (e.g., A getting B to do something B would not otherwise do), or simply on controlling 
outcomes (which may or may not involve coercion) or could simply be a correlation between observable 
preferences and outcomes.  
7
 They argue that monitoring makes it more difficult for the bureaucrat to predict whether he or she will be 
caught shirking.  Since bureaucrats are thought to be risk-adverse, this uncertainty will make them less 
likely to be deceptive.    
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adequate oversight of bureaucratic behavior (Bibby 1966, 1968; Ogul 1976; Pearson 
1975; Ripley and Franklin 1991; however, see Aberbach 1990).   
Alternatively, McCubbins and Schwartz (1984) claim that “police patrol” 
oversight (e.g., congressional hearings) is not needed, arguing that Congress can employ 
“fire alarm” oversight in which constituents and interest groups are enabled to monitor 
bureaucrats (via rules and procedures) and alert agencies, courts or Congress when 
agents violate congressional goals.  This allows Congress to keep bureaus in check, 
while not having to dedicate valuable time and resources to police patrol oversight.  
While some empirical evidence has been marshaled in support of this theory (e.g., Lupia 
and McCubbins 1994), others remain skeptical.  Bawn (1994), for example, argues that 
the credibility of interest-group initiated fire alarms is dubious, thus, undermining the 
likelihood of congressional action.8  Additionally, given the amount of attention the 
average citizen pays to politics and the absence of general political knowledge among 
the public (see Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996), it seems unlikely that “fire alarms” 
would serve as an adequate check on bureaucratic behavior.  Indeed, Cook and Wood 
(1989) found the EPA mobilized interest groups in order to manipulate Congress – the 
opposite of what the fire alarms theory suggests should occur.  Yet, even if the public 
does not routinely sound fire alarms, it is still possible the threat of their use – as with 
monitoring – may effectively keep bureaucratic agents in check.   
                                                 
8
 Meier, Polinard and Wrinkle (1999) argue the theory is incomplete, and they add the notion of “smoke 
detectors,” which are applicable to bottom-line policy areas.  
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Congressional sanctions and oversight are examples of ex post controls, that is, 
controls that are reactive to bureaucratic behavior.  Scholars have also argued that ex 
ante controls can be used and are perhaps more effective and efficient.  McCubbins, Noll 
and Weingast (1987, 1989) argue that the most effective forms of control are ex ante 
controls in the form of administrative procedures and rules.  They argue that 
administrative procedures can increase bureaucratic accountability by allowing 
constituency participation, thus incorporating legislative preferences into policies.  
Additionally, legislators can protect the interests of favored constituents via 
administrative procedures, effectively “stacking the deck” in favor of certain interests 
over time.  They also argue that the structural arrangements of the agency will result in a 
political environment that “mirrors” the politics at the time of enactment.  This 
environment will be biased toward the interests of favored groups, and will exhibit a 
lasting “autopilot” characteristic in that the agency will change as the preferences of the 
favored group change.  Similarly, Moe (1989) claims that the conflictual nature of 
politics will lead to the creation of agencies with structures that lend to inefficiency.  
Knowing they will not be in power forever, political winning coalitions attempt to 
“hardwire” their preferences into the agency’s structure and insulate it from politics so 
that future coalitions cannot reverse their decisions.  A prominent example – albeit a 
political one - of attempts at hardwiring preferences is the political infighting that occurs 
over the selection of Supreme Court Justices. 
Mashaw (1990), however, argues that since administrative procedures include the 
participation of interest groups from both winning and losing coalitions, administrative 
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procedures are unlikely to favor either group.9  Indeed, empirical evidence of so-called 
“deck-stacking” has been mixed.  Balla (1998), for example, finds little evidence of 
deck-stacking in heath care financing, and drinking water policy (Balla and Wright 2001) 
during the rule-making process.  However, Whitford (2002) found that the level of 
agency centralization (i.e., structure) significantly influences bureaucratic 
responsiveness.  
The role of structure and process is also undermined by the apparent influence 
political actors have on bureaucratic performance.  If structure and procedures lock in 
preferences, we should not expect to see bureaucratic outputs significantly shift as 
partisan control of congress changes.  However, Scholz and Wood (1998) find that IRS 
audits are responsive to partisan changes in both Congress and the presidency.  Likewise, 
Wood and Waterman (1993, 1994) find that congressional hearings (as well as 
presidential statements and court rulings) can significantly influence bureaucratic 
behavior.  That said, bureaucratic structure is certainly not unimportant; rather, it may 
not be influential in the manner depicted by McCubbins, Noll and Weingast (1987, 
1989), i.e., deck-stacking and hardwiring.  Likewise, Hammond and Knott (1996) argue 
that the level of agency autonomy affects the form of control it faces.  Structure, then, 
appears to act as a buffer from political control, but does not necessarily negate it.  
While agency theory has been valuable in providing insights to interactions 
between political and administrative institutions, critics contend that it is often overly 
                                                 
9
 Also see Horn & Shepsle (1989) and Arnold (1987) for criticisms of McNollgast’s claims. 
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simplistic and largely ignores the bureaucracy itself.  Indeed, principal-agent models of 
political control are almost exclusive top-down models in political science research.  The 
focus is largely, if not entirely, on the preferences of the political principals rather than 
the bureaucrats.  Being that agency theory often assumes there is goal conflict between 
principals and agents, it is peculiar that the bureaucrats’ preferences are rarely dealt with 
in these models (Meier and O’Toole 2006).  Alternatively, treatments of political control 
by public administration scholars tend to be much more in depth concerning 
characteristics of the bureaucracy and prefer a bottom-up rather than a top-down 
approach (e.g. West 1995, Furlong 1998).   
This project adopts a different approach in examining political influence of 
public policy performance.  Recognizing that the policy process is complex, involving 
multiple actors, stages, and levels, this project begins with a broad governance 
framework.  Governance is a broad term that incorporates all that goes into the 
production of public goods and services; it includes structures, preferences, and 
institutions - public and private, political and bureaucratic.   
A Governance Framework 
In their book, Improving Governance, Lynn, Heinrich and Hill present a 
theoretical framework of governance. Governance, as the authors put it, refers to “the 
means for achieving direction, control, and coordination of wholly or partially 
autonomous individuals or organizational units on behalf of interests to which they 
jointly contribute” (Lynn, Heinrich and Hill 2001, pg. 6).  Governance, then, entails 
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systematic interactions between institutional entities, while also encompassing the larger 
environment in which institutions exercise their authority in achieving their goals.  
Governance includes the “regimes of laws, rules, judicial decisions, and administrative 
practices that constrain, prescribe and enable the provision of public supported goods 
and services” (Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill, 2001 pg. 7).   
The logic of governance outlined by Lynn, Heinrich and Hill incorporates all the 
factors that play a role in the production of public policy goods and services.  In its 
simplest form, the logic of governance places these factors into three broad categories: 
Legislative Choice, Governance, and Political Assessment.  Figure 2.1 displays this 
simplified model of governance.   
 
Legislative Choice 
Governance 
Political 
Assessment 
Figure 2.1 
A Simplified Logic of Governance 
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As the diagram implies, governance is an ongoing cyclical process involving 
multiple stages.  Legislative preferences and choices are the product of legislative 
coalitions that develop in response to the interests of citizens and stakeholders.  
Legislative coalitions are often vital in the design of agencies.  As mentioned above, a 
considerable amount of theoretical and empirical research has examined legislative 
“deck-stacking” – a legislative coalition’s attempt to create structures, procedures, or 
rules that favor a particular group above others (McCubbins, Noll and Weingast 1987, 
1989; Bawn 1995; Balla 1998; Balla and Wright 2001).  Such “deck-stacking” may have 
real world implications on agency management and outputs.   
Lynn, Heinrich and Hill argue that these legislative choices influence the 
implementation of policy.  This occurs at multiple levels of the implementation 
process – from administrative executives to middle managers to street-level 
bureaucrats – via both ex ante and ex post controls, which are attempts to either preempt 
or respond to bureaucratic behavior that departs from legislative preferences 
(McCubbins and Schwartz 1984).  This broad category labeled governance also includes 
the core tasks agencies perform as well as the results and outputs that results from such 
work.  The process does not end once outputs are realized, however.  Rather, political 
actors, citizens and stakeholders assess the performance of administrative agencies, and 
this process then informs future legislative decisions. 
While governance is cyclical, it is decidedly hierarchical.  Figure 2.2 presents a 
more complex model of governance.  Legislatures form their policy preferences and 
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choices based, in part, on the political preferences and interests in the global 
environment often expressed by the public.  Legislative preferences shape the laws that 
create the structures, processes and regimes that guide public agencies.  The 
administration and management of these agencies – both of which are directly affected 
by the formal structure and processes created by legislation – influence the core 
technologies, “primary work,” and outcomes of the organizations.  Arguably, this could 
be broken down into at least two distinct stages or levels, namely, primary work and 
outputs/outcomes.  Finally, the outcomes are subject to political assessment, which, in 
turn, informs the decisions of political actors in their future decisions.   
While the logic of governance as articulated by Lynn, Heinrich and Hill is not a 
theory, it is a framework designed to serve as a heuristic by organizing and simplifying 
the complexity of the public sector.  It incorporates environmental, political, institutional, 
managerial and technical levels of governance and provides a framework for thinking 
about politics and public administration in a systematic manner.   
This project proceeds by asking two broad questions with respect to this 
framework.  The first inquires to what extent political assessment occurs.  That is, do 
political institutions or actors systematically assess policy outputs and outcomes?  Do 
they systematically respond when outcomes deviate from the stated goals of the political 
institution?  Furthermore, does a response from elected officials result in changes in 
administrative behavior?  Research on political control typically views the relationship 
between political actors, public administrators and policy outcomes as hierarchical and 
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often unidirectional.  This project, however, approaches these relationships in a more 
complex and interactive way.  It is interested in how managerial actions, policy outputs 
and policy outcomes result in changing political actions.   
 
The second broad question of interest to this research seeks to understand what 
conditions – environmental, political, managerial, or organizational – facilitate or 
Global/Environmental/
Cultural Context 
Political Interests, 
Legislative Choices 
Governance 
Regimes 
Management 
Strategies 
Primary Work and 
Its Results/Outcomes 
Political 
Assessment 
Figure 2.2 
A Complex Model of Governance 
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constrain political influence over policy outcomes.  Are there organizational or 
managerial traits or conditions that allow elected officials to be more influential in 
shaping policy outcomes?  What role does management play in limiting or facilitating 
political influence?  As mentioned above, this approach does not simply examine the 
relationship between political actors and policy outcomes as a strictly hierarchical, 
unidirectional process.  Rather, it is interested in the dynamics between managers and 
elected policy-makers and the circumstances under which we are most likely to see 
congruence between political preferences and policy outcomes.  
Performance Failure and Political Responsiveness  
The first empirical chapter (Chapter III) of this dissertation examines political 
responsiveness to bureaucratic failure.  There are numerous examples of political actors 
responding to instances of bureaucratic failure.  Elected officials met the Space Shuttle 
Challenger and Columbia disasters with intense scrutiny.  The latter case resulted in the 
suspension of all NASA space shuttle launches for nearly 30 months, while the 
Challenger disaster resulted in a 32-month hiatus in space shuttle launches.  Internal and 
external investigations ensued including a Presidential commission (Rogers 
Commission), Congressional hearings, as well as independent investigations (Columbia 
Accident Investigation Board).   
The question this investigation is interested in, however, is whether political 
responsiveness systematically occurs.  Or, does it only occur in instances of massive 
failure?  That is, do political actors engage in political assessment of policies and, more 
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importantly, do they respond when policies are not satisfactory, but not necessarily 
disastrous.  Much of the political control literature focuses on the question of whether 
political actions change bureaucratic performance.  Chapter III, alternatively, inquires 
whether bureaucratic performance changes political behavior.   
With respect to the governance framework, Chapter III is interested in the final 
level/stage of governance (see Figure 2.3).  Do the results and outcomes produced by 
bureaucratic agencies result in changes in the behavior and choices of elected institutions?  
Political assessment, arguably, is an ongoing and ubiquitous process.  Indeed, political 
institutions frequently set up accountability systems designed to monitor agency 
efficiency, effectiveness and equity.  The federal government has created several such 
systems including the current Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART), which 
evaluates the performance of federal programs.  State and local agencies also establish 
such systems for policy evaluation.  The question Chapter III is concerned with, however, 
is do political actors and institutions respond to these assessment systems.  The creation 
of an assessment system in and of itself is not evidence that political assessment is 
occurring.  Good governance presumes that political behavior and choices respond to 
policy assessment – either positively or negatively.    
There are a number of reasons we would expect political institutions to be 
responsive to policy failure.  Indeed, research on Congress points to a number of 
incentives that should lead to political oversight, with the dominant two being concerned 
with reelection (e.g. Mayhew 1974) and public policy preferences (e.g. Mayhew 1974, 
  
26 
Fenno 1973, 1978).  Chapter III examines these political incentives and how they relate 
to political responsiveness to bureaucratic performance.  
 
Chapter III also examines what effect political action has on future bureaucratic 
performance.  In theory, political responsiveness will result in changes in managerial and 
organizational behavior, producing (hopefully) improvements in future performance.  
Political action could involve changes in agency heads, budgets, structures, processes or 
goals.  Such changes are to result in improvements in areas where past deficiencies 
Political Interests, 
Legislative Choices 
Governance Regimes 
Management 
Strategies 
Primary Work and Its 
Results/Outcomes 
Political Assessment 
Figure 2.3 
Chapter III: Performance and Political Assessment  
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existed.  The arrows on the right-hand portion of Figure 2.3 depict this process.  This 
chapter examines whether political actions do indeed produce changes in managerial 
strategies and, ultimately, future agency performance.   
Although the question of whether political assessment occurs is a core issue in 
ensuring proper governance, it has not been thoroughly examined in the political science, 
public policy or public administration literatures.  Political institutions, as 
representatives of the public, are intended to ensure that public policy outcomes are in 
the public’s best interest.  This presumes that political assessment is occurring at some 
level.  Chapter III seeks to examine whether this is indeed the case.   
Political Representation and Political Responsiveness 
Theoretically, we expect political institutions to be responsive presumably 
because they have political incentives to do so.  Such incentives, either electoral or 
policy related, are the primary catalyst for political responsiveness to agency failure.  
However, does political responsiveness occur when political incentives to respond are 
absent?  When policy failures are not salient or do not affect the majority of citizens, 
does political responsiveness dissipate?   
Chapter IV addresses this question by focusing on policy outcomes important to 
Latinos, a group whose political interests are often underrepresented in electoral 
institutions.  Chapter IV replicates the analysis of Chapter III except it examines outputs 
and outcomes specific to Latinos.  The theoretical considerations developed in Chapter 
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IV posit that political responsiveness is unlikely to occur unless the interests of Latinos 
are represented in the elected body.  If representation is present, however, political 
intervention would be more likely to occur.  Furthermore, policy outputs are likely to 
change as a consequence of such intervention.   
Both Chapter III and IV, then, attempt to assess whether political assessment 
occurs, as suggested by the governance framework.  The idea of political assessment is 
integral to much of the public policy literature.  Students are taught that political 
assessment occurs and the “feedback loop” depicted in Figure 2.3 is part of the policy-
making process.  But is this really the case?  Indeed, there are numerous oversight 
institutions and accountability systems in both federal and local government.  The 
process of political assessment, however, entails more than monitoring and collecting 
performance data.  Rather, political assessment presumes that the behavior and choices 
of elected representatives act in response to these assessment tools.  If they do not, then 
political assessment, as presented in public policy theory, is not really occurring.   
Political Influence and Public Managers 
In their highly acclaimed book Bureaucratic Dynamics, Dan Wood and Richard 
Waterman (1994) examine political influence over a number of federal agencies.  They 
measure the extent of political influence as the magnitude of the relationship between 
political preferences and policy outputs.  Using time series analysis, they examined 
whether political actions (political appointees, budget cuts, etc.) resulted in changes in 
policy outputs. They inferred the extent to which political actions did result in changes in 
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outputs represented political influence on bureaucratic agencies.  They concluded that 
political institutions can and do exert control over the bureaucracy.  Their evidence was 
so compelling they summarized the work by writing: 
We believe this evidence for active political control is so strong that 
controversy should now end over whether political control occurs . . . . 
Future research should turn toward exploring the determinants of political 
control. (Wood and Waterman 1991: 822)  
Sixteen years have passed and this scholarly challenge has largely gone 
unaddressed.  Engaging this challenge would entail an examination of environmental, 
bureaucratic, structural, and managerial conditions that may enhance or impede political 
influence.  That is, it conceptually corresponds with the logic of governance framework 
where one could account for multiple levels of governance rather than solely the link 
between political action and policy outputs and outcomes.  More specifically, it requires 
that we examine how the relationship between political actions and policy outcomes is 
conditional on other factors, such as structure and management.   
One of the difficulties in exploring the determinants of political influence in this 
manner empirically is that it requires a dataset that has considerable variation across 
environmental, organizational, and managerial characteristics.  The data Wood and 
Waterman utilize, while providing temporal variation, is comprised of only a handful of 
agencies, thus limiting the degree to variation across bureaucratic units.  Fortunately, the 
data employed in this analysis includes over 1000 different bureaucratic units, providing 
substantial variation across agencies.   
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In keeping with the governance framework, the final empirical chapter (Chapter 
V) addresses Wood and Waterman’s challenge from a governance approach.  Rather 
than simply examining the direct relationship between political preferences and policy 
outcomes as much of the traditional political control literature does, this analysis 
examines how other levels of governance condition this relationship.  While traditional 
political control literature has only examined the direct effect of political preferences on 
policy outcomes (as depicted on the left-hand side of Figure 2.4), this project examines 
how the other levels of governance are important in determining the extent and nature of 
political influence on policy outcomes.  This is something the traditionally political 
Environmental/ 
Cultural Context 
Political Interests,  
Legislative Choices 
Governance Regimes 
Management 
Strategies 
Policy Outputs/ 
Outcomes 
Traditional Political Control Approach 
Political 
Influence 
Primary/Technical 
Work 
Governance Approach 
Figure 2.4 
Chapter V.  Determinants of Political Influence 
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control literature does not address, but needs to in order to engage Wood and 
Waterman’s challenge appropriately.    
Conclusion 
The aim of this project is to enhance our understanding of the complex 
relationship between political actors, public managers and policy outcomes.  Since the 
most prolific paradigm to studying political influence of policy outcomes (i.e. principal-
agent theory) largely ignores the many other levels of the policy process, a new approach 
is warranted.  My hope is that by using a broader, more inclusive framework – namely, 
the logic of governance – our knowledge of the complexities of these relationships will 
improve.   
This project also contributes to the literature in other important ways.  A critical 
part of governance is political assessment, where political institutions are thought to 
respond to the results and outcomes bureaucratic agencies produce –a process that 
allows politicians to update their information regarding the real-world effects of their 
policy-making decisions.  Arguably, political assessment is as important as any of the 
other levels of governance.  With a simple but fundamental test, chapter III empirically 
examines whether political responsiveness does indeed occur.  Chapter IV further 
extends this analysis to include political responsiveness to historically underrepresented 
groups – namely Latinos.  
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By taking up Wood and Waterman’s challenge, this project is also one of the first 
to examine not only whether political institutions can be influential in shaping public 
policy outcomes, but under what conditions their influence is facilitated or constrained.  
Using a large n dataset with numerous distinct bureaucratic organizations provides 
considerable variation on environmental organizational and managerial characteristics, 
which gives us the leverage needed to test for the determinants of political influence.  
This is a feet that has been met with little success thus far due to the high data 
requirement needed for such analysis.  
This dissertation is also notable for at least two additional reasons. First, it 
focuses on local levels of government, rather than the federal government as the vast 
majority of political influence research does.  While the federal government is certainly 
worthy of attention, local governments are far more ubiquitous and more directly affect 
the lives of citizens.  Therefore, having a more complete understanding of local levels of 
government will contribute to more effective, efficient, and equitable governance.  
Finally, this work deals with education policy, which is an important and highly salient 
substantive policy area.  Indeed, virtually all Americans are directly exposed in one way 
or another to our educational system, so to the extent that we can better understand 
education policy we can improve the lives of citizens in a meaningful way. 
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CHAPTER III 
PERFORMANCE FAILURE AND POLITICAL RESPONSIVENESS 
In January of 2008, the Cincinnati Public School District fired the principal and 
all teachers at Taft Elementary School due to poor performance on standardized tests.  
The pass rates on state mandated exams at Taft Elementary were, on average, 20 points 
below the school district average, and the school failed to meet test standards for nine 
consecutive years. This prolonged failure prompted the en masse firings.  In February 
2008, Dallas Independent School District fired 25 teachers in two elementary and five 
high schools because of poor performance on test scores.  Additionally, there are 
numerous instances of superintendents being fired or bought out of their contracts due to 
poor performance.  In 1999, the student pass rate on the state exam at San Antonio ISD – 
one of the state’s largest school districts – was 17 points below the state average.  An 
unhappy school board voted in favor of buying out the superintendent’s contract at a cost 
of $800,000.  This move violated state law, which does not allow buyouts for more than 
the value of one-year’s salary and benefits.  This resulted in SAISD loosing a portion of 
their state funds as a penalty for the buyout.  Indeed, between July 2005 and July 2007 
alone, 12 Texas public school districts spent over $2.4 million on superintendent buyouts 
(see Ray and Marshall 2006; Hoyle and Skrla 1999).   
Similar to these school districts, there are also numerous examples of intense 
political responses to poor bureaucratic performance in the federal government.  In the 
wake of Hurricane Katrina, for example, the public was inundated with horror stories of 
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the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) inadequate response to the 
devastation left behind.  Members of Congress lashed out on FEMA’s debacle and, in 
particular, FEMA chief Michael Brown, resulting in his resignation.  Elected officials 
promptly called for an investigation and suddenly federal emergency disaster response 
was one of the nation’s top priorities.  In 2007, administrators at the Walter Reed Army 
Medical Center found themselves in a scandal surrounding the lack of quality care Iraq 
War veterans had received.  The resulting political scrutiny included congressional 
hearings, a visit by President Bush and several independent investigations and led to the 
resignations of a number of high-ranking military officials, including generals and the 
Secretary of the Army.   
These anecdotes suggest that elected officials do respond to poor bureaucratic 
performance.  However, do these political responses only occur when the failure is so 
substantial that ignoring it would be political suicide?  Indeed, in many of these cases, 
political interest intensified only after the media called attention to the failure. The first 
question this chapter examines is whether elected institutions respond to poor 
bureaucratic performance in a systematic fashion.  Is the likelihood of political 
intervention contingent on bureaucratic performance, where lower levels of past 
performance are associated with higher levels of intervention?  The second question this 
chapter examines is whether such intervention results in a change in managerial behavior.  
Finally, does increased political involvement lead to improved future performance?   
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Bureaucratic Failure 
Of prime interest to this research is the notion of bureaucratic failure.  Much of 
the literature on bureaucratic failure seeks to understand the causes of failure.  Studies 
have examined the role of factors such as bureaucratic capacity and leadership in 
influencing bureaucratic performance, in addition to a host of other factors (organization 
structure, goal clarity/conflict; see Pierce 1981). For the purposes of this analysis, 
however, the cause of bureaucratic failure is unimportant.  Rather, this project is 
interested in the role political institutions play in responding to such failure.   
Bureaucratic failure, for the purposes of this project, is when a bureaucratic 
agency’s performance on some measure is significantly below typical levels.  This 
definition acknowledges that the agency may be performing well on other 
dimensions.  That is, this definition does not mean that the agency has failed on many or 
all dimensions and is facing closure (e.g. as in the case of market failure).  Indeed, it may 
be that administrators are unaware of the failure, as will be discussed in Chapter IV.   
This definition of failure is also distinct from political failure.  Bovens et al. 
(1999) distinguish program failure from political failure using the following definitions: 
[A] program failure pertains to the technocratic dimension of policy-making and 
organizational behavior.  It occurs when a policy decision, plan, or strategy fails 
to have the desired impact on target populations or even produces major 
unintended and unwanted effects.  A political failure, in contrast, does not 
involve the social consequences of policies but, rather, the way in which policies 
are perceived in the court of public opinion and the political arena (Bovens et al. 
1999, 123). 
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These two failures may or may not coincide.  It is possible, for example, for a program 
to perform well in terms of its stated goals, yet that program could still be considered a 
political failure.  Alternatively, a program could be costly, inefficient and ineffective, yet 
it may not be considered a failure by political actors.  This project is interested with the 
performance of agencies in terms of the outputs and outcomes produced and the extent 
to which these outputs and outcomes are consistent with the goals of the program or 
organization; that is, program performance and failure.  The question is, do political 
actors respond to such performance, or do they only respond to political failures and 
policy fiascos? While there are reasons to suspect the latter is more often the case than 
the former, elected officials and institutions do have incentives to respond.  A brief 
discussion of these incentives is warranted.   
Incentives for Political Responsiveness 
Some argue the primary goal of elected officials is reelection (Mayhew 1974); 
hence, politicians have an electoral incentive to ensure bureaucratic agencies are 
implementing policies that comport with electoral interests.  This occurs because the 
public may hold legislators responsible for policy outcomes even when the elected 
officials are not directly at fault.  For example, presidential approval ratings – and thus 
electoral support – are often influenced by economic factors, even though the president 
may have little to do with the state of the economy (see Wood 2004).  Thus, bureaucratic 
outputs often have electoral consequences for elected officials (see Arnold 1979).  
Indeed, negative policy outputs are often brought to light by political challengers as a 
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means to garner electoral support during election campaigns (Mayhew 1974, Fenno 
1977).  Politicians, as well as political opponents, are continually searching for political 
ammunition, that is, issues that can be turned into electoral support.  Thus, elected 
officials are often conscious of bureaucratic performance particularly concerning issues 
that constituents deem important.    
Political actors often focus on bureaucratic performance (both good and bad) as a 
political tool.  Politicians often point to bureaucratic success to credit-claim in order to 
gain electoral support (Mayhew 1974).  Conversely, when bureaucratic performance 
falters, elected officials are likely shift the blame to administrators (Calvert, McCubbins 
and Weingast 1989; Fiorina 1986; Epstein and O’Halloran 1999).  This allows 
politicians to make political promises of change to constituents and potentially increase 
electoral support.  However, the blame-shifting strategy may have limited utility since 
prolonged failure is likely to have electoral consequences.  That is, if politicians do not 
follow up on their promises and the bureaucracy continues to produce lackluster results, 
the electorate may respond by electing new officials.  For this reason, it is in elected 
representatives’ interests to ensure positive bureaucratic outputs, at least in areas that are 
highly salient to the constituents.   
Policymakers can themselves construct political fiascoes.  Drawing attention to 
policy failures or even events that are out of bureaucrats’ control (e.g. flooding) can be 
in the interest of some politicians.  Indeed, the construction of many policy fiascoes is a 
“highly complex and intensely political process” (Bovens, et al. 1999, 126).  In their 
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study of a police fiasco in the Netherlands, Bovens, et al. (1999) found numerous blame 
avoidance strategies were used to deal with the failure, including blame-shifting, and 
initiating investigations to minimize political damage.   This research suggests that 
political actors do have incentives to pay attention to bureaucratic performance and, 
when possible, even shape the public’s perceptions of the failure in order to avoid blame 
or take credit for success.  
This implies that the interactions between political and bureaucratic actors, both 
in terms of content and frequency, may be contingent, in part, on bureaucratic 
performance.  That is, in situations where the bureaucracy has failed to produce positive 
outputs regarding policy areas that are salient to the public, perceptive elected officials 
may pressure public administrators to address policy programs or areas that need 
improvement before program failure translates into political failure.  Alternatively, in 
circumstances where the bureaucracy is performing well, political institutions may adopt 
a hands-off strategy as not to interfere with bureaucratic success, while still claiming the 
credit for that success.  This is what we would expect from the logic of governance.  
Theoretically, at least, elected officials engage in political assessment and monitor 
bureaucratic performance and intervene when outputs are not consistent with legislative 
goals and objectives.  That is, political behavior and actions adjust in response to 
bureaucratic outputs and policy outcomes.   
This process entails that elected representatives first identify a problem with 
bureaucratic performance.  There are a number of ways in which politicians can become 
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informed of bureaucratic failure.  Constituents often directly contact their representatives 
to voice their dissatisfaction with bureaucratic performance (i.e. fire alarms).  Likewise, 
interest groups continually keep lawmakers informed of a wide range of policy issues 
including inadequate bureaucratic outputs.  Elected officials, however, are likely to take 
notice of issues that are important to their own constituents.  That is, a politician is more 
likely to push for policy changes that will benefit her primary supporters (e.g., 
businesses, environmental groups, etc.) than she would for issues that do not affect her 
constituents.  Legislators, therefore, will carefully choose which issues to advance since 
they have limited resources dedicated to multiple goals (Fenno 1977).  The primary 
criterion for advancing a policy objective is the level of salience the issue holds to the 
representative’s primary constituency.  Gormley (1986, 1989) has argued that policy 
salience is an important predictor as to who participates in policy-making decisions. 
Additionally, Ringquist, Worsham and Eisner (2003) find that salience is important in 
determining the propensity for elected officials to attempt to influence bureaucratic 
behavior.   
Systematic versus Selective Responsiveness 
While there appear to be numerous incentives for political actors to engage in 
systematic political assessment, much of the empirical literature suggests this is not the 
case; rather, political elites respond only to political failure, which may or may not be 
due to actual program failure.  Indeed, few program failures are ever labeled policy 
failures/fiascoes by political elites, and many such failures remain unseen by all except a 
  
40 
handful of those who are directly involved (Bovens et al. 1999).  This suggests that 
political salience and visibility of the failure may be far more important than the 
magnitude and existence of the actual failure.   
In an article on public maladministration, Gerald Caiden (1991) lists 175 
“bureaupathologies” ranging from abuse of power to discrimination to tokenism to red 
tape (492).  These bureaupathologies often result in organizational inefficiency, an 
inability to adjust to environmental changes and gradual atrophy.  Caiden contends that 
that maladministration and bureaupathologies often continue undetected until something 
goes horribly wrong and massive failure occurs.  It is only then that officials finally 
address the problems that led to the failure.  There are numerous anecdotes that confirm 
this general pattern.  The Space Shuttle Program failed to launch space shuttles on 
numerous occasions due to technical problems; arguably, this is an indication that 
something was wrong.  However, these instances of failure were widely ignored.  It was 
only after devastating catastrophes occurred that political elites took a serious look at the 
program’s performance and management.  Similarly, Dunsire and Hood (1989) find that 
little is done to prevent the occurrence or reoccurrence of bureaupathologies.  
Unfortunately, there is very little research on bureaucratic failure, and especially 
political responses to failure.  Most of the literature on bureaucratic failure, or 
maladministration deals with either categorizing types of failure, or is interested in the 
causes of failure.  Pierce (1981), for example, developed 75 hypotheses predicting the 
causes of bureaucratic failure.  Little research, however, has examined political 
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responses to bureaucratic failure.  Hence, little is know about whether elected officials 
systematically respond to poor bureaucratic performance – as we would expect 
theoretically – or only respond to instances of massive failure as much of the empirical 
evidence seems to suggest.  The current literature on this topic, then, presents 
contradictory expectations.   
Based on this logic, we can generate testable hypotheses concerning the 
interaction between an elected institution and an administrative one.  If political elites 
systematically engage in political assessment and respond to bureaucratic performance, 
we should expect the level of interaction between elected officials and public managers 
to increase as bureaucratic performance declines.  As argued above, this may result 
because elected officials fear that bureaucratic failure could aid electoral challengers and 
perhaps lead to a loss of votes in the next election.  Alternatively, political elites 
ostensibly would rather not deal with the embarrassment and public scrutiny involved 
with a policy fiasco, especially if the public holds them responsible.  In an attempt to 
prevent bureaucratic failure from being used against them politically, assiduous 
politicians will pressure public administrators to focus their energy on ameliorating the 
particular areas of bureaucratic performance that have been found wanting.  Such 
pressure necessitates increased contact, if not coordination, between administrators and 
elected officials.  The alternative hypothesis is that argued by Caiden (1991), Bovens, et 
al. (1999) and others, where political actors tend to respond only after massive failure 
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has occurred and program failure has become political failure.10  Using a simple but 
fundamental test, this chapter examines whether political intervention – as expressed via 
political-administrative interactions – is influenced by bureaucratic performance.   
Policy Salience 
As noted above, past research has found that policy salience is an important 
factor in predicting political behavior (Gormley 1986, 1989; Ringquist, Worsham and 
Eisner 2003; Bawn 1997).  Calvert, McCubbins and Weingast (1989) argue that in 
policy areas deemed more important, politicians will limit agency discretion in an 
attempt to lower uncertainty.  Others also argue that political institutions will more 
ardently attempt to influence bureaucratic behavior directly in policy areas that are 
highly salient, particularly when public preferences are uniform (Spence 1997; Bawn 
1997; Epstein and O’Halloran 1994).  Ringquist, Worsham and Eisner (2003), using 
Congressional data from 1949 to 1996, find that the propensity for Congress to use 
legislation aimed at changing bureaucratic behavior is higher for salient policy areas 
than non-salient policy areas.  With respect to responding to bureaucratic failure, the 
incentives and rewards for political elites to act are arguably higher for highly salient 
and visible policy areas than for less salient policies.  Furthermore, the political 
consequences for not acting (e.g. blame for failure) are both more severe and more likely 
                                                 
10
 This may be the more rational action, since most program failure goes by generally unnoticed by the 
public and media, it makes sense that political actors will only respond after it becomes a “problem” for 
the public.   
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if the failure occurs within a visible and salient policy area compared to failure within 
relatively known/unseen policy area.   
The current literature on political responsiveness to bureaucratic failure – though 
sparse – is essentially divided between research that suggests political actors should 
respond to bureaucratic failure (i.e. political incentives to respond exist) and research 
that argues political responsiveness is absent except for the most egregious instances of 
failure.  It could be, however, that policy salience is a key factor in determining whether 
political actors respond.  That is, political actors will be more likely to respond to 
bureaucratic failure if that failure occurs in a policy area or output that is salient to the 
public.  This suggests that political incentives to respond to failure are directly – and not 
surprisingly – linked to the level of salience of the policy output.   
It should be noted that the policy salience is not a clear-cut concept.  Indeed, a 
policy output or outcome may be salient to one group but not another, or one agency but 
not another.  We should expect, however, that political responsiveness will be most 
likely when the majority of the clientele or stakeholders deem the policy output in 
question is salient.  Failures in policy outputs/outcomes that are salient to particular 
groups or sub-clienteles are less likely to elicit a political response than failure in policy 
outputs/outcomes that are considered salient by the majority of the public.11   
                                                 
11
 One potentially important aspect of salience is the role of the media.  Indeed, the media can make a 
policy issues highly salient overnight.  While this project does not directly consider the effects of the 
media’s role in policy salient, it does recognize the potential for its importance. 
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Effectiveness of Political Intervention     
In addition to examining whether political elites respond to bureaucratic failure 
in a systematic manner, the second question this chapter examines is whether such 
intervention results in a change in managerial behavior and, ultimately, improved future 
performance?   
How might this work?  Political pressure from elected officials (some of whom 
have the ability to fire administrators and political appointees) lead these administrators 
to refocus their time and energy on issues and areas that need improvement.  In the case 
of the Challenger and Columbia disasters, pressure from political principals led NASA 
administrators to focus more of their attention on safety issues.  Similarly, in the late 
1950’s and 60’s, NASA’s failure to launch the first satellite into space, undoubtedly 
resulted in increased efforts and resources toward reaching the moon.  In the recent case 
of maladministration at Walter Reed Army Medical Center, political pressure has 
resulted in increased administrative efforts to improve the medical care of soldiers 
returning from Iraq.  Thus, we would expect political pressure to result in changes in 
managerial activities and priorities whereby they will refocus their attention to remedy 
the program failure.   
Looking at this from an administrative perspective, there are several reasons and 
incentives why administrators and public managers would be likely to respond to such 
political pressures.  The first is fear.  This could include fear of losing their position, loss 
of discretion, or budget cuts.  In the case of FEMA director, Michael Brown, despite 
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President Bush’s early compliments (i.e., “You’re doing a heck of a job, Brownie”), it 
did not take long for him to lose his position following FEMA’s mishandling of the 
Hurricane Katrina response.  Similarly, several high-ranking military officials were 
relieved of duty following the policy fiasco at Walter Reed Army Medical Center.    
A second reason is professionalism.  Arguably, most public managers consider 
themselves professionals, and many hold advanced degrees.  Undoubtedly, most public 
managers do care about their organization’s performance.  Many belong to professional 
organizations and are cognizant of the norms within their profession and associations.  
This is akin to Carl Friedrich’s (1940) argument about relying on professionalism and 
the scientific community to ensure bureaucratic accountability.  Finally, the extent to 
which managers build good reputations with respect to their organization’s performance 
can lead to upward movement in terms of career opportunities.  This could provide a 
manager with access to more desirable and satisfying positions either within his or her 
own organization or within other organizations.  
Therefore, this chapter is interested in the effects of political intervention in the 
face of bureaucratic failure.  That is, when bureaucratic outputs are unsatisfactory, does 
political intervention lead to improved performance?  As mentioned above, we would 
expect public managers to redirect their energies and resources to ameliorate the 
problem when faced with mounting pressures from their political principals.  Whether 
they are successful will depend on a variety of factors, such as manager quality and 
capacity, as well as resources and environmental constraints.  Empirically, however, we 
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should expect managerial behavior to change as a result of political pressure and, in turn, 
performance should also change.  This has two testable implications, as indicated by 
Figure 3.1.  First, increased contact between political actors and public managers should 
result in improved future performance, and, secondly, this relationship should be 
strongest in cases where past bureaucratic performance has faltered.     
Figure 3.1 
Past Failure and Political Assessment 
 
As Figure 3.1 implies, bureaucratic failure should result in a political response, 
provided that the policy output is salient to the public.  If the policy area is salient, we 
should expect political actors to monitor performance closely and respond to failure.  
Alternatively, if the policy area is not salient, political actors are less likely to notice the 
failure has occurred and, thus, less likely to respond.  Under this scenario, we would 
expect bureaucratic failure to go by unnoticed indefinitely or until massive failure occurs 
(i.e. the Caiden hypothesis), prompting a drastic increase in public attention to the failure, 
thus increasing salience and eliciting a political response.   
Organizational 
Failure 
Political Assessment/ 
Responsiveness 
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Furthermore, political intervention, when it occurs as a response to failure, is 
expected to result in changes in managerial behavior that results in improvements in 
performance.  Public managers are expected to redirect their time and resources in an 
attempt to improve outputs and outcomes related to performance.  Thus, if an agency is 
performing poorly on their core function, increased political pressure should result in 
increased managerial focus on core tasks and a decrease in secondary activities.  This 
refocusing ought to result in improvements in the performance of the agency’s core 
function.  From this, we can derive at least three testable hypotheses: 
H1:  Bureaucratic failure will lead to increased political oversight/political 
intervention. 
H2: Political intervention will lead to a change in managerial focus and 
behavior. 
H3: Political intervention, as a response to past failure, will lead to 
improvements in future bureaucratic performance. 
An Empirical Test 
This chapter proceeds by testing the arguments articulated above in a series of 
steps.  First, it examines the relationship between past performance and political 
responsiveness.  The expectation is that, if the policy output is salient, political 
responsiveness will occur.  If it is not salient, or is conditionally salient, then we do not 
expect a political response.  Second, increased contact should change managerial 
behavior where managers are expected to reallocate their time and resources to focus on 
core tasks to improve their performance.  Thus, we expect political action to result in a 
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change in managerial behavior.  Finally, this paper will examine the effects of contact on 
future performance.  Increased contact should result in improved future performance, 
particularly in districts that performed poorly in the past.     
While this theoretical framework is applicable to a host of bureaucracies and 
political institutions, the ideal bureaucratic-political relationship used to test this theory 
should hold certain characteristics.  First, the bureaucracy should have identifiable 
performance indicators.  Indeed, Wood and Waterman (1994) argued that the key to 
political influence of policy outputs was the presence and use of measurable 
performance indicators.  Second, bureaucratic outputs should be salient to the public in 
order for political actors to respond.  Thus, we need agencies with different measures of 
policy outputs that vary in levels of salience to the public.  Additionally, the political 
institution should ideally have a generally focused objective that directly relates to the 
bureaucracy.  If the political institution had numerous bureaucracies under its 
jurisdiction, it would be increasingly difficult for the political institution to identify 
bureaucratic failure within any particular agency, particularly if the failure pertained to 
only certain constituencies.  Additionally, the more levels of hierarchy involved, the 
further removed direct political influence will be on actual bureaucratic outputs.  This is 
particularly true in cases where the majority of members within the political institution 
does not recognize the failure and/or does not have political incentives to act.  
School districts are one such political-bureaucratic arrangement that does meet 
these criteria.  Schools do indeed generate identifiable outputs that range considerably on 
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their level of importance to the public, and the relationship between administrators and 
elected officials (school board members) is direct.  School districts have independently 
elected representative bodies, namely school boards.  A school board’s primary 
bureaucratic contact is with school district administration, primarily the district’s 
superintendent.  Thus, political actors are more likely to be aware of failure and more 
capable to intervene directly, making school districts an ideal political-bureaucratic 
system in which to test the theory developed above.   
Data and Methods 
This chapter employs multi-year data collected on Texas public school districts 
to test the hypotheses posited above.  There are over 1000 Texas public school districts, 
offering a great deal of variation on a variety of organizational, demographic and 
performance-based characteristics.  Texas school districts are required to report a wide 
range of data to the Texas Education Agency (TEA), the state’s primary oversight 
agency.  These data are available to the public and form the basis of the performance and 
control variables for this study.  
Bureaucratic Performance/Failure  
School districts can be assessed on a variety of performance measures including 
standardized tests, dropouts, college readiness, SAT scores and graduation rates.  The 
key performance measure used in this project is arguably the most salient.  The state of 
Texas requires all public school districts to annually administer the Texas Assessment of 
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Knowledge and Skills (TAKS) exam to students at multiple grade-levels.12  The test has 
components in Reading, English Language Arts, Mathematics, Science, and Social 
Studies (the topics administered depend on grade level).  Students are required to pass all 
components of the exam as a prerequisite for graduation.  This test is the state’s primary 
means of assessing schools’ performance, and TAKS student passage rates consistently 
ranks high on administrators’ top priorities since state funding is in part a function of 
TAKS performance.  Despite the high salience of TAKS scores, there is considerable 
variation across districts.  In 2005, for example, the percentage of all students who 
passed all components of the exam ranged from 21 percent to 98 percent (mean = 63; 
standard deviation = 12) across Texas school districts.   
In using TAKS pass rates as the primary measure of performance, several 
adjustments were made.  In 2003, the state of Texas changed its mandatory examination 
from the Texas Assessment of Academic Skills (TAAS) to the Texas Assessment of 
Knowledge and Skills (TAKS).  While district-level performance on these two exams is 
highly correlated, there are some significant differences.  The TAKS exam is generally 
thought to be a more difficult exam and includes more topic areas.13  Thus, in the 
transition from TAAS to TAKS, district scores, on average, declined significantly.  The 
average district’s pass rate fell by 19 points in 2003, the year the TAKS took effect.  The 
TEA, realizing districts would need to adjust for the new exam, provided a transitionary 
                                                 
Prior to 2003, Texas administered the Texas Assessment of Academic Skills (TAAS).  While this test is 
somewhat different from the TAKS, the correlation between performance on the TAAS and the TAKS is 
0.77. 
13
 The TAAS exam only had Writing, Reading and Mathematics. 
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period where the state’s level of acceptable performance would be lower for districts 
initially and the new standards would gradually faze in.   
Since this project is interested in past performance, this change in the exam poses 
a potential problem, since a district’s poor performance may simply be the result of a 
change in the measurement instrument rather than in an actual decline in performance.  
To account for this possibility, a relative measure of the TAKS pass rate is used; namely:   
[3.1] 
where Ts  is the state average TAKS pass rate, Ti is the TAKS pass rate for district i, and 
σT  is the standard deviation of statewide TAKS pass rates.  This, then, provides a 
measure where a district’s pass rate is compared to the average pass rate for the state.  
Using a relative rather than absolute measure should make the performance measure less 
sensitive to the change in the testing instrument since this change was felt statewide.  
This is also a measure of failure rather than performance, in that positive values 
represent below average performance and negative values represent above average 
performance.  The measure is standardized and, in the models, lagged to reflect past 
performance.  Thus, we would hypothesize that this measure would be positively related 
to the political intervention (i.e. higher failure leads to more intervention).   
In examining political responsiveness to bureaucratic performance, a core 
contention articulated above is that the level of policy salience is important in 
determining the proclivity of responsiveness; thus, several other performance indicators 
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that vary on this dimension are used.  These are separated into highly or universally 
salient policy outputs and low salience or conditionally salient policy issues.  The latter 
includes policy outputs that may be considered salient to some, but not in all 
circumstances.   
Arguably, TAKS exam pass rates are the most universally salient policy output 
for Texas school districts.  Indeed, over two-thirds of superintendents rank it as the 
number one problem facing their district.14  In addition to TAKS exams, three other 
highly salient outputs are considered: graduation rates, drop out rates and attendance 
rates.  Graduation rates are used universally as an indicator of academic success by 
researchers, the media, administrators and parents alike.  Indeed, this is a definitive 
measure of educational achievement and carries social, emotional and financial 
implications for students and their parents.  An opposite, but equally salient measure of 
academic performance is a district’s dropout rates.  This too is highly salient to parents, 
the media and school district officials.  Not only do high dropout rates create a negative 
public image and reputation for the district, but it can have economic consequences.  
Indeed, public schools are funded, in part, based on enrollments; hence, high dropout 
rates results in fewer state funds for the district.  Finally, I use attendance rates as a 
salient measure of performance.  Since Texas operates under compulsory education 
laws, school districts care about attendance rates.  Indeed, one component of the formula 
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 In a 2007 superintendent survey (the fourth wave of Meier and O’Toole’s Superintendent Management 
Survey), 66.8 percent of superintendents ranked TAKS scores as the most important problem in their 
district.  
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for state funding of public school districts is the average daily attendance rate.  Thus, 
school districts have a fiscal incentive to ensure that attendance is high.    
The second set of policy outputs this chapter examines are labeled low salience 
or conditionally salient outputs/outcomes; namely, the percent College Ready graduates, 
average SAT/ACT scores, and the TAKS pass rates for low-income students, black 
students and Latino students.  Individuals wishing to attend Texas institutions of higher 
education are required to take the Texas Higher Education Assessment (THEA) exam.15  
High school graduates who score high enough on this exam are given the designation 
“College Ready,” while those who do not meet the minimum score are required to enroll 
in remedial college courses.  The level of salience this performance measure holds will 
vary greatly depending on the preferences and expectations of the core clientele of the 
school district.  School districts serving low-income and low educational attainment 
populations are more likely to view college readiness as a secondary or tertiary 
objective.  When college attendance is an exception, not the expectation, measure such 
as percent of students who are “College Ready” may be considered an additional benefit, 
but not a key measure of performance.  This equally applies to average SAT and ACT 
pass rates.  Students in low-income districts are less likely to even take these exams in 
the first place, thus, the number of students these measures apply to is smaller in poor 
districts than in wealthy districts where most students take these exams and intend to 
apply to colleges.  Indeed, on average, only 50 percent of students took the ACT or SAT 
                                                 
15
 Students who score high enough on the ACT or SAT exams are exempt from the THEA and retain the 
status of “College Ready.”  In 2003, the THEA exam replaced the Texas Academic Skills Program 
(TASP).  There is no difference, however, between the two in terms of content and cutoff points for 
“College Ready” status. 
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in districts where at least 75 percent of students were classified as low-income compared 
to over 70 percent of students in school districts with less than 25 percent low-income 
students.     
The second set of conditionally salient outputs deal with TAKS exam 
performance for sub-groups within the district; in particular, the pass rates for low-
income, black and Latino students.  In 2005, the median district had 3 percent black 
students, 22.5 percent Latino students, and 52.5 percent low-income students.  These 
groups generally tend to be politically underrepresented and lack political clout 
compared to Anglos and the wealthy.  Since they also numerically tend to be in the 
minority – with the exception of low-income students – district performance on these 
indicators are less likely to rise to the level of salience required to incite a response from 
political elites.  Thus, we would not expect political responsiveness to ensue as a result 
of poor performance on these indicators.  In examining the effect of performance on 
political intervention, lagged (pervious year) measures of these variables are used.   
Political Responsiveness 
Perhaps the most difficult aspect to this project is developing a measure of 
political responsiveness.  In the case of Texas school districts, a districts most direct 
political link would be with its school board.  School board members are elected and 
have a wide range of authority from hiring and firing the superintendent, to setting the 
budget, setting tax rates, and developing general education policy.  Despite their 
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importance, data on school boards in terms of their activities, preferences, and actions 
are sparse.   
While quality school board data are nearly nonexistent, Kenneth Meier and Larry 
O’Toole administered a unique survey to over 1000 Texas school districts in 2000, 2002, 
and 2005.16  The surveys were sent to school district superintendents and asked a variety 
of questions concerning goals, management styles, and time allocations.  In the Meier-
O’Toole survey, one item asks superintendents how often they have contact with the 
school board and is measured on a six-point scale ranging from never to daily (modal 
category = “weekly”).  While this is clearly not a direct measure of political intervention, 
it is, arguably, a proxy for political attention paid to a school district’s management.  If 
school board members are concerned with district performance, one would expect that 
their interactions with the district superintendent would increase.  Indeed, it would be 
difficult for school board members to change managerial behavior if there were little 
interaction between them.  This measure, then, provides a rudimentary, yet fundamental 
indicator of school board “intervention.”  Granted, increased contact does not inherently 
suggest “intervention” or responsiveness to failure.  However, if contact is 
systematically higher in districts that experience past failure, ceteris paribus, it might be 
an indication that they are directly working with the superintendent to remedy the past 
failure.  Thus, the assumption is not that school board members only interact with 
superintendents to address problems; however, when problems do exist, the assumption 
is that interactions between school board members and the superintendent will increase 
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 I would like to thank Ken Meier and Larry O’Toole for generously providing me with these data.  
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provided that the school board members recognize and care about the failure (i.e. the 
output is salient).17  
These survey data were merged with performance and control data obtained from 
the Texas Education Agency.  The first hypothesis, then, predicts that superintendents in 
school districts that performed poorly in the past will have higher levels of contact with 
the school board holding all else equal.  This pattern, however, should only exist in cases 
where past failure was in a salient policy area.  Thus, for example, political contact 
should be higher if the district experienced poor performance on overall TAKS pass 
rates – a universally salient output – but not necessarily if the district performed poorly 
on Latino TAKS pass rates – a conditionally salient output.   
To test the first hypotheses, an ordered logit model is used.18  The dependent 
variable is the scale measuring the level of contact superintendents report having with 
the school board.  The key independent variables are district performance in the previous 
year.  We expect the previous year’s performance to be negatively related to the level of 
contact.  That is, school districts that perform more poorly will be more likely to have 
contact with the school board than will schools that performed well.  In addition to past 
performance, the model includes several other variables that may explain the level of 
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 One question in the survey asks superintendents how they would rate the quality of school board support.  
The amount of contact superintendents report having with the school board is negatively related to their 
assessment of school board support.  This suggests that increased contact is less often the result of 
“friendships” between the school board and superintendents, but rather suggests conflict at some level.  
18
 This models produces identical results (in terms of direction and significance) when OLS is used.  
However, since the dependent variable is essentially a five-point categorical variable (it is a six-point scale 
but there are no entries in the lowest category), an ordered logit model is more appropriate than OLS. 
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interaction between school boards and superintendents.  Generally, political interaction 
is modeled as: 
C P M O= + + +β β β ε1 2 3     [3.2]  
where  
C is the amount of political-managerial Contact 
P is past Performance 
M is a vector of Managerial factors 
O is a vector of Organizational characteristics 
and ε is a random error term.   
While contact and past performance have already been defined, a brief discussion of the 
measures comprised in these terms is warranted.  
Management 
Two key aspects of management are expected to influence the amount of contact 
between political actors and public administrators.  The first is managerial networking 
and the second is managerial experience.  In their work, Meier and O’Toole (2001) have 
developed a measure of managerial networking – a key component of the M term in the 
model above – that examines the degree to which superintendents network in their 
external environment.  To create the measure of managerial networking, Meier and 
O’Toole factor analyze the degree to which superintendents interact with local business 
leaders, other superintendents, state legislators, and the Texas Education Agency.  
Conceptually, superintendents who engage in more networking with these actors may be 
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more likely to interact with school board members regardless of past performance.  
Therefore, included in the model is an overall managerial networking measure to control 
for superintendents’ propensity to network.   
 Interaction between school boards and superintendents may similarly be 
contingent on the amount of experience the manager has within with district.  
Conceptually, managers with ample experience within a district develop greater 
independence from the school board and thus experience less frequent contact.  Less 
experienced managers may have a greater reliance on school board guidance and 
approval lending to increased levels of contact.  To control for managerial experience, I 
include a measure from the Meier-O’Toole survey of the superintendent’s length of 
employment in the district in any capacity with the expectation that longer tenure should 
result in less political contact.   
Organizational Characteristics 
Organizational characteristics can encompass a variety of variables including 
both controllable and uncontrollable factors.  Such factors may influence the propensity 
of political involvement with administration and, thus, ought to be accounted for.  One 
set of organizational factors are related to personnel issues.  Excessive instability within 
an organization can lead to a host of problems; hence, contact between school board 
members and superintendents may be higher in organizations that suffer from high levels 
of personnel instability.  To control for this, a measure of teacher instability is included 
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in the model, which is simply the percentage of annual teacher turnover within the 
district.   
Like personnel instability, issues surrounding personnel qualifications may be of 
concern to school board members, prompting increased levels of interaction with 
administrators.  Individuals wishing to teach in Texas, in addition to holding a bachelor’s 
degree, are currently required take teacher training courses and pass the Texas 
Examinations of Educator Standards (TEXES) exam to gain teacher certification.  The 
Texas State Board of Educator Certification (SBEC), however, allows school districts to 
apply for temporary teaching certifications, which allows districts to hire individuals 
who do not yet have the standard teacher certification.  Individuals with temporary 
certification are required to obtain full certification within three years of gaining the 
temporary certification.  We may expect, then, that districts with high levels of teacher 
with temporary certification (rather than full certification), may experience increased 
challenges and uncertainty with respect to retaining adequate levels of personnel.  These 
concerns may increase the amount of interaction between school board members and 
administrators.  Thus, I control for this possibility by including a variable measuring the 
number of uncertified teachers (i.e. those lacking full certification) as a percentage of all 
teachers. 
A related personnel/organizational factor that has the potential to affect political-
bureaucratic interactions is the adequate supply of personnel.  Pupil-teacher ratios are 
commonly thought to be linked to performance, where smaller class size is associated 
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with higher performance (but see Hanushek 1998).  In districts with large pupil-teacher 
ratios, school board members may be concerned with how this may affect performance 
as well as the public image reflected by having large classes.  This may, in turn, prompt 
increased interaction with the superintendent.  To account for this, I include a measure of 
class size, which is simply the student-teacher ratio, with the expectation that larger class 
sizes will be associated with increased contact.   
The final personnel-related variable I control for is teacher experience.  Similar 
to teacher qualification, increased teacher experience may provide a more predicable, 
smooth operating organization.  This reduction in uncertainty may alleviate school board 
members’ concerns, thus reducing political involvement in administrative affairs.  To 
control for this, I include a measure of the average number of years of teacher 
experience in the district with the expectation that higher levels of experience will be 
associated with less contact, all else being equal.    
In addition to personnel-related organizational characteristics, resource-based 
organizational factors may be important.  The direction of this relationship could 
conceptually be either positive or negative.  Resource-strapped organizations may have 
difficultly in finding ways to fund programs and may be forced to make trade-offs in 
terms of where resources are allocated.  In making such decisions, school board 
members may be more likely to interact with the superintendent.  Alternatively, districts 
with ample resources may engage in more extensive program building.  This activity 
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may also entail increased interaction and coordination between the school board and the 
superintendent.  
To control for the potential effect resources may have on political-administrative 
interactions, I employ three measures.  The first is average teacher salaries (in $1000) 
within the district.  The second variable is total revenue per pupil (in $1000).  The final 
resource measure is the amount of state funding (logged) the district receives.  State 
funding often comes with restrictions and stipulations; thus, increased state funding may 
result in increased consultation between the school board and school administration to 
ensure state requirements are met.  Finally, I control for school size (student enrollment 
in 1000s).  Larger districts are likely to have more stakeholders with competing interests 
that must be addressed.  This may require increased political-administrative interaction.  
Table 3.1 presents summary statistics for dependent and independent variables used in 
testing the first hypothesis.   
Table 3.2 presents the results from the first model.  Since the dependent variable 
and several key independent variables come from the Meier-O’Toole survey, these 
measures were only collected in survey years, namely 2000, 2002 and 2005.  Thus, these 
models only used data from these years.  To control for variation across time, yearly 
dummy variables were included.  Tests for non-constant error variance indicated that 
heteroskedasticity was not a problem.19   
 
                                                 
19
 The results are essentially identical when robust standard errors or clustered standard errors are used.   
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Table 3.1. Summary Statistics for Model 1 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
     
Political Contact 4.25 0.89 2 6 
Lagged TAKS Pass Rate 77.89 11.42 14 100 
Standardized Relative TAKS Measure 0.00 0.97 -2.43 4.96 
Managerial Networking 0.03 0.99 -2.71 3.67 
Managerial Experience (Years) 9.23 9.37 0 44 
% Teacher Turnover 17.00 7.66 0 61.11 
Student-Teacher Ratio 12.65 2.39 3.30 30.47 
% Non-Certified Teachers 4.63 5.19 0 40.4 
Average Teacher Experience (Years) 12.30 2.25 2.60 22.45 
Average Teacher Salary ($1000) 36.80 2.75 28.10 49.02 
Revenue per Pupil ($1000) 8.07 2.50 1.76 42.90 
Logged State Aid  10.50 3.70 5.41 19.44 
Enrollment (1000s) 4.06 10.66 0.02 163.56 
 
Findings 
Immediately noticeable is that past performance failure is positive and 
statistically significant.20  This implies that contact between school board members and 
superintendents is higher when the district performed poorly in the previous year.  This  
                                                 
20
 Recall that this measure is standardized and is a relative measure where higher values are associated 
with lower pass rates relative to the state average for a given year.   
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Table 3.2.  Past Performance Failure and Political Contact 
 Political Contact 
Past Performance Failure 0.130* 
 (0.052) 
 
Managerial Networking 0.806** 
 (0.061) 
 
Superintendent's Experience in District -0.015** 
 (0.005) 
 
% Teacher Turnover -0.001 
 (0.007) 
 
Average Teacher Experience 0.004 
 (0.026) 
 
% Non-Certified Teachers -0.005 
 (0.009) 
 
Student-Teacher Ratio 0.143** 
 (0.031) 
 
Average Teacher Salary (in $1000s) 0.043 
 (0.025) 
 
Logged State Aid 0.066 
 (0.046) 
 
Revenue Per Pupil (in $1000s) 0.050 
 (0.027) 
 
District Size (in 1000s) 0.018** 
 (0.006) 
 
2002 -0.771** 
 (0.140) 
 
2005 -0.840* 
 (0.370) 
Observations 1739 
Cut1 -0.88 (0.76) 
Cut2 0.88 (0.75) 
Cut3 3.61 (0.75) 
Cut4 5.88 (0.76) 
 
Order Logistic Regression Estimates 
(Standard errors in parentheses) * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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evidence supports the idea that elected officials are concerned about bureaucratic 
performance and will engage the bureaucracy when performance becomes 
unsatisfactory.  Not surprisingly, managerial networking dominates the model, 
independently explaining about 4 percent of the variation in the dependent variable.21  
This suggests that superintendents who engage in more external networking with other 
actors (i.e., business leaders, other superintendents, state legislators), are more likely to 
have contact with the school board.  This, then, controls for the superintendent’s 
proclivity to interact with others.  Also, as expected, managerial experience is negative 
and significant.  This indicates that newer superintendents engage in more contact with 
school boards than superintendents with longer tenure.  The only other statistically 
significant variables were student-teacher ratios and district size, suggesting that larger 
class sizes and increased enrollments have a positive effect on the probability of school 
board-superintendent contact, ceteris paribus.  
Since the models in Table 3.2 estimate the parameters via ordered logit, the 
coefficients are not easily interpretable in terms of the effects on the level of contact; 
thus, Table 3.3 presents the predicted probabilities for the model.  Past performance has 
a considerable effect on the probability of having contact with the school board more 
than once a week as well as weekly contact (the modal category).  The predicted 
probability of more than weekly contact with the school board for a high failure district 
(pass rate 2 standard deviations below the state mean) is about 34 percent.  This is about 
10 percent higher than the predicted probability for a high performing district.  
                                                 
21
 This is based on the change in the “pseudo” R2, from 0.072 to 0.115 in the model below. 
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Alternatively, the predicted probability of weekly contact under high levels of past 
failure is about 51 percent, compared to 58 percent under considerably above average 
performance.  This pattern is also seen in monthly contact, where the predicted 
probabilities are forty percent higher under high performance than under low 
performance (11% vs. 6.9%).  The likelihood for daily contact, though consistently low, 
is nearly twice as high under high failure than it is under high performance (6.5% vs. 
3.8%).     
Table 3.3.  Predicted Probabilities for Different Levels of Past Failure 
 P(Y=Yearly) P(Y=Monthly) P(Y=Weekly) P(Y=Weekly+) P(Y=Daily) 
Past Failure = 
 High (2) 0.015 0.069 0.512 0.338 0.065 
Past Failure =  
 Average (0) 0.020 0.088 0.555 0.288 0.049 
Past Failure =  
 Low (-2) 0.027 0.113 0.583 0.239 0.038 
 
Table 3.4 presents the first differences for these findings based on simulations 
where all other variables are held at their means.  These simulations allow us to obtain 
measures of uncertainty with respect to our estimates.  The results indicate that the 
difference in the probability of having more than weekly school board-superintendent 
interactions between high and low performing districts is about 10 percent and is 
statistically significant.  As expected, the opposite trend is seen with weekly contact, 
where low performance reduces the likelihood of weekly contact in substitution for more 
  
66 
than weekly contact.  Indeed, the probability of observing the two highest levels of 
contact increase as failure increases, while the lower three levels decrease.   
Table 3.4 First Differences in Predicted Probabilities  
Change Past Failure from -2 to 2 
Outcome Mean Std. Err. 95% CI 
∆P(Y=Yearly) -0.027 0.004 -0.015 -0.044 
∆P(Y=Monthly) -0.044 0.017 -0.011 -0.078 
∆P(Y=Weekly) -0.071 0.026 -0.020 -0.119 
∆P(Y=Weekly +) 0.100 0.036 0.167 0.027 
∆P(Y=Daily) 0.027 0.010 0.048 0.007 
First differences and confidence intervals are based on Clarify simulations in Stata 
 
Using estimates derived from the simulations, Figure 3.2 portrays this pattern 
visually.  The x-axis represents different levels of past failure on the pervious year’s 
TAKS exam where higher values indicate more failure.  The y-axis displays the 
predicted probabilities based on the model estimates holding all other variables at their 
means.  What is immediately apparent is that as failure increases, the likelihood of 
weekly contact declines as the likelihood of more than weekly contact increases. At a 
failure value of approximately 1, the differences in probabilities associated with these 
two values are statistically indistinguishable.  A similar pattern can be seen with the 
daily and monthly contact, where the probability of observing daily contact – while still 
small – becomes significantly higher as the level of past failure increases.   
These results appear to support the hypothesis that poor performance leads to 
increased political involvement.  Recall, however, that this hypothesis is conditional on 
the salience of the policy output or outcome.  District-wide pass rates on the TAKS 
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exam are highly salient to the majority of Texas districts.  Indeed, the state bases their 
district rating system largely on districts’ performance on this indicator.  Yet, 
Figure 3.2 Predicted Probabilities of Contact for Different Levels of Past Failure 
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theoretically, we do not expect political actors to respond to every indicator – only those 
they deem salient.  As discussed earlier, this chapter examines a number of other policy 
outputs and outcomes that should vary on this dimension of public salience.  The 
universally salient measures include graduation rates, attendance rates, and annual 
dropout rates.  Policy outputs considered less salient or conditionally salient are TAKS 
pass rates for low-income students, black students, and Latino students, as well as 
average SAT and ACT scores and the percent of students who score high enough on the 
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THEA exam to be deemed “College Ready.”  Also included in this group are 4-year 
dropout rates.  While annual dropout rates are considered salient, 4-year dropout rates 
use a more complicated formula in that they track student progress over a 4-year period.  
The impact of this measure is likely to be more muddled since the failure may have 
occurred years in the past.  Conceptually, this comports with work by Ringquist,  
Table 3.5 Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Universally Salient Outputs      
Graduation Rate 1648 87.84 9.18 0 100 
Attendance Rate 1740 95.98 0.84 92 99.4 
Annual Dropout Rates 1719 0.75 0.89 0 10.1 
Conditionally  Salient Outputs      
4-Year Dropout Rates 1645 6.19 6.13 0 45.5 
Low-Income TAKS Pass Rate 1729 70.81 12.38 14 100 
% "College Ready" 1599 21.17 11.63 0 71.6 
Average SAT Score 1262 972.70 76.43 654 1250 
Average ACT Score 1520 19.88 1.62 14.7 25.1 
Black TAKS Pass Rate 1125 65.00 16.41 0 100 
Latino TAKS Pass Rate 1622 70.55 13.86 8 100 
 
Worsham and Eisner (2003) where they find that both policy salience and policy 
complexity influence politicians’ propensity to attempt to influence bureaucratic 
behavior.  A highly salient output (e.g. dropout rates), if complex (e.g. 4-year dropout 
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rates), is less likely to attract political involvement than would otherwise be expected.  
Table 3.5 presents the descriptive statistics for these 10 dependent variables. 
Table 3.6 presents the results from these 10 models.  The first three models 
include the highly/universally salient outputs, while the final six models present the less 
salient outputs/outcomes.  In all three cases, past performance is related to political 
contact, where poorer performance is associated with higher probabilities of contact.  
Higher graduation and attendance rates in the previous academic year are associated 
with less school board-superintendent interaction.  Alternatively, with the exception of 
low-income student TAKS performance, past performance on the low salient outputs 
had no effect on the frequency of contact.  This is exactly what we would expect 
theoretically; that is, political actors respond to performance indicators they believe are 
salient.  This explains, in part, the discrepancy observed in the literature on this topic, 
where some research portrays actively involved political elites while other research 
implies a lassiez-faire political system that only responds when either public outrage or 
catastrophe strikes.  
The Effects of Contact on Management 
The second empirical question this chapter examines is what effects, if any, does 
political intervention have on managerial behavior.  To quantitatively test whether 
political contact can influence administrative behavior, a measure of managerial 
behavior is needed.  Fortunately, the Meier-O’Toole survey contains at least two 
measures that can be used to test this hypothesis.  The first measure is the managerial  
  
Table 3.6.  Political Responsiveness to Failure and Issue Salience 
 
 High/Universally Salient Outputs  Low/Conditionally Salient Outputs 
DV =  Contact with 
School Board 
Graduation 
Rate 
Attendance 
Rate 
Annual 
Dropout 
Rate 
4-Year 
Dropout 
Rate 
Low 
Income 
Pass 
Rate 
Black 
Pass 
Rate 
Latino 
Pass 
Rate 
College 
Ready 
Average 
SAT 
Score 
Average 
ACT 
Score 
Lagged Performance  -0.016 -0.197 0.091 0.007 -0.015 -0.003 -0.004 0.005 0.000 -0.015 
 (0.006)** (0.060)** (0.056)† (0.009) (0.005)** (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.032) 
Managerial Networking 0.794 0.806 0.807 0.793 0.811 0.773 0.794 0.769 0.769 0.784 
 (0.063)** (0.061)** (0.062)** (0.063)** (0.062)** (0.078)** (0.064)** (0.064)** (0.074)** (0.067)** 
District Size (1000s) 0.016 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.018 0.018 0.017 0.017 0.017 
 (0.006)** (0.006)** (0.006)** (0.006)** (0.006)** (0.006)** (0.006)** (0.006)** (0.006)** (0.006)** 
Student Teacher Ratio 0.156 0.126 0.153 0.169 0.144 0.231 0.150 0.181 0.245 0.180 
 (0.034)** (0.031)** (0.032)** (0.033)** (0.032)** (0.047)** (0.034)** (0.034)** (0.045)** (0.036)** 
Average Teacher Salary 0.034 0.043 0.041 0.034 0.042 0.011 0.030 0.023 0.003 0.028 
 (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.025) (0.031) (0.026) (0.026) (0.030) (0.027) 
Teacher Turnover 0.003 0.001 0.004 0.005 -0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.007 -0.005 0.005 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) 
Superintendent's Tenure -0.016 -0.016 -0.016 -0.015 -0.015 -0.014 -0.015 -0.015 -0.016 -0.016 
 (0.005)** (0.005)** (0.005)** (0.005)** (0.005)** (0.006)* (0.005)** (0.005)** (0.006)** (0.005)** 
% State Aid 0.070 0.078 0.077 0.073 0.065 0.046 0.083 0.052 0.044 0.036 
 (0.049) (0.045) (0.046) (0.049) (0.046) (0.061) (0.048) (0.051) (0.060) (0.053) 
Revenue Per Pupil 0.079 0.053 0.066 0.080 0.062 0.102 0.066 0.079 0.164 0.067 
 (0.033)* (0.027) (0.029)* (0.033)* (0.031)* (0.060) (0.038) (0.034)* (0.057)** (0.035) 
Teacher Experience 0.008 0.002 0.002 0.007 0.001 0.024 -0.002 -0.002 -0.024 -0.008 
 (0.028) (0.026) (0.027) (0.028) (0.026) (0.036) (0.028) (0.029) (0.034) (0.030) 
% Non-Certified Teachers -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.004 0.008 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.004 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) 
2002 -0.866 -0.724 -0.770 -0.827 -0.707 -0.882 -0.792 -0.858 -0.939 -0.807 
 (0.145)** (0.140)** (0.142)** (0.154)** (0.143)** (0.183)** (0.148)** (0.148)** (0.168)** (0.153)** 
2005 -0.880 -0.934 -0.913 -0.904 -1.030 -0.815 -1.028 -0.729 -0.826 -0.575 
 (0.403)* (0.365)* (0.380)* (0.410)* (0.373)** (0.532) (0.399)* (0.419) (0.518) (0.436) 
Observations 1648 1740 1719 1645 1729 1125 1622 1599 1262 1520 
Ordered Logistic Regression.  (Standard errors in parentheses).† significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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networking measure discussed above (see Meier and O’Toole 2001).  More specifically, 
this measure is based on factor analysis on the self-reported frequency of interaction 
between superintendents and the four following entities: state legislators, the Texas 
Education Agency, other superintendents and local business leaders.  The factor analysis 
produces a single factor with an eigenvalue of 2.09.22  Variants of this measure have 
been used extensively in recent research on public management.  In much of this 
research, managerial networking has consistently been found to be an important 
predictor of organizational performance (Meier and O’Toole 2001, 2003, 2005; O’Toole 
and Meier 2004b; Nicholson-Crotty and O’Toole 2004; Goerdel 2006).  
 From a theoretical perspective, O’Toole and Meier (1999) argue that networks 
provide public managers a means to manage their environments.  O’Toole and Meier 
(1999) argue that “management can either adopt a strategy of buffering the environment 
or actively seek to exploit the environment for the benefit of the program system” (517).  
These networks function both as a mechanism for exploitation purposes as well as a 
buffer for absorbing political pressures.  Managerial networking, then, involves 
managers making conscious efforts to engage their external environment.  Political 
actors, however, may pressure administrators to focus on internal, core tasks if they are 
failing to meet adequate standards, which may reduce a manager’s ability to engage in 
extensive networking.  It could be the case that networking is a luxury managers can 
                                                 
22
 This measure of managerial networking is slightly different from Meier and O’Toole’s (2001) original 
measure in that it excludes contact with school board members and provides a unique measure for each 
district for each year the survey was administered.  
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engage in only once they have achieved a satisfactory level of success on core tasks, 
such as state mandated tests.  That is, political pressure may result in a decline in 
managerial networking, as managers who experience political contact refocus their 
energies on internal issues rather than external networking.  To test whether this is the 
case, we can look at how past contact with political principals changes the level of 
networking in which managers engage.   
The second measure we can use to test whether managerial behavior is 
influenced by political contact is a survey-item that asks superintendents what 
percentage of their time is spent on internal management of the district versus interacting 
with non-district personnel in a typical week.  Conceptually, as with managerial 
networking, political contact may influence the extent to which managers work on 
managing the district internally versus interacting with non-district stakeholders.  
Increased political contact may cause managers to refocus their attention to internal 
administrative issues rather than allocating their time to interacting with non-district 
personnel (e.g. politics). 
This can be tested by examining the effect past political contact has on changes 
in the networking and internal management activities of superintendents.  To do this, 
measures of the change in the networking and internal management variables were 
created.  That is, 1−−=∆ tt NNN , where N is the networking scores from the respective 
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years/surveys.  The same is done for the internal management variable.23  This implies, 
of course, that only respondents who replied to at least two consecutive surveys can be 
used, thus significantly cutting the number of usable observations.  What this provides us 
with, though, is a measure of change in managerial behavior across two time points.24  
Table 3.7 presents the descriptive statistics for the networking and internal management 
variables as well as the change variables (i.e. the dependent variables) used in the 
estimation.   
 
Table 3.7 Descriptive Statistics for Networking and Internal Management 
 N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Managerial Networking 767 -0.12 1.06 -2.71 3.67 
∆ Managerial Networking 767 0.11 1.56 -4.36 5.7 
Internal Management 366 72.65 13.63 20 98 
∆ Internal Management 366 -0.4 15.57 -60 55 
 
 
The key independent variable in this model is past political contact25 with the 
expectation that higher levels of past political contact will result in reductions in 
                                                 
23
 The internal management question was only asked in the first two surveys (2000 and 2002); thus, the 
model examining the effect of contact on the change in internal management only include 2002.  
24
 Admittedly, the 2- and 3-year gaps in the surveys induce more error than desirable.  However, recent 
work by Meier and O’Toole (2005) suggests that managerial networking is a management rather than 
organizational characteristic.  This implies that networking patterns are not likely to change drastically 
overtime.  Indeed, lagged measures of networking and internal management – despite being 2- and 3-year 
lags – are statistically significant predictors of current networking and internal management.   
25
 This is simply the self-reported frequency of contact with school board members from the previous 
survey.   
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networking compared to previous levels.  Alternatively, higher levels of political contact 
are expected to increase self-reported levels of internal management at the expense of 
external management.  Table 3.8 presents the results from these models.  In addition to 
school board contact, several other variables are included in the model.  The absolute, 
contemporaneous level of managerial networking and, in the second model, internal 
management are included, and, in addition to the variable used in the first model a 
couple other measures are included.  Specifically, the percent of low-income, black and 
Latino students are included as control variables.   
The results indicate, as expected, that past school board contact is associated with 
managers decreasing the amount of time they spend networking in their external 
environment.  School board contact in the past is also associated with increased 
managerial efforts at internal management.26  A one category increase in past political 
contact (e.g. from weekly to more than weekly) results in about a .39 decrease in 
managerial networking, or over one third of a standard deviation.  A similar increase in 
school board contact is expected to increase the time allocated to internal management 
by about 4 percentage points.  These results are particularly impressive given that the lag 
time between political contact and the observed change in managerial behavior is two to 
three years.  With better data and measures these relationships may be even stronger.   
 
                                                 
26
 Several variations of these models were run including the inclusion of the contemporaneous level of 
school board contact, which was statistically insignificant in both models.  A Breush-Pagan test of 
independence suggests that the errors across these models are not independent (χ2 = 4.6, p = 0.03); 
however, results from seemingly unrelated regression models were nearly identical.   
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Table 3.8 Political Contact and Managerial Networking and Internal Management 
Dependent Variable  =  ∆ Managerial Networking 
∆ Internal 
Management 
Lagged School Board Contact -0.385** 3.905 
 (0.036) 
 
(0.823)** 
Managerial Networking 1.013** 0.040 
 (0.031) 
 
(0.823) 
Internal Management - 0.657 
 - (0.052)** 
 
Superintendent's Tenure 0.002 0.024 
 (0.003) (0.070) 
Teacher Turnover 0.007 -0.196 
 (0.004) (0.106) 
Student Teacher Ratio 0.051** -0.448 
 (0.015) (0.331) 
Average Teacher Experience -0.018 -0.575 
 (0.018) (0.416) 
% Non-Certified Teachers -0.001 -0.281 
 (0.006) (0.152) 
Average Teacher Salary 0.031* 0.927 
 (0.015) (0.399)* 
Instructional Expenditures (1000s) 0.055** -0.178 
 (0.007) (0.146) 
% Black Students -0.005 0.047 
 (0.003) (0.071) 
% Latino Students 0.001 -0.011 
 (0.002) (0.046) 
% Low Income Students 0.001 0.071 
 (0.003) (0.060) 
District Size (1000s) -0.008* -0.070 
 (0.003) (0.094) 
Constant -2.924** -76.506 
 (0.686) 
 
(17.482)** 
Observations 767 366 
R-squared 0.72 0.37 
OLS estimates.  (Standard errors in parentheses)  * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
 
  
76 
The Effects of Political Contact on Performance 
The final question this chapter examines is whether political contact makes a 
difference in terms future performance.  Theoretically, we would expect political 
intervention to result in administrative reforms, which would, in turn, ultimately result in 
improved performance in the future.  Indeed, this is the prime intention of political 
assessment.  Yet, political involvement in administrative affairs in and of itself is not 
necessarily beneficial to organizational performance.  That is, unwarranted political 
involvement may amount to political micromanagement and political meddling.  Rather, 
political intervention may provide benefits when there is a legitimate reason for such 
intervention.  This implies, then, that the effects of political contact are conditional on 
whether contact is justified.  Thus, the expectation is that political contact will have a 
positive effect on future performance when such contact is associated with poor past 
performance.  Alternatively, political contact alone (i.e., when past failure is absent) is 
expected to have no effect, or even a negative effect on future performance.  
Looked at differently, past failure is expected to continue (or at least be 
prolonged) if political pressure is not employed.  While public managers themselves 
would presumably like to improve performance, there may be less of a sense of urgency 
if their boss (i.e. the school board) is not taking notice of the poor performance.  
Conversely, a superintendent in a under-performing district who is regularly hounded or 
even threatened by the school board regarding performance, is more likely to make 
performance his or her top priority and hence more likely to make changes that will 
improve performance.   
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To test this, an interactive model is used, where future performance is modeled as 
a function of past school board contact interacted with past failure.  The expectation is 
that contact will positively affect performance if past failure is present.  The dependent 
variable in this model is the change in TAKS exam performance from the performance 
prior to contact to that following the contact.  Results for the TAKS exams are released 
in the spring of each year; alternatively, the surveys were administered in the fall of each 
survey year.  Therefore, past performance is the exam pass rate in the spring prior to the 
survey and future performance is the exam pass rate in the spring following the survey.  
Therefore, the change in TAKS performance for 2001 is,  
000101 TAKSTAKSTAKS −=∆    [3.3] 
where TAKS00 is the TAKS results for the 1999-2000 school year reported in the spring 
of 2000 and TAKS01 is the results for the 2000-2001 school year reported in the spring 
of 2001.  The measure of political intervention in this case would be amount of contact 
reported in the fall of 2000.   
A variety of environmental and organizational variables are also included in the 
model to control for differences in these districts that may account for changes in 
performance (e.g. large districts may be more inertial).  These include the measures of 
managerial characteristics, personnel-related factors, demographic characteristics, and 
resources.  This interactive model can be depicted formally as: 
∆ P C F CF M O X= + + + + + +β β β β β β ε1 2 3 4 5 6   [3.4] 
where  
∆P is change in district Performance, 
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C is the amount of political-managerial Contact, 
F is past district Failure, 
M is a vector of Managerial variables, 
O is a vector of Organizational characteristics, 
X is a vector of Environmental factors (e.g. district demographics), 
ε is a random error term and the β’s are estimatable parameters.   
Table 3.9 presents the results from this model.  Since this is an interactive model, 
the coefficients are conditional.  These results suggest that the effect of political contact 
on performance, while positive, is not statistically significant when past failure is zero.  
Since the measure of failure is relative to the state pass rate, a value of zero for past 
failure represents a district’s pass rate was the same as the state average.  This suggests 
that, in an average district, higher levels of political contact are not associated with 
future improvements in performance.   
The parameter estimate for past failure is negative and statistically significant at 
the p =0.1 level when political contact is zero.  This, of course, is outside the range of 
the data (political contact ranges from 2 to 6).  The coefficient for the interactive terms is 
positive and statistically significant, suggesting that as contact and past failure increase, 
district performance improves.  To calculate the conditional effects of school board 
contact, the following formula is used (see Bramber, Clark and Golder 2006):   
∂
∂ β β
P
C
F= +1 3     [3.5] 
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Table 3.9 Political Contact, Past Failure and Future Performance 
 ∆ in TAKS Pass Rate 
Political Contact 0.233 
 (0.164) 
 
Past TAKS Failure -1.173 
 (0.656)† 
 
Political Contact × Past Failure 0.758 
 (0.150)** 
 
Managerial Networking -0.144  
 (0.167) 
Superintendent's Tenure 0.001 
 (0.014) 
Teacher Turnover -0.041 
 (0.019)* 
Student Teacher Ratio -0.212 
 (0.061)** 
Average Teacher Experience -0.016 
 (0.070) 
% Non-Certified Teachers -0.040 
 (0.025) 
Average Teacher Salary 0.050 
 (0.068) 
Instructional Expenditures (1000s) -0.096 
 (0.027)** 
% Black Students -0.051 
 (0.014)** 
% Latino Students 0.010 
 (0.008) 
% Low Income Students -0.131 
 (0.012)** 
District Size (1000s) 0.015 
 (0.014) 
2002 -20.690 
 (0.376)** 
2005 4.686 
 (0.353)** 
Constant 13.787 
 (2.916)** 
 
Observations 1736 
R-squared 0.82 
 
OLS estimates (Standard errors in parentheses) † significant at 10% * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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where β1 is the slope for political contact, β3 is the coefficient for the interactive term  
and F is the value for the failure variable.  Similarly, we can calculate the conditional 
standard errors for the conditional slope of political contact for different values of failure 
using the following formula: 
$ var( $ ) var( $ ) cov( $ $ )σ β β β β∂
∂
P
C
F F= + +1
2
3 1 32    [3.6] 
Thus, for every level of past failure, we can obtain a slope and standard error for 
political contact.  Figure 3.3 presents these results.  The y-axis depicts the marginal 
effect (i.e. conditional slope) of political contact on improvements in TAKS performance.  
The x-axis represents different levels of relative past TAKS failure, where higher values 
represent poorer past scores.  The vertical parallel lines represent the range of values 
where the slopes are not statistically significant.   
As can be seen, the effects of political contact are slightly positive – albeit 
statistically insignificant – for districts whose past TAKS pass rates matched the state 
average.  However, as failure increases, the effects of political contact become 
statistically significant and increasingly positive.  For example, if a district’s TAKS pass 
rate was one standard deviation below the state mean,27 the expected effect of school 
board contact on the change in future TAKS rates is about 1, suggesting that, holding all 
else equal, increasing political contact by one unit will improve TAKS pass rates by 
about 1 percent.  This effect is even larger for districts where past failure was higher 
                                                 
27
 The numeric value of one standard deviation below the mean varies depending on the year.  It ranges 
from about 56 percent pass rate (2003) to 79 percent pass rate (2002).  In any given year, there are from 
150 to 160 districts that fall into this category.   
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ranging from .33 (when past failure is .13) to 4.4 (when failure is 5.5).   Interestingly, the 
effect of political contact is negative and statistically significant in districts that were 
performing significantly above average.  More specifically, when past TAKS 
performance is about 0.82 standard deviations above the state mean, the effects of 
political contact are negative and statistically significant, ranging in size from -.39 to 
1.98.  This suggests that political involvement, when not needed, may actually have a 
negative effect on bureaucratic performance.  
Figure 3.3 Marginal Effect of Contact on Performance Conditional on Past Failure 
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Similarly, the marginal effects and standard errors of past failure on performance 
conditional on the level of political contact can be examined by slightly modifying 
formulas 3.5 and 3.6.28  Thus, we can observe what the expected effects of past failure 
on improvements in performance are under different levels of political intervention.  The 
expectation is that bureaupathologies and maladministration in organizations are likely 
to continue unless these problems are recognized and addressed.  Political intervention is 
one possible way such bureaupathologies can be exposed and perhaps remedied.  Thus, 
past failure is expected to have less of an effect of performance if there is contact 
between school board members and superintendents.   
Figure 3.4 presents the slopes for past failure conditional on the level of contact 
with the school board.  Past failure has a positive and statistically significant effect on 
improvements in TAKS pass rates if political contact is at least weekly.  The size of the 
effect increases as political contact increases.  If political contact is less than weekly, 
however, the effect of past failure on TAKS improvements weakens.  When school 
board contact is monthly or yearly, past failure is predicted to negatively affect future 
performance. This suggests, then, that political involvement can help to remedy 
bureaucratic failure and, alternatively, political neglect can result in continued 
maladministration and program failure.   
 
                                                 
28
 The formula for the conditional slope becomes, ∂
∂ β β
P
F
C= +2 3 , and the conditional standard errors are 
calculated as, $ var( $ ) var( $ ) cov( $ $ )σ β β β β∂
∂
P
F
C C= + +2
2
3 2 32 . 
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Figure 3.4 Marginal Effect of Past Failure on Performance Conditional on Contact  
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To demonstrate the magnitude of these effects, Table 3.10 presents simulated 
predicted values of the change in TAKS exam pass rates for four hypothetical scenarios.  
The first cell is the expected change in pass rates for a district that has performed 
significantly above the state average on the TAKS exam and has experienced virtually 
no political involvement from the school board.  Such a district is expected to see a small 
decline (-1.77) in TAKS pass rates compared to their previous performance.  Yet, if this 
same district experienced daily contact with the school board, the expected change in 
pass rates is considerably larger (-8.2).  This suggests that a case of such political 
micromanagement may have a draining effect on agency performance.  
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When past failure is high, however, we see a different pattern.  An absence of 
political involvement is expected to produce large negative effects (-8.06) in terms of 
future improvements.  Yet, if a similarly poor performing district experiences high levels 
of involvement from the school board, the expected improvement in TAKS pass rates is 
positive (1.01).  The results for this scenario are the opposite as the case of a high 
performing district, where higher levels of contact are associated with worse 
performance.   
Table 3.10 Expected Change in TAKS Under Four Scenarios 
 Past Failure  
Contact 
Low High 
Low  -1.77 -8.06 
High -8.2 1.01 
Average expected value from 1000 simulations using Clarify.  All other variables are held at their means. 
Low Performance = 2 on failure index; High Performance = -2 on failure index 
Low Contact = Yearly (2); High Contact = Daily (6) 
 
Conclusion 
These findings provide some insight to the broader question this chapter began 
with; that is, is political assessment taking place in a systematic manner?  As discussed 
in Chapter II, political assessment is, theoretically, a crucial part of governance (Lynn, 
Heinrich, and Hill 2001).  Empirically, however, the research on this topic is divided.  
On the one hand, a wealth of literature has studied political oversight in great depth and 
has examined – both theoretically and empirically – the numerous ways political actors 
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can and do monitor and influence bureaucratic policy outcomes (e.g. McCubbins, Noll 
and Weingast 1989; Wood and Waterman 1991, 1993, 1994; Moe 1989).  Yet, another 
line of research suggests that political assessment does not occur systematically.  Rather, 
most bureaucratic behavior and policy outputs and outcomes are generally ignored by 
political elites.  It is only in times of crisis (e.g. a political/policy fiasco) that political 
actors respond, and often for self-serving reasons (e.g. blame avoidance).   
The findings presented in this chapter attempt to, at least partially, explain this 
discrepancy.  At least for educational political-administrative arrangements, political 
assessment does appear to occur, albeit in a conditional manner.  The key determinant in 
predicting whether political actors will respond to failure is whether the failure pertains 
to a salient policy output/outcome.  Past failure is a significant predictor of political 
involvement if the issue is universally salient.  Failure occurring in secondary or tertiary 
policy outputs does not explain differences in levels of political involvement.  This 
finding reinforces other research that has argued policy salience is key in explaining 
political behavior (e.g. Gormley 1986, 1989; Ringquist, Worsham and Eisner 2003).   
The evidence presented in this chapter also suggests not only do political actors 
respond to bureaucratic behavior and outputs, but that bureaucratic behavior is 
responsive to political actions.  Political contact was associated with changes in both 
managerial networking and the amount of time managers spent on internal rather than 
external management.  Managers who experienced higher levels of contact with the 
school board were more likely to reduce the extent they engaged in networking with 
  
86 
external actors while increasing the percent of time they spent focusing on issues within 
the district.  Furthermore, political interactions with managers also appear to result in 
improved performance, but only for districts that performed poorly in the past.  
Alternatively, unwarranted political contact appears to have a negative effect on future 
performance.   
These results provide some tentative answers to some of the questions posed in 
Chapter II.  While the findings are robust and are not sensitive to model specifications, 
one must be careful in overstating their significance.  First, these findings pertain to a 
particular type of political-administrative system, namely Texas school districts.  School 
districts hold certain traits that are distinct from, say, the federal government.  Thus, 
caution should be used in generalizing these findings.  Also, there is, undoubtedly, 
considerable error in the measures employed.  However, such error should, presumably, 
make it more difficult to find statistically significant results.  Finding these relationships, 
then, given the measurement error provides some reassurance that the theoretical 
relationships actually exist.  Thus, despite the acknowledged shortcomings of these data, 
the results still provide some insight into the broader question concerning the role of 
political assessment in the logic of governance.  
While the findings get us closer to answering the questions put forward earlier, 
they also open up a variety of new questions.  For example, what is the longer-term 
relationship between failure, political intervention and performance?  Past research has 
found that managerial networking has tangible benefits for organizational performance 
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(e.g., Meier and O’Toole 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004; Meier, O’Toole and Nicholson-Crotty 
2004; O’Toole and Meier 2003, 2004; Nicholson-Crotty and O’Toole 2004; Goerdel 
2006).  If increased political involvement decreases managerial networking, such 
interactions may have long-term implications for organizational performance.  That is, 
decreases in networking may result in declines in future organizational performance.  If 
this is the case, we might expect organizations that experience political intervention due 
to poor past performance to produce temporary improvements yet experience longer 
term performance problems due to decreases in networking, which may work to sustain 
longer term organizational performance.  
Furthermore, this research does not address exactly how gains in performance are 
obtained.  Indeed, there are numerous ways managers and school board members could 
attempt to influence performance.  To what extent does removing the chief administrator 
(i.e. the superintendent) result in improvement?  Alternatively, are the gains in 
performance real, or are managers manipulating performance indicators as a means of 
coping with political pressure.  Indeed, teachers and administrators frequently have been 
caught cheating on state test results.29  Thus, are the improvements associated with 
increased political pressure the result of an increase in quality of management or simply 
cunning managers cutting corners?  These are just a few questions that remain 
unanswered, and that future research should address.   
                                                 
29
 Some teachers have been caught actually changing the answers of students after students turn in their 
exams.  Similarly, administrators can manipulate the classification of students (e.g. special education) so 
that test scores of their students do not count toward the district’s accountability rating.   
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CHAPTER IV 
REPRESENTATION, RESPONSIVENESS AND RELATIVE FAILURE 
One of the core findings of Chapter III pertained to the importance of policy 
salience in determining whether political actors will respond to policy performance 
failure.  That is, the likelihood of political contact was significantly higher if past failure 
occurred, but only if that past failure involved a policy output that was salient.  Of the 
seven ostensibly non-salient – or more appropriately, conditionally salient – policy 
outputs examined, only one was a significant predictor of political contact.30  Failure in 
the other six policy areas was not associated with an increased probability of political-
administrative interaction – arguably a prerequisite for political influence.   
One reason selective responsiveness occurs is that different bureaucratic (and 
political) institutions serve different clienteles and, thus, have different goals, priorities 
and demands.  Parents’ expectations for students’ college preparedness in a wealthy, 
suburban district are likely different from parents’ expectations in less affluent, working-
class districts.  Thus, we would expect the preferences and priorities of both 
administrators and school board members to be different in these two scenarios.  Elected 
officials are likely to monitor those policy outputs that matter to their constituents, and 
ignore (perhaps unconsciously) those that do not.31  Indeed, research has found that, at 
                                                 
30
 The one that was statistically significant was the TAKS pass rates for low-income students.  Arguably, 
this policy output was significant because the proportion of low-income students in the typical district is 
quite high, while would result in a reduction of overall TAKS pass rates – a highly salient output.   
31
 Evidence suggests that citizens evaluate political performance in a similar manner, where citizens only 
consider issues they deem salient in assessing politicians (Edwards, Mitchell and Welch 1995). 
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least for salient issues, politicians often respond to the preferences of the public in terms 
of the policies they adopt (e.g., Page and Shapiro 1983, Bernstein 2005).  That is, 
rational politicians will be selectively responsive.   
While this is ostensibly the proper role of democratic representation, selective 
political responsiveness may have negative consequences.  If the interests of some 
segment of the community are not represented, their interests are not likely to be 
considered salient and, thus, not attended to.  In the case of historically disadvantaged 
groups, such as Latinos or African Americans, inadequate representation within the 
elected institution could result in their interests being ignored.  Politicians in majority-
Anglo school districts may be oblivious to the services provided to and the performance 
of minority students.  Politicians are not always alone in such neglect.  In his 
enumeration of bureaupathologies, Caiden (1991) includes “social astigmatism” or the 
failure to identify problems.  If minority student performance is not a salient issue to 
political elites or administrators, such failure is likely to go unnoticed (i.e. social 
astigmatism), providing that it does not interfere with salient outputs.   
Thus, areas of bureaucratic failure that are deemed unimportant to the general 
public are likely to be ignored by both politicians and administrators.  Indeed, O’Toole 
and Meier (2004) have provided empirical evidence that public managers 
disproportionately focus on majoritarian concerns often at the expense of minority group 
interests.  In a study of the role of managerial networking in Texas school districts, 
O’Toole and Meier found that managers with high networking skills improve 
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performance for Anglo students and college-oriented students, and actually negatively 
affect minority and poor students’ performance.  They argue this is because external 
managerial networking disproportionately involves contact with actors who are 
interested in improving performance indicators that are relevant for already advantaged 
students, such as ACT and SAT scores.  This, in turn, comes at the expense of focusing 
on the performance of disadvantaged groups such as black, Latino, and low-income 
students.  
Salience, then, is a relative concept.  What is salient to one group may not be 
salient to another.  Furthermore, the level of salience for a particular output may change 
even within the same group of individuals.  Indeed, this is seen frequently as the 
important issues of the day continually shift (e.g., public opinion toward undocumented 
immigrants, affirmative action, or gun control).  Such shifts in the level of salience for a 
particular policy can occur for different reasons.  One explanation is crisis.  Significant 
policy failure may result in a public outcry, resulting in increased attention and 
ultimately salience.  Indeed, following Hurricane Katrina and Rita, the effectiveness of 
federal disaster responsiveness became one of the most important issues on the political 
landscape.  The media often plays a significant role in either initiating or increasing 
public awareness or exposure to the crisis.32  In the case of Katrina, numerous stories 
relayed by multiple media outlets demonstrated the lack of preparation for the disaster 
on the part of FEMA and local government officials.  Similarly, the devastating events 
                                                 
32
 Past research has found a link between media coverage and public’s opinion about salience of various 
policy issues (e.g. Page, Shapiro, and Dempsey 1987; Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Kellstedt 2003).   
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of September 11, 2001 changed the publics’ level of salience toward airport security and 
perhaps national security in general.  Hence, crisis resulting for bureaucratic failure is 
one means of altering political salience toward an issue and, thus, political 
responsiveness toward that issue.   
A second way political salience can be altered is through a shift in the 
preferences of the political institution.  Indeed, the composition of a political institution 
largely dictates its preferences and priorities.  This can be seen at the national level as 
the composition of political institutions shift from Republican to Democrat, so do the 
priorities.  Environmental protection, for example, is typically given more credence as a 
policy by a Democrat controlled Congress or presidency than a Republican one.  This 
suggests that the salience, and hence political responsiveness, to a policy output is 
contingent, in part, on the composition of the political institution.  With respect to 
education policy, as suggested above, the outputs that are considered salient will largely 
depend on what the community defines as salient and what members of the elected 
school board consider important.   
This chapter is interested in examining political responsiveness to policy outputs 
that may not be considered universally salient.  In particular, it examines political 
responsiveness to failure related to Latino student performance.  Chapter III found that 
past Latino student performance on the TAKS exam is not related to the likelihood of 
political involvement in public administration.  Arguably, this is because Latino student 
performance is not a salient issue to most Texas school districts.  Hence, elected officials 
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as well as school administrators are less likely to take notice of deficiencies in Latino 
student performance (i.e. social astigmatism) unless these deficiencies significantly 
affect overall performance.  This chapter examines the how political representation can 
moderate perceptions of salience, resulting in political responsiveness.   
More than 46 percent of the 4.5 million students enrolled in Texas public schools 
are Latino – nearly 10 percent higher than ten years earlier.33  However, less than 36 
percent of 2007 high school graduates were Latino.  Alternatively, over 47 percent of 
these graduates were Anglo (who make up 35.7 percent of total students).  Despite 
recent gains, Latino students continue to lag behind Anglo students on a number of 
performance indicators.  The average Latino pass rate on the TAKS exam is 62 percent 
compared to 82 percent for Anglo students.  Similarly, the statewide average 4-year 
dropout rate for Latinos is 13.1 compared to 3.9 for Anglos.  The percent of Latino 
students who score above 1110 on the SAT (or its equivalent on the ACT) is nearly 28 
points lower than for Anglos (11.4 percent compared to 38.2 percent), and the percent of 
Anglo students who are classified as “College Ready” is more than double the Latino 
figure (48 percent versus 21 percent). 
These discrepancies in elementary and secondary education have implications for 
future opportunities in higher education.  While Hispanics make up over 35 percent of 
the state’s population, only about 25 percent of those enrolled in higher education 
                                                 
33
 As of 2007, Hispanic students made up 46.3 percent of the 4,576,933 students enrolled in public school 
districts.  In 1997, 1,432,546 Hispanic students were enrolled in public schools (37.4% of total students).  
Source: Texas Education Agency, Academic Excellence Indicator System, 2007 and 1997 State 
Performance Reports. 
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institutions are Hispanic and Hispanics account for only about 21 percent of college 
degree recipients.34  The Latino population in Texas and nationally is growing rapidly; 
indeed, from 2000 to 2006 the Latino population increased by 24 percent and the Census 
projects that by 2050, Hispanics will make up nearly 25 percent of the U.S. population 
(U.S. Census, 2006).  Hence, scholarly research on Latinos – as the nation’s largest 
ethnic minority group – is becoming increasingly necessary and valuable.   
While Latino students are a plurality of students enrolled in Texas public schools, 
the question remains whether Latinos have gained enough political clout to influence the 
behavior of political actors.  That is, in the context of this research project, are political 
actors responsive to Latino student performance?  As Chapter III as well as past research 
suggests, political actors respond to politically salient policy outputs; thus, what 
conditions are needed for political responsiveness to occur when the policy outcome is 
not universally salient?  This chapter presents an interactive model that considers the 
role political representation plays in shaping policy salience, and thus political 
responsiveness.    
Political Representation 
Conceptually, there are several ways to define representation.  One view of 
representation considers the representative a delegate for those particular voters who 
elected him or her, and the legislator ought to represent the interests of this constituency.  
Under this form of representation – called dyadic representation – each legislator has one 
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 Source: 2006 data from the Department of Education, Institute of Education Sciences.   
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constituency (Weissberg 1978).  Another type of dyadic representation is when a 
legislator acts in such a way as to benefit his or her district as a whole rather than solely 
those citizens who voted for him or her.  Again, this presents a situation where there is 
one constituency.  
Coming out of this is Hanna Pitkin’s (1967) distinction between descriptive and 
substantive representation.  Descriptive representation is where the political official is 
“standing for” the represented, where substantive representation is where he or she is 
“acting for” the represented.  Pitkin argues if elected officials substantively represent the 
interests of the people rather than their own interests, then the people are empowered and 
a democratic aspect to the republic is satisfied.  There has been considerable empirical 
research examining both descriptive and substantive representation that has attempted to 
answer the question of whether descriptive representation (e.g. race, ethnicity, gender, 
social class) translates into substantive representation.  The literature on minority 
representation has approached these questions in several different ways.  One approach 
has examined the congruence between the policy preferences of minority legislators and 
minority citizens.  Much of this literature has found that elected minority legislators do 
share many of the same values and policy preferences as their minority constituents (e.g. 
Tate 2004).   
Non-constituents can still be represented under this framework, however, through 
virtual representation, which takes place when there are common interests and attitudes 
between the political actor and a group of people, even though those people did not 
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choose the political actor.  Virtual representation might be found among business or 
environmental groups and legislators who have congruent interests.  Indeed, this form of 
representation may be superior to actual representation (legislators acting in the interests 
of their electors) because virtual representation is based on shared attitudes, whereas 
there may not be shared sentiment under actual representation (see Pitkin’s (1967) 
discussion of Edmund Burke, 175).  Thus, under virtual representation, individuals who 
are not actually represented through their vote may be represented by a legislator who 
shares their values and acts in a manner that advances their interests.  
A second set of research has examined the success to which minority legislators 
are able to adopt legislation and policies that benefit their minority constituents.  Karnig 
and Welch (1980), examine the determinants of the successful elections of black mayors 
and city councilpersons.  They also examine the influence black mayors have on city 
budgets, finding some evidence that black representation is associated with differences 
in budgetary policy (also see Bratton and Haynie 1999).  The most common approach, 
however, examines the relationship between minority representation in elected 
institutions and policy outcomes for minority constituents.  Descriptive representation 
has been linked to increases in minority administrative positions in municipal 
governments (Dye and Renick 1981; Kerr and Mladenka 1994) as well as within school 
districts (Polinard, Wrinkle and Longoria 1990; Wright, Hirlinger and England 1998).  
Furthermore, policy outcomes for minority groups have been found to improve as a 
result of descriptive representation.  With respect to K-12 education policy, Latino 
representation on the school boards is associated with improvements in Latino student 
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performance (Fraga, Meier and England 1986; Meier and Stewart 1991).  There is a 
consensus in this literature suggesting that descriptive representation is indeed associated 
with substantive representation and positive outcomes for the groups who are 
descriptively represented (Karnig and Welch 1980; Eisinger 1982; Meier and Stewart 
1991; Gay 2001; Tate 2003; but see Swain 1993; Robinson 2002).   
Therefore, a great deal of empirical literature suggests that race and ethnicity are 
appropriate proxies for incentives and motivations of elected officials.  That is, Latino 
representatives are more likely to advance the interests of Latino constituents than are 
Anglo representatives.  This could be because Latino representatives gain their primary 
electoral support from Latino voters.  Alternatively, Latino representatives may push for 
Latino interests because of shared values and preferences, as the representation literature 
suggests.  Regardless of the origin of motivation, the literature recognizes race and 
ethnicity as robust indicators of policy preferences.   
Representation and Political Responsiveness 
With the concept of descriptive representation in mind, this chapter proceeds by 
replicating the findings from Chapter III, focusing, however, on Latino student 
performance.  We saw in Chapter III that – unlike with overall performance – school 
boards were not more likely to engage in contact with superintendents in response to 
poor Latino student performance.  This result was theoretically expected since Latino 
student outcomes are not universally salient, and we only expect political actors to 
respond to politically salient issues.  However, if the values of the political institution 
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change, the issue salience should change, ergo, politicians will respond to different 
stimuli.  The expectation, then, is that the more the interests of Latinos are represented 
on the school board via descriptive representation, the more likely it will be that school 
boards respond to Latino student failure.  This implies an interactive relationship 
between past failure and Latino representation, where past Latino failure will not elicit a 
political response unless there is Latino descriptive representation on the school board.   
The second step is to examine whether increased descriptive representation is 
associated with improvements in Latino student performance (i.e. substantive 
representation).35  Chapter III provided evidence that political responsiveness is 
associated with improvements in future performance.  This chapter replicates this 
analysis for Latino student, adding the concept of representation.  The addition of this 
concept complicates the story somewhat.  In Chapter III, the effects of contact were 
conditional on the presence of past failure, where unwarranted contact actually had a 
negative effect on future performance.  In the case of Latino student performance, the 
effects of contact should be moderated by both past failure and descriptive 
representation.  This implies a three-way interaction between past failure, contact, and 
Latino representation.   
The literature on representation has generally found a positive relationship 
between descriptive representation and outcomes for minority groups.  However, under 
                                                 
35
 Arguably, political intervention alone – even if unsuccessful in producing changes – could be 
considered a form of substantive representation.  The act of responding to failure indicates the 
representative is acting for, rather than just standing for, his or her constituents.  The lack of political 
responsiveness could indicate cases where descriptive representation has not translated into substantive 
representation.  
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this framework the effect of descriptive representation on outcomes is conditioned by 
political responsiveness.  That is, descriptive representation is expected to improve 
performance, but only if some action is taken on the part of the representatives.  Indeed, 
it is unlikely that Latino school board members who do not engage administrators of an 
under-performing district will be able to influence policy outcomes for Latino students.  
Thus, this research takes the question of descriptive representation one step further by 
accounting for the actions of representatives.  Indeed, faith (or in this case values) 
without works, is dead.   
From this, we can derive some conditional hypotheses.   
H1a:  The likelihood of political intervention occurring will not increase as 
Latino student failure increases if Latino representation is not present. 
H1b:  The likelihood of political intervention occurring will increase as Latino 
student failure increases if Latino representation is present. 
The first hypothesis posits that bureaucratic failure specific to Latino students is unlikely 
to lead to political intervention if there is no Latino descriptive representation on the 
school board.  Its corollary (H1b) is that political responsiveness to poor Latino student 
performance is likely to occur if at least some members of the school board are 
themselves Latino.  Research suggests that, compared to their non-Latino counterparts, 
Latino elected officials are more likely to have values, experiences and preferences that 
reflect the values and preferences of Latino constituents.  Therefore, Latino school board 
members are more inclined to be concerned with the performance of Latino students and 
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consider it a salient issue, which makes them more likely to identify problems specific to 
Latinos and, in turn, take steps to remedy such problems.  Anglo school board members, 
alternatively, are less likely to be concerned specifically with Latino performance, and 
may simply look at overall measures of performance that they consider salient.   Thus, 
Latino-specific outcomes are expected to be more salient to Latino representatives than 
non-Latino representatives, thus increasing the likelihood that they will respond when 
failure occurs in Latino-specific outputs or outcomes.   
Figure 4.1.  
A Model of Race, Salience and Political Responsiveness 
 
Figure 4.1 visually presents this rationale.  Race and ethnicity are strongly linked 
to values and policy preferences – especially regarding policies that are related to race 
Organizational 
Failure 
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and/or ethnicity.  These preferences, then, shape what is deemed salient, which, in turn, 
influences which policies will be monitored and, in the case of failure, responded to.  
With respect to how representation and political involvement influence future 
performance, the logic articulated above suggests the following hypotheses. 
H2: Political contact will be associated with improvements in Latino student 
performance if past failure and Latino representation are present.  
Hypothesis 2 posits that – as was the case of salient outputs in Chapter III – political 
intervention, as a response to past failure, will result in improvements in Latino student 
performance; however, this result is conditional on the presence of Latino representation 
on the school board.  Political contact in and of itself is not expected to lead to 
improvements and may be nothing more than political meddling.  However, if past 
failure exists and Latinos are represented on the school board, the content of political 
interactions with administrators is more likely to include discussions about the Latino-
related failure than it would be if Latino representation were absent.  Therefore, the 
expectation is that political contact will result in improvements under this scenario.    
The effect of representation on future performance, alternatively, is also 
conditional in nature.  While much of the research consistently finds a positive 
relationship between descriptive representation of minority groups and policy outcomes 
for those minority groups, one would not expect this to be the case if the representatives 
were not responsive to bureaucratic outputs for those groups to begin with.  That is, if 
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elected officials were themselves unaware of failure specific to the group they ostensibly 
represent, or if they simply did not respond to such failure, we would not expect that 
their presence alone would result in an improved outcome for that group.  Again, for 
substantive representation to occur, representative must act for the group they represent.  
Hypothesis 4 summarizes this logic.   
H3: Latino representation will be associated with improvements in Latino 
student performance if past failure and political contact are present.   
Figure 4.2. 
An Interactive Model of the Determinants of Organizational Performance 
 
Failure 
Representation 
Contact 
Future 
Performance 
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This interactive relationship, then, entails a three-way interaction between failure, 
contact and representation, where the effect of any one of these variables will depend on 
the value of the others.  This concept is depicted graphically in Figure 4.2.  That is, the 
relationship between representation and performance of Latino students is going to 
depend on past performance and whether Latino representatives engaged in contact with 
district administration.  Alternatively, the effect of past Latino student failure on future 
performance will depend on whether Latino interests are represented on the school board 
and whether political actors engaged administrators.  
Data and Methods 
To test these hypotheses, the data and measures used in Chapter III are employed.  
In addition to these measures, several others are added.  Specifically, measures of 
Latino-specific failure, Latino performance improvements and Latino descriptive 
representation are needed.  Texas school districts are especially useful in examining 
issues related to Latino students since, unlike many other states, there is tremendous 
variation on Latino student indicators.  In 2005, the average district in Texas was 
comprised of 31 percent Latino students, and this percentage ranged from zero to 100.  
In the average Texas district, 54 percent of Latino students pass all components of the 
TAKS exam; furthermore, the Latino TAKS pass rate ranges from 9 percent to 97 
percent.  These data, then, provide us with substantial variation.    
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Latino-Specific Bureaucratic Failure 
Latino representatives, conceptually, should be more likely to recognize and 
respond to Latino-specific failure.  Thus, a measure is needed that captures the 
performance of Latino students.  Since districts vary considerably in terms of what they 
regard as acceptable performance, an absolute measure of Latino performance is 
problematic.  For example, a Latino TAKS pass rate of 75 may be acceptable to a district 
if the non-Latino pass rate is also in that range, while it would be considered a failure in 
a district where the non-Latino pass rate was 95.  Therefore, a relative measure of 
performance should provide a better measure of failure.  To create a relative measure of 
Latino student performance, the performance gap on the TAKS exam between Anglo 
and Latino students is used.  More formally, it is TAKSA - TAKSL.  This provides the 
differential in performance between Latinos and Anglos, where higher values represent 
higher levels of bureaucratic failure with respect to Latino performance (i.e. Anglos 
perform significantly above Latinos).  Recognizing the vast differences in district 
performance, Anglo pass rates, then, act as a baseline for the expected performance of 
the district.  Latino school board members are expected to be more likely to take notice 
of Latino student performance, and assess whether it is where it should be (i.e. 
comparable to Anglo pass rates).  Discrepancies in the performance of Latino students 
relative to Anglo students should result in increased political involvement with school 
district administration if Latino representation is present on the school board (H1).   
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Political Representation 
With the exception of one school district, the Texas educational system uses 
independent school districts with elected school boards that are charged with 
responsibility for each public school district.  These school districts are independent in 
the sense that they are independently elected and possess authority to run their respective 
districts independent from city, county or state governments.  While there are state 
reporting and testing requirements, school boards make decisions with respect to tax 
rates, educational curricula, hiring the chief administrative officer, among other 
responsibilities.  The majority (92%) of school boards in Texas consist of seven 
members, but size of the board can range from 3 to 19.  In all, there are over 7,000 
school board members serving on Texas school boards.36   
To measure political representation, data from the National Association of Latino 
Elected Officials (NALEO) is used.  This organization produces a directory of all Latino 
elected officials in the United States at national, state and local levels, including the 
number of Latinos who have been elected to school boards.  Using these data, along with 
TEA data on the total number of members each district has, a measure of the percentage 
of school board members who are Latino was created.  There is a considerable variation 
in Latino school board representation in Texas school districts.  Of the 7,000+ school 
board members, nearly 10 percent (695) are Latino.  While the number of Latinos on 
school boards ranges from zero to 11, most school boards (80%) have no Latino board 
                                                 
36
 Based on author’s calculations using 2005 school board data.  Of the 1035 public districts in 2005, there 
were a total of 7178 school board members, 695 of whom were Latino.   
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members at all.  This lack of representation even occurs, albeit at a lower rate, in school 
districts that are majority Latino students.  Indeed, 35 percent of districts with at least 50 
percent Latino student had no Latino members on their school board.  On average, 
Latino descriptive representation on the school board is 20 percentage points lower than 
the percentage of Latino students enrolled in the school district.   
 The Effect of Latino Performance on Political Responsiveness 
The first step in replicating the results from Chapter III for Latinos is to model 
the frequency of political-administrative contact as a function of past bureaucratic failure.  
Political contact is measured as it was in Chapter III; that is, it is a five-point scale of the 
frequency of contact between school board members and the superintendent ranging 
from annual to daily contact.  Past failure, in this case, is the Anglo-Latino gap in TAKS 
pass rates; thus, higher levels of past failure are expected to be associated with 
interactions that are more frequent.  This relationship, however, is expected to be 
conditional on descriptive representation; therefore, Latino school board representation 
is also included in the model and is interacted with past failure.  Formally, this can be 
stated as: 
  
C R F RF M O= + + + + +β β β β β ε1 2 3 4 5   [4.1] 
where C is the level of political Contact, 
R is the level of Latino Representation on the school board, 
F is past Failure (i.e. Anglo-Latino gap), 
RF is a multiplicative term between Failure and Representation, 
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M is a vector of Managerial factors,  
O is a vector of Organizational characteristics,  
and ε is a random error term.  
The same managerial variables that were used in the first model in Chapter III 
are used in this model; namely, managerial experience in the district and managerial 
networking.  Similarly, this model controls for the same organizational characteristics as 
were controlled for in Chapter III.  These include teacher turnover, student-teacher ratio, 
percent of non-certified teachers, average teacher experience, average teacher salary (in 
$1,000), total revenue per pupil, logged state aid, and total enrollment (in 1,000s).  Since 
this model is explicitly interested in minority student populations (Latino students), I 
control for the percent of enrolled students who are Latino and African-American, 
respectively.   
In testing the first hypothesis, several other factors are taken into consideration.  
The measure of past failure is measured as Latino performance relative to Anglo 
performance, which implies that school board members will compare Latino 
performance to some baseline, presumably Anglo performance.  This requires, then, that 
there are such groups so that a comparison can be made.  Superintendents in districts 
with no Latino students obviously cannot respond to their failure.  Alternatively, in 
districts with all Latino students, there is no comparison group to assess student 
performance.  Rather, performance is likely assessed based on the performance of other 
districts, as was argued to be the case in Chapter III.  Therefore, in examining 
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responsiveness to Latino performance, only districts with Latino student percentages 
within the 5th and 95th percentiles (2 percent and 92 percent, respectively) were included.  
Similarly, only districts with at least 5 percent (5th percentile) Anglo students were 
included to ensure an adequate comparison group.  Additionally, only districts with at 
least 10 Latino students and at least 250 total students were included.  This was done 
because, in dealing with percentages, extreme and unrepresentative values are more 
likely in smaller districts.  In the final sample of districts for this model, the average 
district had 27 percent Latino students (ranging from 11 to nearly 99,000 Latino 
students), 62 percent Anglo students (ranging from 49 to over 38,000 students), and an 
average enrollment of 4781 students (median = 1443).  
The final consideration in selecting the cases for the first model is the level of 
past failure.  Theoretically, if the gap between Anglo and Latino students were 
excessively large, political responsiveness would be expected regardless of the level of 
representation.  This could occur for at least two reasons.  First, an exceedingly large 
performance gap is likely to garner attention from citizens, researchers or local media, 
resulting in a crisis or political fiasco.  Such fiascoes are one sure way to capture the 
attention of politicians.  The second reason political responsiveness would be more 
likely under massive failure of Latinos is that extremely poor performance of Latinos, 
relative to Anglos, will decrease the district’s overall performance – a policy output that 
school board members do pay close attention to.  Thus, cases where the past Anglo-
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Latino TAKS pass rate gap was greater than the 95th percentile (27) were excluded. 37 
Table 4.1 presents summary statistics for all the variables in the model.   
Table 4.1. Summary Statistics for Model 1 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Political Contact  4.29 0.88 2 6 
Latino Representation 5.80 13.34 0 100 
Lagged Anglo-Latino TAKS Gap 11.89 8.19 -27.4 26.9 
Managerial Networking 0.01 0.98 -2.71 2.78 
Superintendent's Experience in District 9.57 9.72 0 44 
Teacher Turnover 16.66 6.50 0.8 44.3 
Average Teacher Experience 12.35 1.98 2.6 18.3 
% Non-Certified Teachers 4.54 4.36 0 32.1 
Student Teacher Ratio 13.24 1.96 4.80 30.47 
Average Teacher Salary (in $1000s) 37.10 2.68 29.80 49.02 
Logged State Aid 10.54 3.83 5.48 19.38 
Revenue Per Pupil (in $1000s) 7587.11 1628.12 4723 18656 
% Black Students 9.21 11.52 0 68.6 
% Latino Students 27.43 21.51 2.3 91 
% Low Income Students 45.78 16.46 1.1 89.4 
District Size (in 1000s) 4.78 11.66 0.25 163.56 
 
Ordered logistic regression analysis is used to test Hypothesis 1.  Table 4.2 
presents the results from this analysis.  Latino representation is negatively related to the 
frequency of political contact when there is parity in Anglo and Latino student 
performance (i.e. failure = 0).  More interesting, however, is that past Latino failure is 
                                                 
37
 It should be noted that the results of the models do vary somewhat depending on the selection of cases.  
The general pattern holds, however, for nearly all specifications of the level of past failure (including no 
restriction at all), albeit the relationships are not equally strong in all scenarios.     
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not related to the frequency of contact at all when there is no Latino representation on 
the school board ( 008.−=β) ).  That is, political responsiveness to bureaucratic failure 
pertaining to Latino students is absent if the interests of Latino students are not 
represented on the school board via descriptive representation.  This finding supports 
Hypothesis 1b, which posits Latino failure would not increase the likelihood of contact if 
descriptive representation on the school board was not present.  These results are 
conditional, however, as indicated by the interactive term.  Thus, the effect of 
representation – while negative and statistically significant when failure is absent – may 
be different at other levels of failure.   
To examine the conditional effects of both representation and past failure on the 
likelihood of contact, conditional slopes and standard errors can be obtained for each 
variable.  Using the Clarify package in Stata, 1,000 simulations were used to estimate the 
probability of observing each level of contact.  Rather than having only one estimate for 
each β, these simulations provide 1,000 estimates of each β from the model, which 
provides a measure of level of uncertainty around each of the parameter estimates.  This 
allows us to include estimates of uncertainty in our calculations of the predicted 
probabilities for various levels of the dependent variable.  Figure 4.3 presents four plots 
depicting the predicted probabilities of school board members having annual, weekly, 
more than monthly, and daily contact with the superintendents.   
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Table 4.2.  Political Contact, Latino Representation and Latino Failure 
 Political Contact 
Latino Representation -0.034 
 (0.012)** 
 
Lagged Anglo-Latino TAKS Gap -0.008 
 (0.008) 
 
Representation × Anglo-Latino Gap 0.002 
 (0.001)** 
 
Managerial Networking 0.975 
 (0.067)** 
Superintendent's Experience in District -0.017 
 (0.006)** 
Teacher Turnover -0.006 
 (0.010) 
Average Teacher Experience -0.016 
 (0.036) 
% Non-Certified Teachers 0.005 
 (0.014) 
Student Teacher Ratio 0.101 
 (0.045)* 
Average Teacher Salary (in $1000s) -0.020 
 (0.033) 
Logged State Aid 0.026 
 (0.019) 
Revenue Per Pupil (in $1000s) 0.016 
 (0.053) 
% Black Students 0.014 
 (0.006)* 
% Latino Students 0.014 
 (0.005)** 
% Low Income Students -0.024 
 (0.006)** 
District Size (in 1000s) 0.011 
 (0.006) 
 
Observations 1242 
Pseudo R2 .11 
χ
2
(16)   350.17 
Cut 1     -4.06   (1.16) 
Cut 1     -2.23   (1.15) 
Cut 1      0.54   (1.14) 
Cut 1      2.84   (1.15) 
Order Logistic Regression. (Standard errors in parentheses) * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
  
Figure 4.3. Predicted Probabilities of Contact Conditional on Past Latino Failure by Level of Representation 
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The first plot in this figure presents the predicted probabilities (with confidence 
intervals) of yearly contact – the lowest observed value – for varying levels of past 
bureaucratic failure with respect to Latino performance.  This plot presents the predicted 
probabilities for both high (100 percent) and low (0 percent) levels of Latino 
representation on the school board.  As can be seen, the predicted probability of annual 
contact is quite high when representation is high and Latino student performance is high 
relative to Anglo performance.  This represents the expected likelihood of annual contact 
if Latinos are well represented and Latino students are performing significantly above 
Anglo students.  The predicted probabilities drastically decline, however, as the Anglo-
Latino performance gap grows to where the likelihood of annual contact in the average 
district (Anglo-Latino gap = 12) with full descriptive representation is virtually zero.  
What is interesting is that the predicted probabilities are static when descriptive 
representation is absent.  This implies that the behavior of school boards without Latino 
members is non-responsive to relative Latino performance in that, regardless of whether 
Latinos are under- or over-performing, the likelihood of annual contact does not change.  
The plot in the upper right hand corner presents the predicted probabilities for 
weekly contact – the modal category for this variable.  Here we see that the probabilities 
are trending in opposite directions, although the differences in the probabilities are not 
statistically significant from one another.  The trend, however, is in the direction we 
would expect; that is, as Latino performance falters, the likelihood of weekly contact 
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declines if representation is present.38  More interesting, however, is the plot in the lower 
left-hand side of Figure 4.3.  This plots the probabilities of observing political-
administrative interaction occurring more than once a week.  When representation is 100 
percent, there is a low probability of more than weekly contact if Latino students are 
performing well compared to their Anglo counterparts.  Yet, when Anglos students 
significantly out-perform Latinos (i.e. Latino-specific bureaucratic failure), the 
probability of more than weekly contact significantly increases to the point that, under 
high levels of failure, more than weekly contact is an expected outcome.39  Additionally, 
the differences in predicted probabilities across this range of values of failure are 
statistically different from one another (i.e. the confidence intervals do not overlap).  
Thus, the predicted probability when the performance gap is -10 and representation is 
100 is statistically different from when the gap is, say, +10.   
This is not the cases when descriptive representation is zero.  The likelihood of 
observing this higher level of contact does not change significantly in response to past 
failure.  That is, there is no statistical difference between the likelihood of weekly-plus 
contact when the Anglo-Latino performance gap is -10 and +10, or -10 and +25.  This 
suggests that school boards are unresponsive to Latino performance if Latino interests 
are not represented descriptively on the school board.  This is exactly what Hypothesis 1 
predicts.   
                                                 
38
 A decline is expected under representation since weekly contact is the norm, rather than a high level of 
contact, which we would expect under high levels of representation.  
39
 That is, a probability of .5 is within the 95% interval once failure is greater than about 14.   
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The final plot in Figure 4.3 presents the predicted probabilities of observing daily 
contact between the school board and superintendents – a fairly uncommon phenomenon 
(about 8 percent of observations).  Here we see the same pattern as we did with the other 
level of high contact.  That is, the likelihood of daily contact is low – virtually zero – 
unless past failure is high, in which case it increases significantly and is statistically 
different from the predicted probabilities at lower levels of failure.  This is only the case 
when representation is high.  When representation is absent, political institutions appear 
to be completely unresponsive to Latino student performance.   
We can also examine this conditional relationship between representation and 
bureaucratic performance by estimating the predicted probabilities of contact across the 
full range of representation for different levels of past failure.  Figure 4.4 presents four 
graphs that capture these effects.  The y-axis depicts the predicted probabilities while the 
x-axis is the level of Latino representation on the school board.  The graphs present two 
scenarios of past failure: one where Anglo and Latino pass rates are the same (gap = 0) 
and one where the gap is one standard deviation above the mean (22).  The first graph 
presents the probabilities of observing annual contact and suggests that the presence of 
past failure produces distinctly different expectations even at higher levels of 
representation.  When representation is low, the likelihood of annual contact is 
essentially zero regardless of the level of failure.  However, at higher levels of 
representation, we begin to see a difference.  In districts where Latinos were 
underperforming, the likelihood of annual contact remains essentially zero.  
Alternatively, the likelihood of rare contact was considerably higher in cases where 
  
Figure 4.4.  Predicted Probabilities of Political Contact Conditional on Representation by Level of Latino Failure 
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Latinos were performing well and representation was high.  This suggests that politicians 
may be more likely to employ a hands-off approach in cases where bureaucratic agencies 
are producing satisfactory policy outputs and outcomes.   
The likelihood of weekly contact – the most common frequency of contact – 
tends to decline as the percent of Latino representation on the school board increases, 
especially in cases where past failure was high.  These differences, however, are not 
statistically significant.  Yet for more than weekly contact (bottom left-hand corner), we 
do see a striking difference in the predicted probabilities between different levels of 
failure and representation.  When the school board had few or no Latino members, the 
level of failure does not appear to matter; that is, the predicted probability is about 30 
percent regardless of whether Latino performance was high or low.  Yet, once Latino 
representation reaches about 18 percent, the differences in the predicted probabilities are 
statistically significant.  The likelihood of more than weekly contact drastically declines 
as Latino representation increases, but only in cases where Latino students are 
performing as well as their Anglo counterparts.  In cases where Latinos perform 
significantly below Anglos, the likelihood of contact significantly increases as 
representation increases.   
The final plot in Figure 4.4 presents the predicted probabilities for daily contact, 
and, as can be seen, the pattern is similar to that of more than weekly contact.  At low 
levels of representation, the level of Latino failure does not matter; that is, the behavior 
of school boards is the same regardless of whether Latinos are doing poorly or doing 
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well.  However, as the level of representation increases, the behavior of the school board 
depends on the performance of Latino students.  If Latino students are doing well, the 
likelihood of daily contact is essentially zero; however, if Latino students are 
significantly under-performing compared to Anglos, the likelihood of contact increases.  
What is interesting in all of these scenarios is that when Latino representation is absent, 
the behavior of school boards is the same, regardless of Latino performance.  It is only 
when Latino students are descriptively represented that past Latino performance/failure 
matters in influencing the likelihood of increased levels of contact.  This evidence 
provides support for Hypothesis 1.  This, then, comports with our theoretical expectation 
and suggests that political assessment occurs, but only for policy areas that are 
considered salient by elected officials.  The likelihood that Latino-specific outputs would 
be deemed sufficiently salient to warrant attention increases as the number of elected 
officials who are Latino increases, thus increasing the probability of a response to the 
failure.    
The Conditional Effect of Political Contact on Performance 
The second question this chapter addresses is whether Latino representation and 
political representation make a difference in terms of the future performance of Latino 
students.  Much of the literature on descriptive representation contends that minority 
groups benefit from descriptive representation in terms of policy outcomes that directly 
affect minority groups.  Theoretically, however, this should only be the case if minority 
representatives actually take action on behalf of their constituents.  Minority legislators 
  
118 
who do not actively pursue policies aimed at bettering their constituents, are unlikely to 
be associated with positive policy outcomes for the group they ostensibly represent.  
Thus, in the present case, we should only expect representation to have a positive effect 
on future performance of failing districts if representatives recognized that failure had 
occurred and took some action to remedy that failure (i.e. made political contact).   
This entails a three-way interactive term between past failure, political 
representation and political contact, where the expected effects of each are dependent on 
the presence of the others (see Figure 4.2).  As Hypotheses 3 suggests, higher levels of 
contact are expected to be associated with improvements in performance, if past failure 
and representation are present.  As discussed in Chapter III, contact in and of itself is not 
necessarily conducive to improvements; however, if the contact is in response to failure, 
then improvements are expected.  Similarly, Hypothesis 4 suggests that the relationship 
between representation and improvements for Latinos is conditional on both the level of 
contact and failure.  Unnecessary high contact is expected to have a negative effect on 
performance.  Yet if failure is present and nothing is done (i.e. little interaction with 
superintendent), then we do not expect improvements to occur, regardless of the level of 
descriptive representation since substantive representation (i.e. action) is arguably not 
occurring.   
To test these hypotheses, improvements in the Anglo-Latino performance gap is 
examined.  This measure is created by simply taking the difference of the current Anglo-
Latino TAKS pass rate gap from the gap from the previous year; that is, Improvement = 
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TAKS Gapt-1 – TAKS Gapt.  This gives us a measure where higher values are associated 
with greater success at closing the performance gap between Latino and Anglo students.  
The average improvement in closing the Anglo-Latino performance gap in this sample is 
0.22 (std. dev. = 8.8).  Thus, the gap between Anglos and Latinos tends to stay about the 
same from year to year in most districts.  Indeed, in about half of the observations, the 
change in performance does not change more than three points in either direction.  The 
expectation, then, in that under the correct circumstances, Latino representation and 
contact will be associated with larger gains in closing this performance gaps (i.e. positive 
values on the dependent variable).  Formally, this is modeled as:  
P C R F CR CF RF CRF M O X= + + + + + + + + + +β β β β β β β β β β ε1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10        [4.2] 
where,  
P is the size of the reduction in the Anglo-Latino gap in TAKS pass rates, 
C is the amount of political-managerial Contact, 
R is the level of Latino Representation on the school board, 
F is past Failure (i.e. Anglo-Latino gap), 
CR is a multiplicative term between Contact and Representation, 
CF is a multiplicative term between Contact and Failure,  
RF is a multiplicative term between Failure and Representation, 
CRF is a multiplicative term between Contact, Representation and Failure, 
M is a vector of Managerial variables, 
O is a vector of Organizational characteristics, 
X is a vector of Environmental factors (e.g. district demographics), 
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ε is a random error term and the β’s are estimatable parameters.   
This model essentially replicates the third model in Chapter III, except it 
examines Latino-specific failure and the role that representation plays in shaping policy 
outcomes for Latino students.  This model is estimated using ordinary least squares 
regression and the results are presented in Table 4.3.40  The interpretation of the 
interactive coefficients is complex since these coefficients are conditional on the values 
of the other variables.  For example, the effect of political contact is positive but not 
statistically significant when representation is zero and there is parity in Anglo and 
Latino performance (i.e. gap is 0).  Similarly, representation has a positive effect on 
Latino performance when the performance gap and contact are both zero (a value outside 
the range of data).  To calculate the marginal effects of each constitutive variable we can 
use the following formulae: 
For Contact:  
∂
∂ β β β β
P
C
R F RF= + + +1 4 5 7   [4.3] 
For Representation: 
∂
∂ β β β β
P
R
C F CF= + + +2 4 6 7   [4.4] 
For Past Failure: 
∂
∂ β β β β
P
F
C R CR= + + +3 5 6 7   [4.5]  
                                                 
40
 It should be noted that this model is not as robust as the other models.  While the direction and size of 
the interaction coefficients do not change significantly, the standard errors do change depending on case 
selection.  The best results appear to occur when the percentage of Latino students is between 10 and 60 
percent (presented in Table 4.3).  At other specifications (e.g. the specifications used for Model 1) the 
interactive effects, while still in the same direction, are not statistically significant.   
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By imputing different values of the constitutive variables, we can obtain the 
expected marginal effects of each variable under different scenarios.  Furthermore, we 
can also compute the conditional standard error for each variable at different values of 
the other interactive variables, which allows us to test whether the marginal effects of 
each variable are statistically significant.  The conditional standard error for political 
contact (β1), for example, is computed as: 
 
$
var( $ ) var( $ ) var( $ ) var( $ ) cov( ) cov( )
cov( ) cov( ) cov( ) cov( )
σ
β β β β β β β β
β β β β β β β β∂∂PC
R F R F R F
RF RF RF FR
=
+ + + + +
+ + + +
1
2
4
2
5
2 2
7 1 4 1 5
1 7 4 5
2
4 5
2
5 7
2 2
2 2 2 2
 [4.3] 
Using these formulas, the marginal effects and standard errors of all three 
constitutive variables were calculated for different values of the other variables.  Table 
4.4 presents the conditional slopes and standard errors for 12 hypothetical situations.  
The table first presents the marginal effects of political contact on improvements in 
Latino performance relative to Anglo performance.  This is computed using four 
different states: low representation (0%) and low past failure (Anglo-Latino gap = 0), 
low representation and high failure (gap = 22), high representation (60%) and low failure, 
and high representation and high failure.  The results suggest that political-
administrative contact has no effect of performance when both representation and past 
failure are low.  This represents a situation where there are not electoral incentives (i.e. 
representation) or need (i.e. past failure) for political contact; thus, such contact is not 
expected to – and apparently does not – produce benefits.  Under high political 
representation and low failure, political contact also does not have a statistically 
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Table 4.3.  Effect of Contact, Representation, and Past Failure on Performance 
Dependent Variable = Reduction in Anglo-Latino Gap 
Political Contact (β1) 
 
0.636 
 (0.552) 
 
% Latino School Board Representation (β2) 0.504 
  (0.280)† 
 
Past Anglo-Latino Gap (Failure) (β3) 0.868 
   (0.144)** 
 
Contact × Latino SB Representation (β4) -0.091 
 (0.060) 
 
Contact × Past Failure (β5) -0.093 
   (0.033)** 
 
Latino SB Representation × Past Failure (β6) -0.041 
  (0.018)* 
 
Contact × Latino SB Representation × Past Failure (β7) 0.008 
  (0.004)* 
 
Teacher Turnover -0.067 
 (0.038) 
District Size (1000s) -0.014 
 (0.027) 
Superintendent's Tenure 0.022 
 (0.028) 
Managerial Networking -0.480 
 (0.300) 
Average Teacher Salary -0.117 
 (0.121) 
Instructional Expenditures (1000s) -0.153 
   (0.053)** 
% Black Students -0.016 
 (0.027) 
% Latino Students -0.046 
 (0.026) 
% Low Income Students 0.004 
 (0.025) 
Student Teacher Ratio -0.138 
 (0.125) 
Average Teacher Experience -0.162 
 (0.144) 
% Non-Certified Teachers -0.162 
   (0.055)** 
Constant 10.517 
 (5.789) 
Observations 950 
R-squared 0.22 
(Standard errors in parentheses). † significant at 10% * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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significant effect on performance.  In agreement with the finding in Chapter III, political 
contact does not appear to be related to improved organizational performance if the 
contact is not needed.  That is, in both cases where past failure was low (i.e. there was no 
need for political intervention), contact had no effect on performance regardless of the 
level of representation.   
When past failure is high, however, we see a different pattern.  The effect of 
contact on future performance is negative and statistically significant when 
representation is absent.  In such a case, political interactions with administrators are less 
likely to pertain to Latino performance since Latino interests are not descriptively 
represented by members of the school board; thus, contact does not improve outcomes 
for Latinos.  Yet, when Latinos are descriptively represented, the effect of contact under 
high past failure is positive at statistically significant at the .1 level (one-tailed test).41  
This suggests that the relationship between political involvement in administrative 
affairs and organizational performance is conditional on both the reason for involvement 
as well as the incentives and preferences of the political institution.   
The second set of marginal effects present the effect representation has on 
performance for different levels of contact and past failure.  When past failure is low, 
representation has a positive and statistically significant effect on future performance if 
political contact is low.  Again, this comports with our expectations where unnecessary 
                                                 
41
 Given the amount of random noise in the contact measure, finding any systematic pattern is unlikely.  
With more accurate measures, these relationships would likely be stronger.   
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Table 4.4 Marginal Effects of Contact, Representation and Failure on Performance 
 
Marginal Effects of Contact on Performance 
 Past Failure 
Representation  Low (0) High (22) 
 
Low (0) 0.64 
(0.55) 
-1.39* 
(0.47) 
 
High (60) -4.80 
(3.47) 
3.84◊ 
(2.49) 
 
 
Marginal Effects of Representation on Performance 
 Past Failure 
Contact  Low (0) High (22) 
 
Low (Yearly) 0.32* 
(0.17) 
-0.22† 
(0.127) 
 
High (Daily) -0.04 
(0.11) 
0.13† 
(0.068) 
 
 
Marginal Effects of Past Failure on Performance 
 Representation 
Contact  Low (0) High (60) 
 
Low (Yearly) 0.70* (0.08) 
-1.15* 
(0.56) 
 
High (Daily) -0.33* 
(0.06) 
0.65† 
(0.36) 
    
Conditional slopes with conditional standard errors in parentheses. 
* p < .05;  † p < .10 (two-tailed tests); ◊ p < .1 (one-tailed)  
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contact is not desirable.  In a case where bureaucratic outcomes are satisfactory, lower 
levels of political involvement yields the better outcome.  However, when past 
performance is poor, the opposite trend emerges.  The effects of representation on 
performance are actually negative in cases where past failure is high and political 
intervention does not occur.  Conversely, representation has a positive effect on Latino 
performance in the same situation if contact between school board members and 
administrators is high.  These results support Hypothesis 3 and suggest that descriptive 
representation alone is not enough.  Irrespective of their ethnicity, representatives who 
do not engage in political assessment and take action when needed are not associated 
with substantive representation in terms of positive outcomes for the groups they 
represent.   
The final set of scenarios presented in Table 4.4 examines the effects of past 
failure on future performance.  Theoretically, poor performance in the past is expected to 
continue or even worsen if no action is taken to remedy bureaupathologies that may 
cause the failure.  Such problems are expected to continue until substantial failure occurs 
and major reforms are adopted (Caiden 1991).  If the appropriate action is taken, 
however, past failure can be addressed and appropriate steps can be taken to prevent 
future failure from occurring.  When representation is absent, the assumption is that the 
interactions between school board members and superintendents are not related to Latino 
performance.  Indeed, Model 1 presented evidence suggesting that political actors are 
completely unresponsive to Latino-specific failure when descriptive representation was 
not present.  Therefore, contact observed in districts with non-Latino representation is 
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likely related to other, presumably majoritarian (i.e. Anglo) issues.  The expected 
relationship between past failure in such a case is positive when political contact is low 
and negative when contact is high.  While not immediately apparent, this actually fits 
with our expectations.  High levels of political involvement on issues not related to 
Latinos – which is presumably the case when representation is zero – are likely to divert 
managerial attention to other issues, thus exacerbating the problem.  Low levels of 
contact (when Latino failure would not be the focus) may actually provide managers 
more time to better assess their organizations performance, which may result in 
improvements.   
High levels of descriptive representation, however, are not inherently expected to 
result in improved outcomes for minorities.  When representation is high, but nothing is 
done (i.e. low contact), past failure continues to worsen.  However, if political actors are 
responsive to the failure, the relationship between past failure and future performance is 
positive and statistically significant (at the .1 level).  This, too, supports Hypothesis 3 
and illustrates the conditional nature of these relationships.  
Conclusion 
In Chapter III, we saw the importance of policy salience in determining whether 
political responsiveness to failure would occur.  Political actors, both theoretically and 
empirically, respond to issues they consider salient, perhaps at the expense of “non-
salient” issues.  Unfortunately, in the case of Latinos and African-American student 
performance failure, political responsiveness appeared to be lacking.  This begs the 
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question, how can a democratically elected institution ensure that it is responsive to the 
needs of all citizens, especially those who have historically been disenfranchised?  In 
examining this question, the concept of representation – both descriptive and 
substantive – was introduced and incorporated in the model of political assessment.     
The empirical findings from the models tested in this chapter provide tentative 
support for the hypotheses posited above.  Political values and preferences – measured 
via ethnicity – is a significant predictor of political responsiveness to Latino student 
performance.  Alternatively, when school boards do not represent Latino students, the 
likelihood of political involvement with administration is strikingly static and immune to 
the presence or absence of past failure.  This suggests that political representation of 
group-based interests is a vital component to the political assessment process, and would 
especially be the case in highly diverse communities.   
The theoretical and empirical contributions of this chapter inform at least three 
distinct literatures in the fields of political science and public administration.  First, using 
a governance framework, this work addresses literature on political control.  Consistent 
with past research, it highlights the importance of issue salience in explaining the 
behavior of political institutions.  It goes a step further in examining the nature of 
conditional salience, particularly the importance of race and ethnicity in shaping 
preferences and values, which then determines which issues are considered salient.  It 
also contributes to this literature in finding that political involvement in administrative 
  
128 
affairs is not always desirable.  Indeed, when political contact is not in response to 
bureaucratic shortcomings, political intervention appears to be counterproductive.  
This research also speaks to research on public management in that it illustrates 
how management can develop social astigmatism by only focusing on universally salient 
policies at the expense of disadvantaged groups.  Indeed, O’Toole and Meier (2004) 
found that managerial characteristics that are generally considered assets (e.g., 
managerial networking) disproportionately benefit students who are already better off 
rather than those who are most likely to be disadvantaged (minority students, low 
income).  This suggests that managers –even quality ones – may (perhaps unconsciously) 
wear figurative blinders that focus their sight on a particular set of policy outputs (e.g. 
overall TAKS), perhaps at the expense of others.  What this chapter suggests is that 
political representation of the interests of these disadvantaged groups can help managers 
remove their blinders and help draw managerial attention to the plight of these oft 
forgotten groups.   
Finally, this research speaks directly to the literature on political representation, 
particularly research on descriptive and substantive representation of racial and ethnic 
minorities.  This large literature has found mixed results especially in linking descriptive 
representation to policy outcomes that benefit the descriptively represented groups.  This 
chapter adds to this literature by – in addition to examining how representation 
influences policy outcomes – considering the role representation plays in responding to 
the needs of the represented group.  This chapter suggests that representation is crucial to 
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the process of political assessment and to achieving a government that is responsive to 
the needs of its citizens.   
It also contributes to our understanding of representation in providing evidence 
that descriptive representation alone does not automatically result in substantive 
representation.  Districts that have representation but that are unresponsive are 
associated with inferior outcomes for Latinos.  While representation is linked to higher 
probabilities that Latino-specific failure will be noticed and responded to, if 
representatives fail to do so, then representation alone is not linked to positive outcomes 
in terms of future improvements.   
While this chapter provides some insights into the conditional and nuanced 
nature of political assessment and representation, there are still numerous questions that 
need to be addressed.  Superior data are needed to get a better handle on the activities, 
motivations, and preferences of public managers and especially elected officials.  While 
these data allow us to examine the frequency of interactions, we really can only assume 
what these interactions involve and what motivations and objectives drive political-
administrative contact.  Also due to data limitations, the policy process here is largely 
treated as a black box where we observe inputs, some management, and outputs.  More 
research is needed on what policies are adopted and – with respect to the importance of 
representation – what it is that representatives are actually doing in terms of policies to 
improve the plight of those they represent.   
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CHAPTER V 
POLITICAL INFLUENCE AND PUBLIC MANAGEMENT 
In their influential work on political control of the bureaucracy, Dan Wood and 
Richard Waterman conclude: 
We believe this evidence for active political control is so strong that 
controversy should now end over whether political control 
occurs…Future research should turn toward exploring the determinants 
of political control.  (Wood and Waterman 1991, 822).    
The authors, then, propose a number of possible determinants, such as bureaucratic 
structure, personnel attributes, mission complexity, and issue salience (a topic covered in 
Chapters III and IV).  Since the time this conclusion was made seventeen years ago, there 
has been a surprising paucity in research that has taken on this challenge.  Recently, 
several scholars have empirically examined how structure (Whitford 2002a), 
decentralization (Whitford 2002b) and salience (Ringquist, Worsham, and Eisner 2003) 
influence political control or the propensity to engage in attempts at controlling the 
bureaucracy.  Yet, there has not been a systematic attempt to determine what factors 
facilitate or constrain political attempts at influencing policy outcomes.  Using the 
governance framework discussed in Chapter II, this chapter examines how bureaucratic 
factors moderate the influence political actors have on public policy outcomes.   
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Political Control versus Political Influence 
The term political control is most commonly used in political science literature, 
particularly research using the principal-agent framework.  The use of the word “control” 
is central to the underlying assumptions of principal agent theory, where there is an 
inherent conflict between the interests of the principal and the agent.  Terry Moe explains 
the core assumptions of agency theory in the following manner: 
The principal-agent model is an analytic expression of the agency 
relationship, in which one party, the principal, considers entering into a 
contractual agreement with another, the agent, in the expectations that the 
agent will subsequently choose actions that produce outcomes desired by 
the principal….[T]he principal’s decision problem is far more involved 
than simply locating a qualified person -- for there is no guarantee that the 
agent, once hired, will in effect choose to pursue the principal’s best 
interests or to do so efficiently. The agent has his own interests at heart, 
and is induced to pursue the principal’s objective only to the extent that 
the incentive structure imposed in the contract renders such behavior 
advantageous.  (Moe 1984, 756). 
Thus, a political principal can never be sure that agents are acting in the principal’s best 
interest.  Bureaucratic expertise and informational asymmetries exacerbate this 
uncertainty.   Principals, however, can employ a variety of tactics to create incentive 
structures (both positive and negative) that will increase the likelihood of compliance 
(see Chapter II for a more detailed discussion on principal agent models).  These include 
ex post controls, such as the structural design of an agency to “stack the deck” in favor 
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of particular interests (McCubbins, Noll and Weingast 1987), or to “hard-wire” agency 
preferences via structural design (Moe 1989).  Alternatively, political actors can resort to 
ex ante controls such as “police patrols” or less costly “fire-alarms” (McCubbins and 
Schwartz 1984).  Thus, central to this framework is the notion that political actors must 
monitor and coerce bureaucrats in order to ensure that they are fulfilling their obligations.  
Thus, at its core, agency theory assumes there is inherent goal conflict between 
principals and agents.   
While goal conflict is a key assumption in agency theory, it is rarely directly 
incorporated in empirical tests of political control.  Indeed, the bureaucracy in general is 
rarely explicitly accounted for in the empirical political science literature on political 
control.  Conceptually, however, political influence – as opposed to control – makes no 
such assumption.  The key difference is the conceptualization of how political actors get 
what they want: political control implies coercion while political influence does not.  
The core question this chapter addresses is whether political actors get more of what 
they want and, more importantly, how do bureaucratic factors either contribute or hinder 
their success.  This directly addresses Wood and Waterman’s challenge in examining the 
determinants of political influence.   
Testing for Political Influence 
In the principal-agent framework, the conventional way political scientists have 
tested political influence on policy outcomes is by examining the relationship between 
some measure of political preferences and policy outputs or outcomes.  Wood and 
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Waterman (1991, 1994), for example, began by examining a number of outputs from 
several different bureaucratic agencies (e.g., EPA, NRC, FTC, EEOC, FDA).  They 
model agency outputs as an autoregressive process, thus eliminating any temporal trends 
that would explain increases or decreases in these outputs.  Furthermore, a set of control 
variables that may explain outputs can be added to the model to account for changes in 
outputs not associated with political factors.  Finally, political preferences are measured 
in a variety of ways, such as interest group scores, partisanship percentages, political 
appointees or changes in budgets.  Thus, the general model is: 
O O X Pt t t t= + + +−β β β ε1 1 2 3      [5.1] 
where,  
 Ot  represents current agency outputs, 
 Ot-1 represents past outputs,  
 Xt is a vector of control variables,  
 Pt represents political preferences or a political event,  
 and ε is a random error term.    
In this setup, β3 represents the extent to which political preferences influence outputs (i.e. 
political control) above and beyond the effects of past outputs and other factors that may 
influence current outputs. 
  Figure 5.1 presents this in the logic of governance framework.  Traditional 
political control research, then, examines how political variables influence policy 
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outputs after controlling for other factors.  For example, in Wood and Waterman’s work, 
one political variable they examined was the appointment of an agency head and how 
particular political appointees changed policy outputs.  Using sophisticated time-series 
techniques, the political appointee was modeled as an intervention; and the authors 
estimated how outputs changed following the appointment of a particular appointee.   
Figure 5.1 A Simple Model of Political Influence 
 
This approach, however, does not directly incorporate bureaucracy.  
Alternatively, a governance framework is explicitly concerned with multiple actors and 
levels in the governance process.  Putting the traditional political influence approach in a 
governance framework, allows us to account for bureaucracy in examining questions of 
political influence – an undertaking public administration scholars have strongly 
advocated.  Additionally, a governance framework allows us to engage Wood and 
Political Interests,  
Legislative Choices 
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Political 
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Waterman’s call in exploring the determinants of political influence, many of which 
include bureaucratic, managerial, and institutional factors.  
Figure 5.2 incorporates the multiple levels of governance in explaining how the 
relationship between political preferences and policy outputs and outcomes is 
conditional on a host of other factors.  This, then, examines the factors that facilitate or 
constrain political influence.  That is, political influence may be greater under certain 
circumstances than others.  This framework models this relationship as an interactive 
relationship rather than a simple linear relationship.  It can be summarized formally as:  
O O X P C PCt t t t= + + + + +−β β β β β ε1 1 2 3 4 5    [5.2] 
where all variables are defined as they were in equation 5.1, and the added component, C, 
represents some catalyst or condition that either enhances or hinders political influence.  
This catalyst is then interacted with the political preference variable, which allows us to 
calculate the conditional effect of political preferences on outputs and determine if this 
effect changes as the catalyst changes.  If a condition increases the extent of political 
influence, β5 should be positive, while a condition that reduces political influence should 
be negative.  
As the model suggests, conceptually, there are numerous catalysts or conditions 
that can be considered in this framework. These include factors within the broader 
environment, institutional structures, organizational culture, mission complexity, 
managerial choices and traits, and personnel characteristics of street-level bureaucrats, 
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just to name a few.  This chapter considers the importance of two broad factors of 
theoretical importance to research on political influence; namely, goal conflict and 
political insulation.   
Figure 5.2.  A Conditional Model of Political Influence 
 
Preference/Goal Conflict 
As mentioned above, the principal-agent framework assumes that there is conflict 
in the preferences and goals of political principals and bureaucratic agents.  This conflict 
often develops over time, principally since (in theory) wining political coalitions in 
legislatures “stack the deck” in favor of particular groups or interests and “hardwire” 
agency preferences when the organization is designed (e.g. McCubbins, Noll and 
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Weingast 1987, 1989; Moe 1984).  Indeed, Moe (1989) argues that political actors – 
knowing that they will not retain political power indefinitely – intentionally create rules 
and procedures that make political influence more difficult so that future political 
coalitions will not be able to easily manipulate policy outcomes (see also Lewis 2003).  
Thus, when new political interests gain power, they find that the preferences of 
bureaucratic agencies differ from their own.   
Much of the formal political control literature is based on conceptualizations of 
how the political preferences (i.e. ideal points) of different institutions diverge and, 
based on these preference differences, theoretical propositions concerning likely 
outcomes (e.g. extent of discretion) are derived (e.g. Huber and Shipan 2002; Epstein 
and O’Halloran 1999).  While the use of preference divergence is ubiquitous in formal 
models of delegation, most of the empirical work on political control only examines the 
political preferences of the political institutions, but not the preferences of bureaucratic 
actors.  Public administration scholars who study bureaucratic politics often examine 
bureaucratic values at great length, but are largely uninterested in political preferences 
and how political actors may or may not influence bureaucrats.  Research on 
bureaucratic politics, rather, is largely interested in the reverse; that is, how bureaucrats 
shape their political environments (e.g. O’Leary 1994).   
This chapter, alternatively, takes a different approach in that it is interested in 
how political influence is conditional on the level of divergence or convergence in the 
goals and values of politicians and bureaucrats.  The larger the preference differential 
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between policy-makers and administrators/bureaucrats, the more difficult – and thus the 
less likely – it will be for political actors to achieve policy outputs that are consistent 
with their policy preferences.42  In a review of agency theory in the marketplace, Pratt 
and Zeckhauser (1985) contend that “agency loss is the most severe when the interests or 
values of the principal and agent diverge substantially” (5).  While this is a simple and 
commonsensical conclusion, having convergent policy preferences and values is 
arguably the most effective way for politicians to get what they want (e.g. Meier 2000).  
Goal conflict or preference divergence can occur at different levels within an 
agency, for example, agency executives versus street-level bureaucrats.  Wood and 
Waterman (1991, 1994) considered the ideology of political appointees (measured 
largely as the appointing president) and examine how policy outputs changed as result of 
their leadership within the agency.  While this is not quite the same as what is proposed 
here (i.e. they used political appointees as a measure of the president’s political 
preferences rather than the bureaucracy’s), they do implicitly recognize that the 
preferences of agency executives are important in determining policy outputs.  There are 
a variety of ways one can measure the preferences of an agency’s administration; 
however, what this project is interested in is measuring the extent to which 
administrators’ values differ from the values of the elected institution.  The greater the 
difference, the less political influence elected officials will have in shaping agency 
outcomes, ceteris paribus.  
                                                 
42
 Theoretically, this could be achieved though detailed legislations/less delegation, more monitoring, 
etc. – all of which are costly and less likely to produce the desired results than would having convergent 
preferences.   
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The second level of value/preference convergence this chapter examines is at the 
level of technical or primary work.  In his now classic work, Michael Lipsky (1980) 
found that front-line bureaucrats – or what he termed “street-level” bureaucrats – 
exercised varying degrees of discretion in performing their jobs.  In times of resource 
scarcity, street-level bureaucrats ration services, control clients, and conserve worker 
resources – all without direction from higher authorities (Lipsky 1980, 86).  Lipsky’s 
research indicates that street-level bureaucrats can be more responsive to their clients 
than to their political principals, largely due to vague or conflicting goal expectations 
proffered by political elites.  His work ultimately concludes street-level bureaucrats 
make decisions and judgment calls on a daily basis, many of which are not directly 
guided by the rules or mission of the organization for which they work.  This discretion 
they exercise directly shapes de facto public policy (see also Brehm and Gates 1997).   
Indeed, Wood and Waterman’s work (1994) demonstrates how lower-level 
bureaucrats can often resist political pressures.  Following Reagan’s inauguration, EPA 
enforcements actually increased despite the Reagan administration’s efforts to reduce 
EPA outputs.  Wood and Waterman attribute this spike in enforcements to “a zealous 
cadre of environmentalists” within the EPA who intentionally thwarted the 
administration’s attempts at reducing enforcements.  Similarly, O’Leary (1994) 
chronicles the successful efforts of lower- and mid-level bureaucrats within the U.S. 
Department of the Interior and the Nevada Department of Wildlife to surreptitiously 
shape their political environments in opposition to the preferences of their superiors.  
Therefore, the policy preferences of front-line bureaucrats may be as, if not more 
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important than the policy preferences of agency administrators and chief executives in 
shaping policy outputs and outcomes.  The expectation, then, is that the more supportive 
of the political goals of an elected institution the front-line employees within an agency 
are, the more influence that political institution will have.  Thus, in examining whether 
preference/goal alignment enhances political influence, this chapter considers the degree 
of policy preference convergence between political institutions and both agency heads 
and street-level bureaucrats.   
Insulation from Political Pressure 
While the political control/principal-agent literature adopts a top-down approach 
to political-bureaucratic interactions, a separate literature on bureaucratic politics has 
developed in public administration over the past several decades.  Research on 
bureaucratic politics is interested in how bureaucratic institutions acquire power and how 
they influence their political environments, including political institutions.  Judith 
Gruber (1987) contends that bureaucrats prefer to retain significant levels of discretion 
and favor systems where the power of outside actors is minimal.  Like Thompson (1967), 
she argues that bureaucrats seek to buffer themselves from outside influences.  
Furthermore, she argues that bureaucrats attempt to insulate themselves from political 
influences, relying rather on other bureaucrats and peers for guidance and advice rather 
than on elected officials, whom they view suspiciously whose motivations are self-
interested political.  This comports with one of Wilson’s (1989) conclusions that 
bureaucratic executives value autonomy perhaps even more than resources (181-195). 
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Related to issues of political insulation is work on bureaucratic influence.  In his 
classic book, Bureaucracy, Politics and Public Policy, Francis Rourke (1969) explores 
the determinants of bureaucratic power.  Rourke argues that the primary sources of 
bureaucratic power are based on bureaucrats’ political power and expertise.  Political 
power includes support from the public and recognizes that administrators’ ability to 
mobilize constituencies including politicians, interest groups and private citizens is 
essential to building bureaucratic power.  Thus, it is the cultivation of political and social 
networks within the agency’s environment that will translate into bureaucratic power and 
independence.  Rourke also argues that knowledge is power; thus, bureaucratic expertise 
is a critical source of bureaucratic power.   
Work on public management also suggests that public administrators seek to 
buffer environmental influences from influencing their organization.  O’Toole and Meier 
(1999) contend that managers establish networks that facilitate in their ability to manage 
their environments.  Such management entails adopting “a strategy of buffering the 
environment or actively seek[ing] to exploit the environment for the benefit of the 
program system” (1999, 517).  This buffering may include attempts to insulate the 
organization from political influences.   
This literature, then, suggests that managers who are motivated to gain 
bureaucratic independence and power – and are successful at doing so – are more likely 
to be insulated from the political influence.  There is reason to believe that managers 
make conscious decisions to develop their own political capital and political networks, 
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which in turn may work to make political attempts at shaping policy outputs less 
successful.  This chapter proceeds by examining the role these two broad concepts – goal 
conflict and political insulation – play in either limiting or enhancing political influence 
on organizational outputs and outcomes.   
Data and Methods 
This chapter again takes advantage of the Texas public school district data.  
Wood and Waterman (1991, 1994), in testing for political control, examined a handful of 
agencies over an extended period of time.  This allowed them to examine the effects of 
political changes, such as political appointees, budget cuts, and presidential 
administrations, on policy outputs of each agency.  However, the amount of 
bureaucratic variation in these several agencies is not large.  Since this project is 
interested in how variation in bureaucratic characteristics can influence political 
influence, we need data on a wide range of agencies that perform similar functions, yet 
also possess distinct organizational and managerial traits.  Texas school districts provide 
just that.  This chapter utilizes data on school districts from 2000-2005, resulting in as 
many as 5619 usable observations (depending on the model). 
Compared to many other bureaucratic organizations, school districts are highly 
professional and tend to be decentralized.  Indeed, in 2007, over 99 percent of teachers 
in Texas had at least a Bachelor’s degree and nearly 22 percent had at least a Master’s 
degree (TEA 2007 State AEIS Report).  Nearly 99 percent of Texas superintendents 
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have at least a Master’s degree and 34 percent have a doctorate.43  While this high level 
of expertise should work to limit political influence, school districts possess governance 
structures that should facilitate political influence.  First, they are governed by an elected 
school board that appoints the superintendent, establishes the budget and tax rate, and 
determines general educational policy.  Second, school districts tend to be flat 
organizations, thus the distance between school board members and street-level 
bureaucrats (teachers) is small.  This facilitates the opportunity for greater political 
influence due to lower transaction costs.  Third, school districts only deal with one type 
of policy – education – which allows political actors to be more focused on a single 
policy domain.  Finally, there is no separation of powers, which can lead to problems 
with multiple principals complicating the principal-agent link.  These characteristics 
ought to increase the extent to which political actors will be able to influence policy 
outcomes.  While this is ideal for testing the theoretical considerations discussed above, 
caution should be employed in generalizing the results to other political systems (e.g. the 
federal government). 
Political Preferences: Representation as a Proxy for Values 
Chapter IV discussed in some detail the theoretical link between race/ethnicity 
and values, which is expected to translate into policy preferences.  A great deal of 
empirical literature suggests that race and ethnicity are appropriate proxies for 
motivations and preferences of elected officials (Karnig and Welch 1980; Dye and 
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 These figures are based on 735 superintendents who replied to the survey administered by Kenneth J. 
Meier and Larry O’Toole in the fall of 2007. 
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Renick 1981; Eisinger 1982; Fraga, Meier and England 1986; Polinard, Wrinkle and 
Longoria 1990; Meier and Stewart 1991; Kerr and Mladenka 1994; Rocha 2006).  Thus, 
Latino representatives, for example, are more likely to advance the interests of Latino 
constituents than are Anglo representatives.  This chapter, then, uses the ethnic 
composition of the elected school board as a surrogate for the policy preferences of the 
institution.  School boards with higher levels of Latino descriptive representation are 
more likely to prefer and pursue policy outputs and outcomes that benefit Latino 
students.  This is not to say that non-Latino representatives do not want Latino students 
to succeed; rather, it is simply less likely to be on their radar or one of their top priorities 
unless they are in an all-Latino district, in which case Latino student performance simply 
becomes overall student performance.  Thus, to measure the preferences of the school 
board, the percentage of Latino school board members is used.   
Dependent Variables 
In addition to Latino TAKS pass rates, nine other Latino-specific policy 
outputs/outcomes are used in this analysis, ranging from low-end performance indicators 
to high-end outcomes.  Theoretically, some outputs are easier to manipulate than others; 
thus, we might expect more political influence over certain outputs/outcomes, but not 
others.  Gormley (1986, 1989) argues that elected officials are most likely to intervene in 
policy areas that are high in salience and low in complexity; alternatively, issues that are 
high in complexity and low in salience are the least likely to receive political attention 
(see also Ringquist, Worsham and Eisner 2003).  Latino student attendance rates 
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represent a low-end policy output and are calculated as the average daily attendance rate 
for Latino students for the school year.  Latino graduation rates – another measure that is 
considered – are measured as the number of Latino students who received their diploma 
on time or early as a percentage of Latino students within their cohort.44  The Texas 
State Board of Education also had developed a set of more rigorous standards for 
graduation designated as Recommended or Distinguished.  The TEA reports the rates of 
students who satisfy the course requirements for either the Recommended High School 
Program or the Distinguished Achievement Program.  Thus, in addition to Latino 
graduation rates, the percentage of Latino students who have earned the Recommended 
distinction is also used as a dependent variable.   
 Several higher-level indicators are also used, namely, the percentage of Latino 
students who enroll in advanced courses, the percentage who take advanced placement 
(AP) classes, and two measures of Latino student success on AP exams.  Advanced 
placement classes are offered to prepare students for college, and students who 
successfully pass the national AP exam with a score of 3 or higher may earn college 
credit for the course.  The TEA offers two measures of performance on the AP exams: 1) 
the percentage of Latino examinees who scored at least a 3 on at least one AP exam, and 
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 For example, for the 2004-2005 school year this would be calculated as: 
 
cohort 02-2001 in the students of #
05-2004 of end by the diploma a received cohort who from students Latino of #
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2) the number of AP Latino examination scores at or above the criterion for AP 
passage.45   
 
Table 5.1 Summary Statistics for Dependent Variables 
 
Finally, two measures of top-end performance measuring college preparedness 
are used:  the percentage of Latino students who have taken either the SAT or the ACT 
and the percentage of Latino students who score at or above 1110 on the SAT or its 
equivalent on the ACT (24 or above).  Table 5.1 presents summary statistics for all 10 
                                                 
45
 More specifically, these scores include both AP exams and the International Baccalaureate 
Organization’s International Baccalaureate (IB) examinations, and are calculated as: 
 
% Latino Students  =  
 examinees IB & AP Latino grade12th  &11th   #
criterion aboveor at  scored  whoexaminees IB & AP Latino grade12th  &11th  of #
 
% Latino scores =  
 scoresn examinatio IB & AP Latino grade12th  &11th   #
criterion aboveor at  scoresn examinatio IB & AP Latino grade12th  &11th  of #
 
 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
     
Latino TAKS Pass Rate 68.17 15.65 8 100 
Latino Attendance Rate 96.03 1.08 89.8 99.7 
Latino Graduation Rate 74.62 25.39 0 100 
% Latino Graduates - Recommended  54.55 21.94 0 100 
% Latino in Advanced Classes  12.55 9.49 0 83.3 
% Latino Students Taking AP Classes 7.71 9.32 0 85.7 
% Latino Students Pass AP Exams 46.98 23.77 0 100 
% Latino Scores Above AP Pass Criterion 37.42 21.68 0 100 
% Latino Taking SAT/ACT  43.38 18.55 0 100 
% Latino Student Above 1110 SAT 12.14 11.10 0 83.3 
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dependent variables.  As can be seen, there is considerable variation on all these 
variables (perhaps with the exception of attendance rates).    
Preference/Goal Alignment  
To measure the extent to which preferences between political actors and 
bureaucrats converge or conflict, measures of bureaucratic preferences are needed in 
addition to measures of political preferences.  As suggested earlier, this can be done by 
examining either managerial/administrative preferences or the values of street-level 
bureaucrats.  Since our measure of political preferences is based on ethnicity, we could 
similarly use a measure of managerial ethnicity as a proxy for values.  Indeed, there has 
been a large and growing literature on representative bureaucracy that examines how 
racial and ethnic compositions of agencies are linked to positive policy outcomes for 
minority clienteles (Mosher 1968; Selden 1997; Dolan 2000; Keiser et al. 2002; Meier, 
Wrinkle and Polinard 1999).  The logic to this theory is much the same as the reasoning 
behind research on descriptive and substantive representation.  Representative 
bureaucracy argues that the socialization process associated with the development of 
values and preferences is correlated with demographic differences (race, ethnicity, 
gender, religion, etc.).  These values inform the decisions bureaucrats make especially 
when bureaucrats have considerate latitude in decision-making in the implementation of 
policy.  Thus, a bureaucracy that is representative of the public in terms of demographic 
traits – passively representative – will make decisions differently than one that is not, 
and these differences in values may be reflected in the policy outputs and outcomes the 
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bureaucracy produces – active representation (see Meier 1993 for a discussion of the 
necessary conditions for this to transpire; see also Meier and Hawes [forthcoming] for a 
conceptual application of this theory in a comparative context). 
The goal in measuring political-bureaucratic preference alignment is to capture 
the extent to which political and bureaucratic institutions possess share values.  Since 
ethnicity is used as a proxy for political preferences, we can examine the ethnicity of the 
superintendent with the expectation that Latino superintendents will more closely share 
preferences with Latino school board members than will non-Latino superintendents.  
Since our measures of policy outputs are also Latino-specific, the expectation is that, all 
else being equal, Latino political influence will be greater when the superintendent 
passively represents Latino students (i.e. the superintendent is Latino).  That is, 
H1: Political influence will be greater when the superintendent is Latino.46   
As noted earlier, we can also examine the divergence/converge in preferences 
between political actors and street-level bureaucrats.  The expectation is that the more 
supportive the front-line employees are of the goals and values of the political branch, 
the more success the political branch will be in achieving those goals.  This could be 
measured in a variety of ways including simply the percentage of street-level bureaucrats 
(i.e. teachers) who are Latino (see Meier, O’Toole and Hawes 2007).  If we measure 
goal/value alignment in this manner, we would expect to see a positive relationship 
between the level of teacher Latino representation and amount of political influence.  To 
                                                 
46
 In the principal-agent framework, this is akin to the adverse selection problem. 
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measure value convergence – or bureaucratic support – I simply take the number of 
Latino teachers within each district as a percentage of the total number of teachers.47  
Theoretically, we should expect the effect of representation to increase as the level of 
support within the bureaucracy increases.  Thus,  
H2:   Political influence will increase as the percentage of Latino teachers 
increases.   
The third measure of goal/preference conflict examines the extent to which the 
school board supports the superintendent.  In the Meier-O’Toole surveys (see Chapter III 
for a discussion on the surveys), superintendents were asked to rate the quality of school 
board support.  Superintendents rated school board support as Excellent (53 %), Above 
Average (33 %), Average (11%), Below Average (79%) and Inadequate (0.8%).  
Arguably, superintendents who believe the school board supports them are more likely 
to share the school board’s values and goals.  Put differently, superintendents who 
perceive that school board support is sub-par, probably do not see eye-to-eye with the 
school board on policy matters.  Therefore, 
H3: Higher levels of school board support (i.e. policy alignment) should be 
associated with higher levels of political influence.  
                                                 
47
 Data on teacher and superintendent ethnicity were obtained from the Texas Education Agency’s staff 
and role data files.  
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Political Insulation 
The second broad set of factors that this project considers to be theoretically 
relevant in determining political influence deals with the extent to which bureaucrats 
insulate themselves from political pressure.  One component to bureaucratic insulation 
from politics is the ability of managers to cultivate political support and networks within 
their political environments.  The Meier-O’Toole survey asks a battery of questions 
pertaining to managerial interactions with their actors in their environments.  Using these 
survey items, Meier and O’Toole (2001, 2003) have developed and empirically validated 
a measure of managerial networking.  Recall that this measure was a key variable in 
examining the likelihood of political contact in Chapters III and IV.  This networking 
variable includes superintendent interaction with the TEA, state legislators, local 
business leaders, as well as peers (other superintendents).  Conceivably, managers who 
have developed extensive networks are more likely to have built social and political 
capital in their environments.  This development of social and political clout is arguably 
akin to Rourke’s description of the cultivation of political support that translates into 
bureaucratic influence and power.  Thus,  
H4:  Managerial networking is expected to reduce the extent of political 
influence of school boards. 
A related hypothesis is that entrenched superintendents will also be less 
responsive to political pressure from school boards, thus reducing the extent of political 
influence on policy outputs/outcomes.  Managers who have been the superintendent of a 
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district for an extended period of time are more likely to have developed a political, 
social and professional network that may afford them the political clout needed to resist 
political pressure.  The Meier-O’Toole survey provides data on the number of years the 
superintendent has been employed as the district’s superintendent.48  We can test this 
with the following hypothesis: 
H5: Executive entrenchment will work to reduce political influence on policy 
outputs and outcomes.   
Another form of insulation from politics may involve budget autonomy from the 
school board.  Wood and Waterman (1991, 1994) demonstrate that political principals 
can use budgets to influence bureaucratic behavior and ultimately outputs.  However, the 
extent to which administrators secure finds from sources not directly linked to their 
political principal, the more they will be insulated from any budget manipulations 
politicians may attempt.  Presumably school boards have more control over local, rather 
than non-local monies.49  The TEA provides a break down of sources of revenue for 
each district.  Using these data, the percent of each district’s budget that came from non-
local (as opposed to local) sources was calculated.  Thus, 
H6: Budget Autonomy will work to undermine political influence, ceteris 
paribus. 
                                                 
48
 An alternative measure would be to examine the length of time the superintendent had been employed in 
the district in any capacity, since political clout within the community may have been developed over this 
time period as well.  I use the superintendent employment measure since I believe it more closely fits with 
Rourke’s description of executives cultivating support.  That said, the second measure produces consistent 
finding that are actually more robust.   
49
 Most state money is assigned using rigid formulae that local school board would not have control over.   
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The final hypothesis deals with relative distance between political decisions and 
implementation.  Conceptually, every additional decision-maker within a hierarchy 
creates additional uncertainty.  Political actors could conceivably monitor and influence 
one decision-maker more effectively than 5 decision-makers, particularly if some 
“deciders” (to quote George W. Bush) are further down the hierarchy.  Ultimately it is an 
issue of accountability, where more layers of hierarchy muddles responsibility.  This is 
what Downs (1967) refers to as “leakage of authority”, which is the result of the number 
of layers of hierarchy.  There are a number of ways to measure hierarchy such as taking 
the ratio of managers to personnel (see Meier, O’Toole and Hawes 2007).  In this project, 
I focus on the amount of decision-making authority that is transferred to lower levels 
within the hierarchy.  The Meier-O’Toole survey includes an item that captures the 
amount of discretion that is granted by superintendents to principals (i.e. middle 
managers).  Conceivably, superintendents who abdicate some of their decision-making 
authority to middle managers have less control of the decisions and thus outcomes that 
result.  Increased allocation of discretion down the chain of command will likely 
increase the variability and uncertainty related to decisions and their consequences.  
Therefore, 
H7: The more discretion in decision making superintendents assign to 
principals, the less influence political actors will have.      
Table 5.2 presents summary statistics for these 7 variables. 
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Table 5.2.  Summary Statistics for Catalytic Variables 
Concept Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Goal Convergence       
Supportive Executive (H1) Latino Superintendent  0.07 0.25 0 1 
Supportive Bureaucracy (H2) % Latino Teachers 9.53 18.74 0 100 
Policy Alignment (H3) School Board Support 4.36 0.77 1 5 
Political Insulation      
Political Network (H4) Managerial Networking -0.03 0.89 -2.71 3.06 
Entrenchment (H5) Years as SI 5.60 4.90 0 40 
Leakage of Authority (H6) Discretion to Principals 3.66 0.85 1 6 
Budget Autonomy (H7) % Non-Local Revenue 55.50 22.45 2 100 
 
Control Variables 
As in the models in the previous chapters, there are a number of other factors that 
may influence organizational outputs and outcomes.  In Wood and Waterman’s (1991, 
1994; Wood 1992) research design, the primary control was history; that is, they used 
advanced time-series techniques to account for past levels of outputs and any trends in 
the dependent variable.  Once history is accounted for, any change in outputs following a 
political event (e.g. appointee, budget cut) could be attributed to that political event.  In 
the present case, however, I do not have an extended time-period of data and cannot take 
advantage of advanced time-series analysis techniques.  Yet, past levels of outputs may 
still be important to consider; therefore, a lagged value of the dependent variable is used, 
which accounts for past levels of performance.  
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A second control variable measures how well other students within a school 
district are performing.  Even after controlling for resources, some districts are simply 
better than others, and Latino students in these districts are likely to perform better than 
Latino students in other districts.  To control for this, I include the performance of Anglo 
students on each respective performance indicator (e.g. in the graduation model, Anglo 
graduation rates are included in the model).  The interpretation of the Latino 
representation coefficients, then, is the change in Latino performance from last year’s 
performance (because of the lagged dependent variable) that was beyond any impact 
Latino representation may have had on Anglo students.    
In addition to the lagged dependent variable and the control for Anglo student 
performance, a set of other control variables that have been linked to student 
performance are also included.  These controls include demographic (percent low 
income students, percent Latino students and percent black students), personnel (percent 
non-certified teachers, percent low-experience [less than 5 years] teachers and student-
teacher ratio), and resource-related (percent instructional expenditures and average 
teacher salary) variables (see Chapters III and IV for more on the control variables).   
Findings 
To test these hypotheses, Texas school district data from 2000-2005 are used.  
All models use OLS, and due to small levels of heteroskedasticity in most models, I use 
Huber-White robust standard errors clustered by school district.  As there are 7 
hypotheses and 10 dependent variables, there are 70 models to summarize.  Furthermore, 
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each model includes an interaction term that requires interpretation.  The results for the 
baseline models (no interactive terms) as well as the 70 interactive models are included 
in Tables 5.6 through 5.12 in the Appendix at the end of this chapter.  
Assessing Political Influence 
Using Wood and Waterman’s operationalization of political influence, the extent 
to which school board members exert political influence will be measured as the 
relationship between political preferences and policy outcomes.  In the present case, 
political preferences are measured as the percentage of school board members who are 
Latino; thus, political influence is measured as the effect (slope coefficient) that Latino 
representation has on Latino specific outputs and outcomes (i.e. β3 from equation 5.1).  
The expectation is that this coefficient will be positive and its size will be an indication 
of and the magnitude of political influence.  This project, then, examines factors that 
either dampen or enhance political influence, that is, factors that either increase or 
decrease the size of this relationship/slope.  This is captured in the conditional slope for 
political influence, which is conditional on the value of the catalytic variable (C in 
equation 5.2).  This is calculated as: Conditional β of P = β1 + β3C, where P is the 
political preferences and C is the catalyst.     
Yet, there is another way to consider and operationalize political influence.  If we 
conceptualize political influence as the extent to which politicians get more of what they 
want, then it is possible that some factors/catalysts may enhance political influence while 
decreasing the direct effects of political influence as captured in the conditional slopes.  
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Consider the following example.  District 1 and District 2 have the same policy 
preferences, that is, the same level of Latino representation, say 40 percent.  District 1, 
appoints Superintendent Soyuna Abogada who is a strong advocate for Latino students, 
which results in significant improvements in Latino student performance.  District 2, 
however, is stuck with Superintendent Ima Gringo.50  In the former case, the district 
observes improvements in Latino student performance, while the latter case experiences 
average performance.  In District 1, Latino representatives are getting more of what they 
want; however, the direct effect of representation may actually not be as large as in the 
latter case.  That is, by hiring Superintendent Abogada, the school board can do less but 
actually get more of what they want – positive Latino outputs.  Thus, we may see a case 
where the marginal effect of Latino representation (the conditional slope) on student 
performance actually decreases, while the actual outputs increase.  If the regression 
coefficients were: 
 
$Y  = 60 + .55(Representation) + 3.5(Abogada) -0.05(Rep*Abogada)  [5.3] 
the marginal effects of representation decreases with the better superintendent (from .55 
to .5), even though the actual outcome ( $Y ) is higher with Abogada than without her 
(83.5 vs. 82).  Thus, one can examine the conditional nature of political influence in 
more than one way – via the change in marginal effect of the political variable over 
different values of the catalyst, or via the change in the expected values for the outcome 
                                                 
50
 The names used here are fictional.  Any resemblances to real individuals are pure coincidence.   
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variable over different levels of the catalyst variable – and get results that are subject to 
different interpretations.   
An Illustration 
Two catalytic variables – each with a different directional expectation – are used 
to demonstrate how political influence can be assessed.  We expect that a supportive 
bureaucracy (H2) with respect to the passive representation of street-level bureaucrats 
(i.e. percentage Latino teachers) will result in more political influence, while increased 
discretion granted to principals (H6 – i.e., Leakage of Authority) will hinder the ability of 
school board members to influence policy outputs and outcomes.  To examine these 
conditional relationships on Latino TAKS performance, we can use the following 
models: 
Latino TAKSt =  β1(Latino Representation) + β2(Discretion) + β3(Representation × Discretion) 
+ β4(Latino TAKSt-1) + β5(Anglo TAKSt) + Controls + ε        [5.4] 
Latino TAKSt =  β1(Latino Representation) + β2(Latino Teachers) + β3(Representation × 
Teachers) + β4(Latino TAKSt-1) + β5(Anglo TAKSt) + Controls + ε       [5.5] 
Table 5.3 presents the results from each of these models.  The first model 
(column 2) is the model examining the Latino TAKS pass rates as a function of 
representation, the discretion granted to principals and the control variables.  Since this 
is an interactive model, the coefficients for the constitutive terms of the interaction are 
conditional on the value of the other variable.  Thus, principal discretion is negatively 
  
158 
Table 5.3.  Supportive Bureaucracy and Discretion as Catalysts 
DV = Latino TAKS Pass Rates 
Catalyst = Discretion to Principals % Latino Teachers 
Latino Representation 0.103 0.059 
 (0.040)* 
 
(0.019)** 
Catalyst -2.244 0.113 
 (0.289)** 
 
(0.021)** 
Representation × Catalyst -0.013 -0.007 
 (0.011) 
 
(0.0003)* 
Lagged Latino TAKS Pass Rate 0.384 0.315 
 (0.021)** (0.014)** 
Anglo TAKS Pass Rate 0.797 0.863 
 (0.029)** (0.020)** 
% Low Income Students 0.059 0.050 
 (0.024)* (0.017)** 
% Latino Students -0.122 -0.157 
 (0.019)** (0.016)** 
% Black Students -0.062 -0.061 
 (0.028)* (0.021)** 
Student Teacher Ratio 0.131 -0.073 
 (0.119) (0.090) 
% Non-Certified Teachers -0.002 -0.008 
 (0.049) (0.039) 
% Low-Experience Teachers 0.023 0.012 
 (0.027) (0.017) 
Instructional Expenditures  -0.074 -0.027 
 (0.045) (0.030) 
Average Teacher Salary -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -10.162 -17.552 
 (5.609) 
 
(4.170)** 
Observations 2432 5619 
R-squared 0.68 0.65 
(Robust standard errors clustered by district in parentheses) * significant at p<.05; ** significant at p<.01 
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related to Latino TAKS performance (-2.2) when Latino representation on the school 
board is 0. Alternatively, the effect of representation on Latino TAKS pass rates is 
positive and statistically significant (0.1, p < 0.05) when the level of discretion is 0 – a 
value outside the range of the data.  Recall that these coefficients represent the change 
(improvement) in performance over and above changes in Anglo performance.   
Both of these values are subject to change, however, as the other variable 
changes.  With respect to representation, we are interested whether the effect is still 
positive when discretion is not 0, but some higher level.  Our expectation is that the 
effect of representation will decline as principal discretion increases.  The interaction 
term, which is negative, confirms this prediction.  Using this information, we can 
calculate the expected effect of representation for different levels of principal discretion.   
Figure 5.3 presents these results, where the y-axis represents the expected value 
of the coefficient for representation and the x-axis is different levels of principal 
discretion.  As can be seen, Latino school board representation remains a positive and 
statistically significant predictor of Latino TAKS pass rates so long as principal 
discretion is not high.  At the highest levels of principal discretion, the marginal effect of 
representation – albeit positive – is not statistically significant.  Note that the interaction 
term need not be statistically significant in order to observe a conditional relationship.  A 
statistically significant interaction term simply indicates that the difference in the 
conditional coefficients is not statistically significant – as indicated in the graph where 
the upper confidence interval under high discretion is included in the lower confidence 
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interval for low discretion.  What we are interested here, rather, is whether the effect of 
representation is statistically different from zero at one value of discretion, but not at 
another.   
Figure 5.3.  Marginal effects of Representation on Latino TAKS Conditional on 
Discretion  
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Turning to the second model we see that the effect of representation is positive 
and statistically significant (0.06, p < 0.01) when the percent of Latino teachers in the 
school district is zero.  Our theoretical expectation was that a supportive bureaucracy, as 
measured by Latino teacher representation, would increase political influence.  Yet, in 
examining the interaction term, we see a negative and statistically significant value.  
Figure 5.4 presents the marginal effects of representation conditional on Latino teachers.  
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We see that Latino representation has a positive and statistically significant effect on 
Latino TAKS pass rates until teacher representation reaches about 48 percent, in which 
case school board representation is no longer statistically significant. Yet, this does not 
necessarily discount our hypothesis.  This is where the second method of assessing 
political influence becomes important.   
Figure 5.4.  Marginal effects of Representation on Latino TAKS Conditional on 
Teachers  
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As the hypothetical example involving Superintendent Abogada demonstrated, 
politicians can get more of what they want (i.e. political influence), without having to be 
directly involved if they have in place other mechanisms (e.g. bureaucrats who share 
their preferences) that achieve those same aims.  In such a case, examining the marginal 
effects of representation does not tells us if Latino school board members are getting 
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more of what they want – (presumably) improved outputs for Latino students.  To assess 
political influence in this manner, we can examine the expected values of Latino pass 
rates for different values of Latino teachers, while holding Latino representation at some 
constant value.  If Latino teachers do indeed aid Latino representatives in achieving their 
goals (i.e. improved outputs for Latino students), then we would expect Latino outputs to 
increase as Latino teachers increase holding representation constant.   
Figure 5.5 presents the expected values of Latino student pass rates for when 
Latino school board representation is at 48% (2 standard deviations above the mean) 
across the full range of possible levels of the catalytic variable, namely, the percentage 
of Latino teachers.51  When Latino representation is high (48) and Latino teachers are 
absent, the expected Latino pass rate in the average district is 69.6 percent.52  As the 
percent of teachers who are Latino increases, so does the expected pass rate.  When 
school board representation is at 48 percent, the difference in pass rates is statistically 
significant once Latino teacher representation reaches about 39 percent.  These findings 
suggest that Latino representatives are more successful in improving Latino student 
TAKS scores when they have teacher support.  This approach essentially captures the 
total effect of school board and teacher representation on how they affect outputs 
together.  These results can be taken as evidence that Latino teachers facilitate political 
influence.  This approach is applied to all the remaining dependent variables and 
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 In order to obtain confidence intervals rather than just point estimates, Clarify was used to generate 
1000 simulations of the coefficients.  Representation was held at 48 percent and all other control variables 
were held at their means.  Using these simulations, the 95% confidence intervals (two-tailed) were 
calculated.  
52
 This expected value is for when all control variables are at their means – including the lagged variable; 
thus, these estimates are for a district with average past performance.   
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hypotheses.  That is, the expected values are computed for low and high values of the 
catalytic variables while holding representation constant.  If the expected values increase, 
then this is taken as evidence that the moderating variable aides political influence, if the 
expected values decrease, then this suggests that political influence (in terms of Latino 
school board members attaining their goals) is inhibited.  Table 5.4 summarizes these 
findings.   
Figure 5.5.  Expected Values of Latino Pass Rates for Varying Levels of Teacher 
Representation  
 
 
Each column presents the direction of the change in the dependent variable for a 
change - moving from low to high values - in the moderating variable.  The first three 
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are the variables used to test the role of goal alignment in aiding political influence.  For 
these three variables, the expected direction is positive; that is, higher levels of these 
variables should increase political influence (i.e. improvements in Latino outputs).  
These include Latino superintendent, the percent of teachers who are Latino and the 
extent of to which the school board supports the superintendent.  The level of 
representation is held constant at 48 percent.  The first column suggests that in all 10 
models, Latino superintendents were associated with increases in Latino student 
performance.  If Latino superintendents were not related to Latino school board 
members getting policy outputs they desire – that is, if there was no relationship – we 
would expect the effect to be random where we would see negative and positive effects 
with an equal probability.  In this first case, we have 10 positive results and zero 
negative results.  We can calculate the probability of observing 10 positive results out of 
10 models using a binomial probability distribution.53  The probability of observing 10 
positive cases if the true probability for each independent trial was 0.5 (i.e. random) is 
0.00098.  Thus, we can be quite confident that a supportive agency head facilities 
political actors in achieving their goals.   
This procedure is repeated for all 8 moderating variables.  As can be seen, 9 of 
the 10 models for Latino teachers produced a positive result, which produces a 
probability of 0.011.  The third model, however, does not perform as well.  Only 5 out of 
                                                 
53
 The binomial probability function can be calculated as: 
( )P nk n k p pk n k n k( , ) !!( )! ( )= −  − −1  
where n is the number of independent trials (10), k is the number of successful trials and p is the 
probability of success on each trial (0.5 in this case). 
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the 10 models were in the predicted direction suggesting that school board support – at 
least as measured here – does not work to increase political influence.  This could be due 
to measurement error.  Recall that this measure is the superintendent’s perception of the 
quality of school board support.  Perhaps the qualitative judgments used in making this 
assessment vary considerably from superintendent to superintendent (financial support 
vs. policy support vs. personnel support, etc.).  These conceptualizations of support do 
not necessarily relate to goal or value alignment, as this variable was intended to 
measure.  Indeed, upon closer conceptual examination, perhaps this measure actually 
captures support that is more akin to Rourke’s notions regarding political support, in 
which case we would expect increased support to reduce political influence.  Despite the 
limited success of this variable, as a group these measure perform quite well.  The 
probability of observing 24 out of 30 positive relationships is less than 0.001.  This 
probability drops to 0.00002 if the political support variable is not included (19 out of 20 
trials).   
The final 4 columns present the results for the measures of political insulation.  
Theoretically, we expect that higher levels of political insulation will work to reduce 
political influence (i.e., negative relationship).  The first measure of political insulation 
was political networking, which can be used as an effective tool to buffer an 
organization from external influences including political ones (see O’Toole and Meier 
1999).  In 7 of the 10 cases, managerial networking worked to reduce political influence 
resulting in a probability of .172.  The three cases where it improved Latino student 
performance were higher-end achievements, namely recommended graduates, the 
  
Table 5.4.  Summary of Interactive Models: Direction of Effect of Catalytic Variables of Latino Student Outputs/Outcomes 
 Goal Convergence (+)   Political Insulation (-) 
 
Supportive 
Executive 
(H1) 
Supportive 
Bureaucracy 
(H2) 
Political-
Agency 
Alignment  
(H3) 
 
 
Political 
Network 
(H4) 
Entrenchment 
(H5) 
Leakage 
of 
Authority 
(H6) 
Budget 
Autonomy  
(H7) 
TAKS Pass Rates + + -   - - - + 
Attendance Rate + - -   - - + + 
Graduation Rates + + -   - - - + 
% Graduates - Recommended 
Program + + + 
 
 + - - 
+ 
% in Advanced Classes + + +   - - + + 
% Students Taking AP Classes + + +   - + - + 
% Students Pass AP Exams + + +   - - + + 
% Scores Above AP Pass Criterion + + +   - + + + 
% Taking SAT/ACT + + -   + - - + 
% Student Above 1110 SAT + + -   + + + + 
No. Models in Predicted Direction 10 9 5   7 7 5 0 
Probability  .00098 .011 .623   .172 .172 .623 .00098 
Probability by Group   24 of 30 = .0007 19 of 20 = .00002      
19 of 40 = .437 
14 of 20 = .058  
Overall Probability  43 of 70 = .036 33 of 40 = .00002         
+ = Political influence is enhanced; - = political influence is reduced.  Based on Latino School Board Representation Level of 48 percent.  Probabilities are directional 
(one-tailed) 166
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percentage taking SAT/ACT exams, and the percentage of Latino student scoring above 
1110 on the SAT.  This actually comports with earlier research that found managerial 
networking was positively related with higher-end achievements, often at the neglect of 
low-end objectives and disadvantaged students (O’Toole and Meier 2004a).  
We see similar results for managerial entrenchment in that 7 of the 10 results 
were in the expected direction (negative).  This suggests that managers who are well-
established in their districts are less susceptible to political pressure.  Note again that it is 
the higher-end outputs that do not fit this trend.  It could be that managers who have 
more experience within the district and have larger networks tend to focus on higher-end 
tasks that are aimed at responding to the policy preferences of the elite within the 
community.  By putting time and energy into these objectives, some minority students 
are likely to peripherally benefit, even if they were not directly targeted. 
The Leakage of Authority hypothesis (i.e. principal discretion) received mixed 
support in that only 5 of the 10 models were in the predicted direction.  This suggests 
there is no clear pattern between discretion and political influence – at least across this 
set of outputs and outcomes.  This is not necessarily surprising, however, since increases 
in discretion are theoretically linked to greater uncertainty (hence the argument for a loss 
of political influence).  Greater uncertainty in decision-making could work to increase or 
decrease political influence depending on the preferences of the individual decision-
makers (principals in this case).  Thus, these mixed findings support the notion that the 
greater allocation of discretion in decision-making to middle-managers increases the 
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variability in decisions and thus results.  This greater variability may increase or 
decrease political influence depending on the policy convergence of managers and 
politicians.   
The final set of findings provides unambiguous results for Hypothesis 7.  Budget 
autonomy is consistently related to increased political influence.  The probability of 
observing 10 consistent predictions is less than 0.001, which provides strong support for 
this hypothesis – but in the opposite direction.  That is, the more revenue a district 
receives from non-local sources (i.e. state or federal money), the more political influence 
Latino representative have in terms of improvements for Latino students.  Our 
expectation was that increased state and federal money would result in less political 
control since these monies often have strings attached and are thus less subject to 
political manipulation on the part of school board members.  However, if we reconsider 
our notion of who the political principal is, this actually makes sense.  That is, these state 
and federal funds are often designated for particular purposes such as bilingual education 
or English as a Second Language (ESL) programs.  In such a case, state and federal 
funding does not represent budget autonomy since there are actually more restrictions on 
funds.  That is, less budget autonomy for political actors does not necessarily means 
more budgetary autonomy for bureaucratic actors.  Furthermore, Latino school board 
members may actively seek these resources in an attempt to further their goals.  Indeed, 
they may seek to secure state and federal funds (e.g. grants) that specifically target 
Latino student populations.  Thus, increased revenue from state and federal sources may 
result in less budgetary discretion and thus autonomy for managers.  If looked at this 
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way, the budget autonomy hypothesis is actually supported (were local funds are an 
indication of budget autonomy).   
 In all, the political insulation models produce mixed results (at least from the 
original conceptualization of these relationships).  Of the 40 models, 19 of them produce 
results in the hypothesized direction, producing a probability of about .44.  Yet, if the 
discretion and budget autonomy models are excluded (since their results can actually be 
seen as support for the underlying theoretical premises of Hypotheses 6 and 7), 14 of 20 
models are in the hypothesized direction.  The probability associated with this pattern is 
about 6 in 100.  Across all 70 models, the probability of observing as many relationships 
in the hypothesized direction as we have (43 of 70) is 0.036.  If the results for budget 
autonomy are included as support for Hypothesis 7 (in that more restrictions on funds 
result in less administrative discretion in their use), then the probability drops to 
0.0000096 – or less than 10 in 1 million.  Arguably, this provides substantial support for 
the general hypotheses, namely, the importance of goal/preference convergence and 
political independence.   
Conclusion 
This chapter addresses an important theoretical question that has been of central 
importance to political scientists, public administration scholars, bureaucrats and 
politicians alike – namely, how can we reconcile the need for bureaucracy with the 
demands democracy places on it.  This question has been asked for generations by many 
scholars such as Woodrow Wilson (1887), Frank Goodnow (1900), Carl Friedrich 
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(1940), Herman Finer (1941), Dwight Waldo (1971), Herbert Simon (1998) and many 
others.  With respect to how political actors can ensure bureaucrats are accountable to 
the public, the dominant paradigm in political science has been the principal-agent 
framework.  However, in most treatments of political control, the bureaucracy is left out.  
This project reframes this question in a governance framework, which explicitly takes 
multiple levels of governance – including bureaucracy – into account.   
This chapter contributes to our understanding of political influence by examining 
the determinants of political influence.  This is an undertaking Wood and Waterman 
(1991) urged political scientists to explore, yet little has been done to advance our 
knowledge in this respect.  In particular, this chapter examines the role that goal or value 
convergence and bureaucratic independence play in either limiting or facilitating 
political influence.   
Rather than assuming there is goal conflict between political and bureaucratic 
institutions, this chapter develops measures of how closely the values of bureaucrats 
mirror the values of elected officials.  Increased value convergence was found to be 
related to increased political influence – a finding that is often assumed but rarely tested.  
This appeared to be the case at both the executive and street-level within agencies.  The 
most robust finding of this chapter was the importance of passive representation within 
the bureaucracy, which coincides with much of the literature on representative 
bureaucracy.    
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This chapter also examined the extent to which bureaucratic insulation from 
politics hinders political influence.  Managerial networking and managerial 
entrenchment both appear to be related to a reduction in political influence.  The 
evidence also suggests that this pattern holds for principal discretion and budget 
autonomy depending on what the theoretical expectations are.  One reason the support 
for the political insulation hypothesis is not as robust as the goal/value convergence 
findings is that goal convergence is likely an important determinant of how bureaucratic 
independence will interact with political influence.  That is, political actors may actually 
get more of what they want when bureaucratic autonomy is high if the preferences of 
political and bureaucratic actors are similar.  Alternatively, bureaucratic independence 
is likely to reduce political influence if the values and goals of bureaucrats and 
politicians are dissimilar.  This suggests there may be a three-way interaction between 
bureaucratic power, political preferences and goal/value convergence – a task that is 
better left for another time.  
While these results do provide new insight into the conditional nature of political 
influence, these findings may not be universally generalizable.  The political-
bureaucratic relationship between school boards and superintendents is significantly 
different from the relationship between Congress or the president and a federal agency.  
School boards are single issue elected bodies and the problems of multiple principals are 
not as pronounced in this setting as is the case in federal agencies.  This is not to say 
these findings are not important or are completely inapplicable to the federal government.  
These patterns, theoretically, are just as likely to occur at the federal government as at 
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any other level of government.  However, given the significant structural differences, 
caution is implored in making conclusions about intergovernmental relations at the 
federal level based on these results.  Rather, these findings are more likely to provide 
insight to political-bureaucratic arrangements that are more similar to the school board-
district structure, which may include other local governments (e.g., city councils-city 
managers), higher education governance systems or parliamentary systems where 
separation of powers is not present. 
Needless to say, there is still considerable work that needs to be done in this 
regard.  This chapter examines 2 determinants of political influence out of countless 
factors.  In addition to examining the role of value convergence and bureaucratic power, 
future research should examine other factors such as resource scarcity, managerial 
quality, bureaucratic expertise, mission complexity, and organizational stability.   
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
This project began with a broad empirical question that is directly connected to 
over forty years of policy literature, namely, is political assessment taking place in a 
systematic manner?  Prominent literature in public policy theory contends that political 
assessment is a crucial part of governance (Easton 1965; Anderson 1990; Lynn, Heinrich, 
and Hill 2001).  Empirically, however, the research on this topic is divided.  On the one 
hand, a wealth of literature has examined the numerous ways political actors can and do 
monitor and influence bureaucratic policy outcomes (e.g. McCubbins, Noll and 
Weingast 1989; Wood and Waterman 1991, 1993, 1994; Moe 1989).  Yet, other research 
suggests that political assessment does not occur systematically (Bovens et al. 1999; 
Caiden 1991).  Rather, it is only when a political/policy fiasco occurs that political actors 
respond, and often for self-serving reasons (e.g. blame avoidance).   
The findings presented in this project address this discrepancy in the literature.  
Chapter III suggests that political assessment does appear to occur, albeit in a 
conditional manner.  Policy salience is the key determinant in predicting whether or not 
political actors will respond to failure.  If the issue is universally salient, past failure is a 
significant predictor of political involvement.  This finding reinforces other research that 
has argued policy salience is key in explaining political behavior (e.g. Gormley 1986, 
1989; Ringquist, Worsham and Eisner 2003).   
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The evidence presented in this project suggests that not only do political actors 
respond to bureaucratic behavior and outputs, but that administrators respond to political 
actors.  Both managerial networking and the amount of time managers spent on internal 
rather than external management were affected by political involvement with 
administration.  Furthermore, political interactions with managers also appear to result in 
improved performance, but only for districts that performed poorly in the past.  
Alternatively, unwarranted political contact appears to have a negative effect on future 
performance.   
While Chapter III provided evidence of political responsiveness, it was not 
uniform.  Political responsiveness appeared to be absent in the case of Latino and 
African-American student performance failure, and other policy areas that were not 
deemed universally salient.  Chapter IV investigated the conditions under which political 
institutions would be responsive to Latino student performance.  In doing so, the concept 
of representation – both descriptive and substantive – was introduced and incorporated 
in the model of political assessment.  The empirical results suggest that political values 
and preferences – measured via ethnicity – are a significant predictor of political 
responsiveness to Latino student performance.  Alternatively, when school boards do not 
represent Latino students, the presence or absence of Latino failure – no matter how 
drastic – had no effect on the likelihood of political intervention.  This suggests that 
political representation of group-based interests is a vital component to the political 
assessment process.   
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Chapter V examined the determinants of political influence.  This is a challenge 
Wood and Waterman (1991) urged political scientists to take on, yet, with few 
exceptions, little has been done in this regard.  Chapter V identified two theoretically 
important aspects of bureaucracy, namely, value convergence and bureaucratic 
independence, and examined to what extent they limit or facilitate political influence.  
Rather than simply assuming that goal conflict between political and bureaucratic 
institutions is present, this project employed measures of how closely the values of 
bureaucrats mirror the values of elected officials.  As expected, political influence was 
enhanced by value convergence at both the executive and front-line bureaucratic levels.  
Alternatively, bureaucratic insulation from politics appears to limit political influence.  
Managers who had larger political networks appear to be less susceptible to political 
influence.   
Theoretical Contributions 
The theoretical contributions of this project inform at least three distinct 
literatures in political science and public administration.  In many respects, this 
dissertation is about political influence (or political control).  It is distinct from 
traditional political science research in that is adopts a governance framework.  Doing so 
allows one to theoretically incorporate the bureaucracy (e.g. structure, management, 
agency preferences) into the discussion – a consideration largely ignored by empirical 
work on political influence.  Like past research, this project stresses the importance of 
policy salience in explaining the behavior of political institutions.  Furthermore, it 
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explores the nature of conditional salience, particularly the importance of race and 
ethnicity in shaping preferences and values.  These values, in turn, inform an 
individual’s perceptions of the level of salience associated with various policy outcomes.  
This is arguably a considerable contribution to the political control literature – a 
literature that has largely ignored race and ethnicity as important proxies for policy 
preferences (for an exception see Meier and O’Toole 2006).  
In addition to the political control literature, this project directly engages 
literature on political representation, particularly research on descriptive and substantive 
representation of racial and ethnic minorities.  While literature on the bureaucracy has 
typically found a positive relationship between passive representation and policy 
outcomes for minority groups (e.g. Keiser et al. 2002; Selden 1997), the large literature 
on political institutions has found mixed results especially in linking descriptive 
representation to policy outcomes that benefit the descriptively represented groups.  By 
considering the role representation plays in responding to the needs of the represented 
group – that is, responding to group-specific failure – this project provides empirical 
support for one of the core assumptions of representation theory.  That is, substantive 
representation entails acting for constituents rather than just standing for them (Pitkin 
1967).  The findings in Chapter IV provide evidence that descriptive representation is 
associated with an increased likelihood of political responsiveness to poor bureaucratic 
performance that disproportionately impacts minority students.  This is a finding that is 
often assumed but rarely verified in the representation literature.    
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This chapter adds to the representation literature by providing evidence that 
descriptive representation alone does not automatically result in substantive 
representation.  Districts that have representation but that are unresponsive are 
associated with inferior outcomes for Latinos.  While representation is linked to higher 
probabilities that Latino-specific failure will lead to political intervention, if 
representatives fail to intervene, then descriptive representation alone is not linked to 
positive future outcomes for Latino students.  This provides insight into a central 
component of the representation literature and empirically demonstrates the necessity of 
the link between descriptive and substantive representation – namely, political action. 
This research also speaks to the public management literature in several respects.  
First, it illustrates how managers (even good ones) can suffer from social astigmatism in 
that they fail to recognize disparities in outcomes by focusing only on universally salient 
policies at the expense of disadvantaged groups.  Chapter IV suggests that political 
representation may help draw managerial attention to otherwise ignored discrepancies 
within their organizations.  This dissertation also addresses the public management 
literature by incorporating management decisions and behavior (e.g. managerial 
networking, delegating practices) in examining political influence.  Again, much of this 
literature ignores management; by including management, our understanding of 
political-bureaucratic interaction is more complete.   
In sum, three theoretical contributions stand out.  First, it appears that elected 
institutions do engage in political assessment.  School board involvement with 
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administration was significantly higher when past bureaucratic failure was present, 
suggesting that political actors are responsive to bureaucratic outputs and outcomes.  
This provides empirical support for the leading theoretical models of public policy.  Yet, 
rather than being universally the case, political assessment appears to be conditional on 
the salience of the policy.  The evidence suggests that political actors were only 
responsive to failure if that failure pertained to universally salient policy outcomes.  
Policy areas that were less salient – or salient to particular groups – were largely ignored.  
These findings highlight the role of issue salience in policy making.  The general models 
of public policy are just that – general – and as such they may only be applicable to 
policy areas that are generally salient.  In the case of less salient policy areas, it appears 
that political actors are not responsive, as some public administration scholars suggest 
(e.g. Caiden 1991; Dunsire and Hood 1989). 
 The second key theoretical contribution pertains to representation as it relates to 
political assessment and policy outcomes for minority groups.  As noted above, 
politicians were generally unresponsive to bureaucratic failure, if the failure was specific 
to minority groups (Latinos and African-Americans).  However, when the interests of 
these groups are represented in the elected body, we see a different story.  The evidence 
in Chapter IV suggests that the likelihood of political intervention is completely 
dependent the level of Latino-specific failure but only if Latino representation is present.  
The behavior of school boards with no Latinos, however, does not change at all 
regardless of Latino student performance.  This provides compelling evidence for the 
importance of representation.   
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Finally, this project puts bureaucracy back into the study of bureaucratic 
responsiveness to political institutions.  While central in the formal models of political 
control, the empirical literature on political influence of bureaucratic policy outcomes 
rarely directly accounts for the bureaucracy itself.  When the bureaucracy is incorporated, 
this study finds that the extent to which political actors get what they want is conditional 
on value alignment with the bureaucracy as well as bureaucratic independence – two 
findings that support past theoretical work. 
Caveats 
These results provide some tentative answers to the important questions in 
political science and public administration.  However, caution should be taken in 
generalizing these finding to other cases.  First, these findings are based on Texas school 
districts, which have a particular type of political-administrative system that is distinct 
from the federal government.  School boards are single-issue elected bodies and multiple 
principal problems – a key complication in the principal-agent literature – are not present 
in this setting as is the case in federal agencies.  That is, while the theoretical 
conclusions are certainly conceptually applicable to the federal government, the 
evidence presented in the project should not necessarily be taken as evidence that these 
phenomena occur at the federal level.  Rather, these findings provide greater insight to 
political-bureaucratic arrangements that are more similar to the school board-district 
structure, which may include other local governments, higher education governance 
systems or parliamentary systems where separation of powers is not present. 
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Future Research 
These conclusions, while informative, open up a wide range of new questions for 
researchers.  Given the relatively short period of time examined in this project, this 
project does not directly address the longer-term relationship between failure, political 
intervention and performance.  Past research has consistently found that managerial 
networking has tangible benefits for organizational performance (e.g., Meier and 
O’Toole 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004; Meier, O’Toole and Nicholson-Crotty 2004; O’Toole 
and Meier 2003, 2004; Nicholson-Crotty and O’Toole 2004; Goerdel 2006).  If 
increased political involvement decreases managerial networking, as is suggested in 
Chapter III, such interactions may have long-term implications for organizational 
performance, where decreases in networking may result in declines in future 
organizational performance.  In such a case, we might expect temporary improvements 
in organizations that experienced political intervention due to poor past performance, yet 
they may experience performance problems in the longer term due to decreases in 
networking, which may work to sustain long-term organizational performance.  
Furthermore, this research does not address exactly how gains in performance are 
obtained.  There are countless ways school board members and public managers could 
potentially influence performance.  Future research should examine what policies and 
strategies work best at improving the performance of failing organizations.  As some 
policy outcomes are easier to manipulate than others, the question becomes whether the 
gains in performance are real, or are managers manipulating performance indicators as a 
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means of coping with political pressure.  Indeed, there are numerous ways 
superintendents can cheat, including via the strategic tracking of students to 
classifications that will not count toward the districts accountability ratings.  Future 
research should examine this important question of whether managers are simply 
cheating as a means to placate elected officials – the answer to which has important 
implications for empirical research on political control as well public administration in 
practical terms.   
With respect to the relationship between political assessment and representation 
(Chapter IV), there are still may unanswered questions that warrant attention.  Better 
data on the activities, motivations, and preferences of public managers and elected 
officials are needed to get a better handle on what role race and ethnicity plays in the 
decision-making calculus of policy makers (both elected and bureaucratic).  Without 
precise data and measures, we are left to assume what these interactions between elected 
officials and bureaucrats involve and what motivations and objectives drive political-
administrative contact.  While perhaps less so than much of the past work on descriptive 
and substantive representation, the policy process is still largely treated as a black box 
where we observe inputs, some management, and outputs.  More research is needed on 
what policies are adopted and – with respect to the importance of representation – what 
it is that representatives are actually doing in terms of policies to improve the plight of 
those they represent.  These are just a few of many questions that remain unanswered, 
and that future research should address.   
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 5.5.  Baseline Models of Political Influence 
 
Latino 
TAKS 
Pass Rate 
Latino 
Graduation 
Latino 
Attendance 
Latino 
Recommend 
Latino 
Advance 
Courses 
Latino AP 
% Taken 
% Latino 
Taking 
SAT 
Latino 
AP % 
Students 
Latino AP 
% Scores 
Above 
Criterion 
Latino SAT 
Above 
1110 
Criterion 
Latino Representation 0.068 0.053 0.001 0.123 0.062 0.037 0.148 0.038 0.028 0.024 
 (0.011)** (0.014)** (0.001) (0.023)** (0.009)** (0.009)** (0.020)** (0.031) (0.024) (0.010)* 
Lagged DV 0.316 0.255 0.606 0.210 0.300 0.364 0.344 0.395 0.363 0.149 
 (0.014)** (0.027)** (0.018)** (0.016)** (0.022)** (0.035)** (0.025)** (0.045)** (0.040)** (0.031)** 
Anglo Performance 0.861 0.982 0.305 0.687 0.459 0.324 0.382 0.446 0.423 0.216 
 (0.021)** (0.012)** (0.019)** (0.026)** (0.025)** (0.019)** (0.026)** (0.042)** (0.041)** (0.025)** 
% Low Income Students 0.052 0.129 0.007 0.141 0.070 -0.005 -0.021 0.051 -0.002 -0.165 
 (0.017)** (0.024)** (0.001)** (0.034)** (0.013)** (0.013) (0.034) (0.065) (0.052) (0.025)** 
% Latino Students -0.126 -0.132 -0.008 -0.190 -0.105 -0.032 -0.092 -0.117 -0.073 -0.022 
 (0.014)** (0.020)** (0.001)** (0.031)** (0.012)** (0.011)** (0.030)** (0.058)* (0.045) (0.021) 
% Black Students -0.065 -0.087 -0.002 -0.126 -0.079 -0.026 -0.138 -0.107 -0.050 -0.037 
 (0.021)** (0.028)** (0.001) (0.038)** (0.012)** (0.013)* (0.035)** (0.069) (0.055) (0.028) 
Student Teacher Ratio -0.001 -0.069 0.007 0.461 -0.096 -0.031 -0.479 -0.001 0.376 0.194 
 (0.091) (0.150) (0.005) (0.252) (0.069) (0.078) (0.213)* (0.396) (0.320) (0.136) 
% Non-Certified Teachers -0.005 0.132 0.008 0.321 0.027 0.009 0.066 -0.053 0.033 -0.041 
 (0.040) (0.063)* (0.002)** (0.089)** (0.029) (0.025) (0.081) (0.170) (0.130) (0.053) 
% Low-Experience Teachers 0.014 0.075 0.004 0.187 0.035 0.046 0.049 0.097 0.039 0.079 
 (0.017) (0.028)** (0.001)** (0.042)** (0.014)* (0.014)** (0.037) (0.070) (0.059) (0.030)** 
Instructional Expenditures  -0.039 -0.097 -0.005 -0.008 -0.072 -0.056 -0.006 -0.120 -0.094 0.004 
 (0.031) (0.051) (0.002)* (0.078) (0.024)** (0.032) (0.069) (0.123) (0.094) (0.047) 
Average Teacher Salary -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)* (0.000)** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)** 
Constant -19.550 -41.486 7.875 -30.044 -3.030 -1.868 -3.508 -5.688 -4.786 -6.819 
 (4.165)** (5.463)** (1.686)** (6.620)** (2.216) (3.118) (6.281) (10.830) (9.327) (4.068) 
Observations 5619 2848 4907 2213 4256 2697 2921 753 886 2126 
R-squared 0.65 0.80 0.60 0.56 0.43 0.58 0.36 0.63 0.63 0.37 
(Robust standard errors clustered by district in parentheses)  ‡ significant at p<.1 (0ne-tailed)  † significant at p<.05 (0ne-tailed) * significant at p<.05(two-tailed); ** significant at p<.01(two-tailed) 
  
198
 
Table 5.6.  Supportive Executive 
 
Latino 
TAKS 
Pass Rate 
Latino 
Graduation 
Latino 
Attendance 
Latino 
Recommend 
Latino 
Advance 
Courses 
% Latino 
Advanced 
Placement 
% Latino 
Taking 
SAT 
% Latino   
Students 
Pass AP 
% Latino 
AP 
Scores 
Above  
Criterion 
Latino 
SAT 
Above 
1110 
Criterion 
Latino Representation 0.071 0.035 -0.000 0.112 0.054 0.026 0.130 0.008 0.011 0.010 
 (0.016)** (0.018)* (0.001) (0.030)** (0.010)** (0.009)** (0.025)** (0.044) (0.035) (0.013) 
Latino Superintendent  2.667 -1.374 0.087 7.252 2.067 0.980 2.518 0.132 -0.407 0.048 
 (0.972)** (1.718) (0.069) (2.351)** (0.928)* (0.925) (2.319) (2.716) (2.558) (0.904) 
Rep. × Latino Super -0.029 0.043 0.000 -0.046 -0.006 0.010 0.011 0.040 0.027 0.025 
 (0.020) (0.028) (0.001) (0.043) (0.017) (0.019) (0.036) (0.050) (0.042) (0.016) 
Lagged DV 0.317 0.256 0.607 0.208 0.300 0.361 0.342 0.393 0.362 0.146 
 (0.014)** (0.027)** (0.018)** (0.016)** (0.022)** (0.034)** (0.025)** (0.045)** (0.040)** (0.031)** 
Anglo Performance 0.861 0.981 0.307 0.686 0.460 0.322 0.384 0.447 0.425 0.216 
 (0.021)** (0.012)** (0.019)** (0.025)** (0.025)** (0.019)** (0.026)** (0.042)** (0.041)** (0.025)** 
% Low Income Students 0.050 0.127 0.007 0.136 0.067 -0.009 -0.026 0.047 -0.004 -0.171 
 (0.017)** (0.024)** (0.001)** (0.035)** (0.013)** (0.014) (0.034) (0.065) (0.052) (0.025)** 
% Latino Students -0.131 -0.128 -0.008 -0.206 -0.108 -0.032 -0.098 -0.113 -0.069 -0.019 
 (0.015)** (0.021)** (0.001)** (0.033)** (0.012)** (0.011)** (0.032)** (0.061) (0.048) (0.022) 
% Black Students -0.064 -0.088 -0.002 -0.121 -0.076 -0.023 -0.135 -0.105 -0.049 -0.036 
 (0.021)** (0.028)** (0.001) (0.038)** (0.012)** (0.013) (0.035)** (0.070) (0.055) (0.028) 
Student Teacher Ratio -0.026 -0.079 0.006 0.341 -0.124 -0.054 -0.549 0.001 0.373 0.153 
 (0.094) (0.151) (0.005) (0.253) (0.069) (0.079) (0.219)* (0.397) (0.319) (0.140) 
% Non-Certified Teachers -0.002 0.136 0.008 0.330 0.028 0.011 0.072 -0.054 0.031 -0.038 
 (0.040) (0.063)* (0.002)** (0.088)** (0.029) (0.025) (0.081) (0.175) (0.132) (0.054) 
% Low-Experience Teachers 0.015 0.074 0.005 0.191 0.037 0.047 0.052 0.096 0.040 0.081 
 (0.017) (0.028)** (0.001)** (0.042)** (0.014)* (0.014)** (0.037) (0.070) (0.059) (0.030)** 
Instructional Expenditures  -0.038 -0.093 -0.005 0.013 -0.068 -0.052 0.001 -0.118 -0.095 0.008 
 (0.031) (0.051) (0.002)* (0.078) (0.024)** (0.031) (0.069) (0.124) (0.094) (0.047) 
Average Teacher Salary -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)* (0.000)** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)** 
Constant -19.464 -41.362 7.558 -29.412 -3.071 -1.751 -2.751 -5.385 -4.731 -6.522 
 (4.147)** (5.484)** (1.696)** (6.614)** (2.205) (3.118) (6.268) (10.828) (9.343) (4.104) 
Observations 5606 2841 4893 2212 4246 2696 2919 753 886 2123 
R-squared 0.65 0.80 0.60 0.57 0.43 0.58 0.36 0.63 0.63 0.38 
(Robust standard errors clustered by district in parentheses)  ‡ significant at p<.1 (0ne-tailed)  † significant at p<.05 (0ne-tailed) * significant at p<.05(two-tailed); ** significant at 
p<.01(two-tailed) 
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Table 5.7.  Supportive Bureaucracy 
 
Latino 
TAKS 
Pass Rate 
Latino 
Graduation 
Latino 
Attendance 
Latino 
Recommend 
Latino 
Advance 
Courses 
% Latino 
Advanced 
Placement 
% Latino 
Taking 
SAT 
% Latino   
Students 
Pass AP 
% Latino 
AP 
Scores 
Above  
Criterion 
Latino 
SAT 
Above 
1110 
Criterion 
Latino Representation 0.059 0.029 -0.003 0.069 0.040 -0.003 0.082 -0.148 -0.127 -0.000 
 (0.019)** (0.024) (0.001)** (0.040) (0.013)** (0.013) (0.032)* (0.065)* (0.053)* (0.018) 
% Latino Teachers 0.113 -0.011 0.000 0.300 0.081 0.051 0.292 -0.057 -0.046 0.071 
 (0.021)** (0.039) (0.002) (0.048)** (0.021)** (0.019)** (0.052)** (0.082) (0.066) (0.023)** 
Rep. x Latino Teachers  -0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.003 0.003 -0.000 
 (0.000)* (0.000) (0.000)** (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.000) 
Lagged DV 0.315 0.255 0.601 0.678 0.294 0.353 0.321 0.380 0.354 0.141 
 (0.014)** (0.027)** (0.018)** (0.026)** (0.022)** (0.035)** (0.025)** (0.044)** (0.040)** (0.030)** 
Anglo Performance 0.863 0.981 0.311 0.203 0.464 0.321 0.388 0.449 0.429 0.216 
 (0.020)** (0.012)** (0.019)** (0.016)** (0.025)** (0.019)** (0.026)** (0.042)** (0.041)** (0.025)** 
% Low Income Students 0.050 0.125 0.007 0.138 0.065 -0.013 -0.027 0.022 -0.024 -0.168 
 (0.017)** (0.024)** (0.001)** (0.035)** (0.013)** (0.014) (0.035) (0.064) (0.052) (0.025)** 
% Latino Students -0.157 -0.127 -0.008 -0.289 -0.127 -0.044 -0.201 -0.071 -0.033 -0.052 
 (0.016)** (0.025)** (0.001)** (0.039)** (0.013)** (0.012)** (0.037)** (0.076) (0.062) (0.025)* 
% Black Students -0.061 -0.084 -0.001 -0.112 -0.072 -0.019 -0.127 -0.076 -0.024 -0.033 
 (0.021)** (0.028)** (0.001) (0.039)** (0.012)** (0.013) (0.035)** (0.071) (0.056) (0.027) 
Student Teacher Ratio -0.073 -0.092 0.004 0.034 -0.176 -0.124 -1.011 -0.042 0.353 0.037 
 (0.090) (0.157) (0.005) (0.259) (0.071)* (0.079) (0.222)** (0.399) (0.330) (0.146) 
% Non-Certified Teachers -0.008 0.133 0.008 0.324 0.024 0.007 0.060 -0.118 -0.016 -0.041 
 (0.039) (0.063)* (0.002)** (0.089)** (0.029) (0.025) (0.081) (0.165) (0.125) (0.053) 
% Low-Experience Teachers 0.012 0.074 0.004 0.186 0.033 0.046 0.053 0.068 0.016 0.080 
 (0.017) (0.028)** (0.001)** (0.042)** (0.014)* (0.014)** (0.037) (0.071) (0.060) (0.029)** 
Instructional Expenditures  -0.027 -0.096 -0.005 0.046 -0.060 -0.046 0.051 -0.135 -0.106 0.024 
 (0.030) (0.052) (0.002)* (0.078) (0.024)* (0.032) (0.068) (0.126) (0.095) (0.048) 
Average Teacher Salary -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)* (0.000)** (0.000) (0.000)** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)** 
Constant -17.552 -41.100 7.861 -21.666 -1.189 -0.153 5.950 -1.469 -1.577 -3.567 
 (4.170)** (5.563)** (1.701)** (6.801)** (2.216) (3.146) (6.405) (10.553) (9.292) (4.154) 
Observations 5619 2848 4907 2213 4256 2697 2921 753 886 2126 
R-squared 0.65 0.80 0.60 0.57 0.44 0.58 0.37 0.63 0.63 0.38 
(Robust standard errors clustered by district in parentheses)  ‡ significant at p<.1 (0ne-tailed)  † significant at p<.05 (0ne-tailed) * significant at p<.05(two-tailed); ** significant at p<.01(two-tailed) 
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Table 5.8.  School Board Support 
 
Latino 
TAKS 
Pass Rate 
Latino 
Graduation 
Latino 
Attendance 
Latino 
Recommend 
Latino 
Advance 
Courses 
% Latino 
Advanced 
Placement 
% Latino 
Taking 
SAT 
% Latino   
Students 
Pass AP 
 Latino 
AP 
Scores 
Above  
Criterion 
Latino 
SAT 
Above 
1110 
Criterion 
Latino Representation 0.099 0.146 0.005 0.083 0.039 -0.028 0.159 0.015 0.076 0.050 
 (0.050) (0.087) (0.002)* (0.093) (0.031) (0.039) (0.079)* (0.183) (0.149) (0.054) 
School Board Support -0.252 -0.080 0.024 0.006 -0.114 -0.319 0.339 0.097 0.408 -0.202 
 (0.281) (0.501) (0.018) (0.692) (0.242) (0.349) (0.620) (1.214) (1.054) (0.435) 
Rep. x SB Support  -0.008 -0.021 -0.001 0.007 0.004 0.014 -0.016 0.004 -0.008 -0.012 
 (0.011) (0.021) (0.001) (0.021) (0.007) (0.009) (0.018) (0.042) (0.034) (0.012) 
Lagged DV 0.332 0.281 0.639 0.230 0.306 0.384 0.363 0.378 0.364 0.146 
 (0.020)** (0.033)** (0.022)** (0.023)** (0.032)** (0.041)** (0.032)** (0.059)** (0.055)** (0.039)** 
Anglo Performance 0.857 0.987 0.281 0.669 0.456 0.292 0.376 0.470 0.462 0.256 
 (0.028)** (0.016)** (0.022)** (0.037)** (0.036)** (0.023)** (0.035)** (0.058)** (0.063)** (0.034)** 
% Low Income Students 0.071 0.145 0.005 0.228 0.068 -0.018 0.034 0.033 0.035 -0.136 
 (0.023)** (0.028)** (0.002)** (0.046)** (0.017)** (0.018) (0.046) (0.086) (0.075) (0.032)** 
% Latino Students -0.136 -0.155 -0.006 -0.249 -0.097 -0.022 -0.106 -0.090 -0.108 -0.032 
 (0.020)** (0.022)** (0.001)** (0.041)** (0.015)** (0.015) (0.042)* (0.074) (0.058) (0.027) 
% Black Students -0.065 -0.065 -0.001 -0.188 -0.090 -0.028 -0.182 -0.024 -0.058 -0.092 
 (0.027)* (0.039) (0.002) (0.057)** (0.016)** (0.018) (0.050)** (0.099) (0.081) (0.034)** 
Student Teacher Ratio 0.135 0.110 0.003 0.464 -0.114 0.130 -0.244 0.194 0.227 0.217 
 (0.114) (0.165) (0.007) (0.332) (0.090) (0.098) (0.294) (0.590) (0.444) (0.170) 
% Non-Certified Teachers -0.059 0.126 0.007 0.178 0.014 -0.036 0.041 -0.372 -0.196 -0.110 
 (0.057) (0.079) (0.003)* (0.124) (0.041) (0.041) (0.123) (0.225) (0.174) (0.077) 
% Low-Experience Teachers 0.023 0.078 0.005 0.256 0.041 0.051 0.079 0.081 0.094 0.120 
 (0.024) (0.034)* (0.002)** (0.057)** (0.020)* (0.018)** (0.052) (0.113) (0.092) (0.040)** 
Instructional Expenditures  -0.038 -0.102 -0.006 0.031 -0.084 -0.013 0.060 -0.178 -0.146 0.040 
 (0.042) (0.066) (0.003)* (0.105) (0.033)* (0.037) (0.096) (0.153) (0.134) (0.058) 
Average Teacher Salary -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000) (0.000)* (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)* 
Constant -19.857 -47.673 7.040 -40.362 -2.037 -2.489 -15.900 -0.287 3.081 -7.314 
 (5.458)** (6.860)** (2.233)** (9.499)** (2.973) (4.230) (9.018) (15.225) (13.294) (5.807) 
Observations 2828 1560 2526 1193 2245 1443 1562 399 486 1164 
R-squared 0.66 0.82 0.63 0.55 0.45 0.59 0.35 0.66 0.65 0.39 
(Robust standard errors clustered by district in parentheses)  ‡ significant at p<.1 (0ne-tailed)  † significant at p<.05 (0ne-tailed) * significant at p<.05(two-tailed); ** significant at 
p<.01(two-tailed) 
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Table 5.9.  Networking 
 Latino 
TAKS 
Pass Rate 
Latino 
Graduation 
Latino 
Attendance 
Latino 
Recommend 
Latino 
Advance 
Courses 
% Latino 
Advanced 
Placement 
% Latino 
Taking 
SAT 
% Latino   
Students 
Pass AP 
% Latino 
AP Scores 
Above  
Criterion 
Latino SAT 
Above 
1110 
Criterion 
Latino Representation 0.071 0.062 0.001 0.104 0.061 0.029 0.092 0.023 0.051 -0.005 
 (0.014)** (0.017)** (0.001) (0.032)** (0.012)** (0.011)** (0.026)** (0.040) (0.031) (0.014) 
Managerial Networking -0.295 -0.636 -0.018 1.436 0.169 -0.173 0.325 2.292 0.902 0.460 
 (0.249) (0.388) (0.019) (0.638)* (0.190) (0.211) (0.557) (1.298) (0.967) (0.385) 
Rep. x Networking -0.010 -0.027 -0.001 -0.002 -0.013 -0.003 -0.001 -0.096 -0.062 -0.005 
 (0.015) (0.018) (0.001) (0.026) (0.008) (0.010) (0.021) (0.036)** (0.030)* (0.012) 
Lagged DV 0.325 0.291 0.645 0.217 0.308 0.387 0.357 0.360 0.354 0.157 
 (0.022)** (0.033)** (0.023)** (0.023)** (0.033)** (0.041)** (0.033)** (0.059)** (0.056)** (0.040)** 
Anglo Performance 0.855 0.979 0.276 0.676 0.452 0.275 0.378 0.482 0.485 0.241 
 (0.028)** (0.017)** (0.022)** (0.037)** (0.038)** (0.020)** (0.035)** (0.059)** (0.063)** (0.031)** 
% Low Income Students 0.068 0.152 0.006 0.226 0.067 -0.016 0.027 0.004 0.036 -0.148 
 (0.024)** (0.029)** (0.002)** (0.047)** (0.018)** (0.019) (0.047) (0.087) (0.079) (0.034)** 
% Latino Students -0.139 -0.160 -0.007 -0.248 -0.100 -0.019 -0.107 -0.074 -0.127 -0.013 
 (0.021)** (0.023)** (0.001)** (0.042)** (0.016)** (0.015) (0.044)* (0.074) (0.060)* (0.028) 
% Black Students -0.070 -0.068 -0.001 -0.206 -0.092 -0.020 -0.188 -0.010 -0.052 -0.075 
 (0.028)* (0.040) (0.002) (0.059)** (0.017)** (0.017) (0.052)** (0.100) (0.082) (0.033)* 
Student Teacher Ratio 0.031 0.085 0.004 0.402 -0.171 0.092 -0.292 0.181 0.179 0.251 
 (0.114) (0.175) (0.007) (0.331) (0.093) (0.101) (0.301) (0.592) (0.445) (0.173) 
% Non-Certified Teachers -0.074 0.148 0.007 0.206 0.014 -0.028 0.063 -0.457 -0.251 -0.101 
 (0.057) (0.080) (0.003)* (0.125) (0.042) (0.041) (0.126) (0.232) (0.188) (0.077) 
% Low-Experience Teachers 0.034 0.086 0.005 0.269 0.044 0.048 0.077 0.086 0.105 0.093 
 (0.025) (0.035)* (0.002)** (0.056)** (0.020)* (0.017)** (0.052) (0.115) (0.092) (0.040)* 
Instructional Expenditures  -0.047 -0.057 -0.006 -0.032 -0.086 -0.001 0.069 -0.302 -0.179 0.013 
 (0.041) (0.070) (0.003)* (0.107) (0.036)* (0.038) (0.101) (0.169) (0.143) (0.060) 
Average Teacher Salary -0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000) (0.000)* (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -19.412 -52.751 7.070 -37.348 -2.610 -5.549 -13.380 8.343 7.304 -3.352 
 (5.650)** (7.185)** (2.261)** (9.148)** (3.061) (3.715) (8.990) (15.940) (13.436) (5.013) 
Observations 2691 1509 2414 1151 2151 1391 1517 383 463 1120 
R-squared 0.67 0.82 0.63 0.55 0.45 0.58 0.35 0.66 0.66 0.38 
(Robust standard errors clustered by district in parentheses)  ‡ significant at p<.1 (0ne-tailed)  † significant at p<.05 (0ne-tailed) * significant at p<.05(two-tailed); ** significant at 
p<.01(two-tailed) 
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Table 5.10.  Entrenchment 
 
Latino 
TAKS 
Pass Rate 
Latino 
Graduation 
Latino 
Attendance 
Latino 
Recommend 
Latino 
Advance 
Courses 
% Latino 
Advanced 
Placement 
% Latino 
Taking 
SAT 
% Latino   
Students 
Pass AP 
% Latino 
AP 
Scores 
Above  
Criterion 
Latino 
SAT 
Above 
1110 
Criterion 
Latino Representation 0.088 0.074 0.002 0.122 0.057 0.024 0.099 0.056 0.047 -0.007 
 (0.020)** (0.021)** (0.001) (0.039)** (0.015)** (0.014) (0.035)** (0.050) (0.040) (0.018) 
Years as Superintendent 0.116 -0.254 -0.000 -0.154 -0.020 -0.016 -0.038 0.283 0.010 -0.056 
 (0.044)** (0.073)** (0.003) (0.121) (0.032) (0.043) (0.097) (0.209) (0.176) (0.068) 
Rep. x Years as SI -0.004 -0.003 -0.000 -0.002 -0.000 0.002 -0.001 -0.008 0.001 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.000) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.009) (0.009) (0.003) 
Lagged DV 0.330 0.272 0.640 0.224 0.307 0.379 0.361 0.369 0.363 0.151 
 (0.020)** (0.034)** (0.022)** (0.024)** (0.032)** (0.042)** (0.032)** (0.061)** (0.055)** (0.040)** 
Anglo Performance 0.844 0.969 0.284 0.667 0.460 0.298 0.384 0.483 0.463 0.261 
 (0.028)** (0.017)** (0.022)** (0.036)** (0.036)** (0.023)** (0.035)** (0.059)** (0.064)** (0.034)** 
% Low Income Students 0.068 0.129 0.005 0.230 0.072 -0.014 0.040 0.046 0.017 -0.131 
 (0.023)** (0.028)** (0.002)** (0.046)** (0.017)** (0.018) (0.046) (0.088) (0.075) (0.032)** 
% Latino Students -0.132 -0.153 -0.006 -0.250 -0.099 -0.025 -0.113 -0.088 -0.100 -0.030 
 (0.020)** (0.022)** (0.001)** (0.042)** (0.015)** (0.015) (0.042)** (0.075) (0.059) (0.027) 
% Black Students -0.059 -0.066 -0.001 -0.193 -0.093 -0.028 -0.192 -0.034 -0.053 -0.088 
 (0.027)* (0.039) (0.002) (0.057)** (0.017)** (0.017) (0.050)** (0.101) (0.081) (0.034)** 
Student Teacher Ratio 0.102 0.030 0.003 0.420 -0.107 0.139 -0.285 0.151 0.151 0.212 
 (0.112) (0.167) (0.007) (0.330) (0.090) (0.098) (0.296) (0.577) (0.429) (0.174) 
% Non-Certified Teachers -0.060 0.148 0.007 0.184 0.014 -0.037 0.044 -0.423 -0.166 -0.115 
 (0.057) (0.083) (0.003)* (0.125) (0.041) (0.041) (0.123) (0.236) (0.179) (0.077) 
% Low-Experience Teachers 0.018 0.078 0.005 0.260 0.043 0.048 0.082 0.098 0.101 0.113 
 (0.025) (0.034)* (0.002)** (0.057)** (0.020)* (0.018)** (0.053) (0.113) (0.091) (0.039)** 
Instructional Expenditures  -0.053 -0.107 -0.006 0.052 -0.081 -0.009 0.060 -0.174 -0.147 0.044 
 (0.042) (0.067) (0.003)* (0.107) (0.034)* (0.037) (0.096) (0.152) (0.135) (0.058) 
Average Teacher Salary -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000) (0.000)* (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)* 
Constant -18.474 -42.059 6.785 -40.304 -2.885 -3.562 -14.021 -0.091 7.392 -8.098 
 (5.354)** (7.119)** (2.227)** (8.746)** (2.884) (3.767) (8.499) (14.599) (12.220) (5.326) 
Observations 2796 1543 2501 1178 2224 1425 1551 397 481 1154 
R-squared 0.66 0.82 0.63 0.55 0.46 0.59 0.35 0.66 0.65 0.40 
(Robust standard errors clustered by district in parentheses)  ‡ significant at p<.1 (0ne-tailed)  † significant at p<.05 (0ne-tailed) * significant at p<.05(two-tailed); ** significant at 
p<.01(two-tailed) 
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Table 5.11.  Discretion 
 Latino 
TAKS 
Pass Rate 
Latino 
Graduation 
Latino 
Attendance 
Latino 
Recommend 
Latino 
Advance 
Courses 
% Latino 
Advanced 
Placement 
% Latino 
Taking 
SAT 
% Latino   
Students 
Pass AP 
% Latino 
AP Scores 
Above  
Criterion 
Latino SAT 
Above 
1110 
Criterion 
Latino Representation 0.103 0.060 -0.001 0.145 -0.023 0.102 0.184 -0.041 -0.102 -0.049 
 (0.040)* (0.052) (0.003) (0.133) (0.047) (0.058) (0.080)* (0.154) (0.128) (0.046) 
Discretion to Principals -2.244 -0.099 -0.019 -0.055 -0.217 -0.144 0.836 -1.245 -2.225 -0.383 
 (0.289)** (0.389) (0.027) (0.900) (0.308) (0.301) (0.601) (1.659) (1.608) (0.514) 
Rep. x Discretion  -0.013 -0.003 0.000 -0.011 0.024 -0.017 -0.022 0.033 0.045 0.014 
 (0.011) (0.014) (0.001) (0.042) (0.016) (0.016) (0.023) (0.044) (0.038) (0.013) 
Lagged DV 0.384 0.287 0.622 0.251 0.317 0.345 0.376 0.389 0.344 0.176 
 (0.021)** (0.037)** (0.023)** (0.025)** (0.034)** (0.054)** (0.034)** (0.077)** (0.071)** (0.049)** 
Anglo Performance 0.797 0.986 0.295 0.637 0.440 0.307 0.429 0.501 0.486 0.214 
 (0.029)** (0.017)** (0.025)** (0.044)** (0.040)** (0.026)** (0.039)** (0.071)** (0.070)** (0.037)** 
% Low Income Students 0.059 0.147 0.004 0.198 0.063 -0.007 0.110 -0.012 0.043 -0.138 
 (0.024)* (0.033)** (0.002)* (0.050)** (0.019)** (0.019) (0.045)* (0.116) (0.090) (0.038)** 
% Latino Students -0.122 -0.149 -0.006 -0.209 -0.088 -0.027 -0.159 -0.040 -0.078 -0.030 
 (0.019)** (0.026)** (0.001)** (0.048)** (0.017)** (0.017) (0.041)** (0.090) (0.067) (0.031) 
% Black Students -0.062 -0.062 -0.000 -0.180 -0.075 -0.029 -0.239 0.072 -0.062 -0.091 
 (0.028)* (0.049) (0.002) (0.069)** (0.018)** (0.021) (0.057)** (0.149) (0.115) (0.040)* 
Student Teacher Ratio 0.131 -0.000 0.003 0.350 -0.129 -0.009 0.121 0.151 0.559 0.218 
 (0.119) (0.172) (0.007) (0.370) (0.101) (0.095) (0.306) (0.687) (0.521) (0.187) 
% Non-Certified Teachers -0.002 0.228 0.014 0.234 0.066 0.018 0.080 -0.194 -0.062 -0.060 
 (0.049) (0.093)* (0.003)** (0.136) (0.047) (0.036) (0.129) (0.250) (0.185) (0.081) 
% Low-Experience Teachers 0.023 0.085 0.005 0.196 0.026 0.049 0.068 0.062 0.139 0.103 
 (0.027) (0.037)* (0.002)** (0.061)** (0.020) (0.021)* (0.059) (0.128) (0.101) (0.044)* 
Instructional Expenditures  -0.074 -0.143 -0.003 -0.021 -0.102 -0.051 -0.047 -0.015 0.024 0.058 
 (0.045) (0.074) (0.003) (0.117) (0.037)** (0.042) (0.099) (0.165) (0.149) (0.062) 
Average Teacher Salary -0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000) (0.000)* (0.000) (0.000)* (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -10.162 -48.572 7.382 -28.998 0.290 -2.109 -21.595 10.413 6.775 -2.895 
 (5.609) (8.106)** (2.234)** (10.851)** (3.279) (4.161) (9.611)* (17.245) (13.623) (5.982) 
Observations 2432 1311 2178 982 1938 1188 1344 341 410 988 
R-squared 0.68 0.83 0.62 0.55 0.44 0.58 0.37 0.66 0.63 0.35 
(Robust standard errors clustered by district in parentheses)  ‡ significant at p<.1 (0ne-tailed)  † significant at p<.05 (0ne-tailed) * significant at p<.05(two-tailed); ** significant at 
p<.01(two-tailed) 
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Table 5.12.  Budget Autonomy 
 Latino 
TAKS 
Pass Rate 
Latino 
Graduation 
Latino 
Attendance 
Latino 
Recommend 
Latino 
Advance 
Courses 
% Latino 
Advanced 
Placement 
% Latino 
Taking 
SAT 
% Latino   
Students 
Pass AP 
% Latino 
AP Scores 
Above  
Criterion 
Latino SAT 
Above 
1110 
Criterion 
Latino Representation 0.081 0.058 -0.003 0.042 0.037 0.047 0.128 -0.213 -0.135 -0.033 
 (0.030)** (0.032) (0.002) (0.077) (0.026) (0.027) (0.056)* (0.090)* (0.072) (0.031) 
% Non-Local Revenue 0.033 0.027 -0.001 0.006 0.005 0.020 0.057 -0.098 -0.075 -0.037 
 (0.009)** (0.013)* (0.001) (0.027) (0.008) (0.010)* (0.021)** (0.035)** (0.030)* (0.016)* 
Rep x Non-Local Revenue -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.004 0.002 0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.000)* 
Lagged DV 0.315 0.252 0.605 0.687 0.300 0.363 0.339 0.386 0.357 0.144 
 (0.014)** (0.027)** (0.018)** (0.026)** (0.022)** (0.034)** (0.025)** (0.045)** (0.040)** (0.030)** 
Anglo Performance 0.862 0.982 0.306 0.210 0.460 0.325 0.385 0.438 0.415 0.209 
 (0.021)** (0.012)** (0.019)** (0.016)** (0.026)** (0.019)** (0.026)** (0.042)** (0.042)** (0.025)** 
% Low Income Students 0.036 0.115 0.007 0.126 0.064 -0.015 -0.060 0.048 0.002 -0.156 
 (0.018)* (0.025)** (0.001)** (0.038)** (0.013)** (0.014) (0.037) (0.066) (0.053) (0.026)** 
% Latino Students -0.121 -0.129 -0.008 -0.184 -0.103 -0.030 -0.084 -0.086 -0.057 -0.021 
 (0.015)** (0.020)** (0.001)** (0.031)** (0.012)** (0.011)** (0.030)** (0.060) (0.045) (0.021) 
% Black Students -0.060 -0.083 -0.001 -0.117 -0.075 -0.022 -0.122 -0.070 -0.030 -0.036 
 (0.021)** (0.028)** (0.001) (0.039)** (0.012)** (0.013) (0.035)** (0.071) (0.055) (0.027) 
Student Teacher Ratio -0.062 -0.123 0.005 0.371 -0.130 -0.059 -0.644 -0.003 0.373 0.207 
 (0.091) (0.159) (0.006) (0.259) (0.068) (0.083) (0.222)** (0.394) (0.321) (0.147) 
% Non-Certified Teachers -0.008 0.135 0.008 0.322 0.027 0.012 0.073 -0.045 0.040 -0.044 
 (0.040) (0.063)* (0.002)** (0.089)** (0.029) (0.025) (0.081) (0.172) (0.129) (0.053) 
% Low-Experience Teachers 0.018 0.074 0.004 0.186 0.035 0.046 0.047 0.054 0.017 0.078 
 (0.017) (0.028)** (0.001)** (0.042)** (0.014)* (0.014)** (0.037) (0.073) (0.059) (0.029)** 
Instructional Expenditures  -0.065 -0.116 -0.004 -0.016 -0.077 -0.070 -0.054 -0.080 -0.062 0.033 
 (0.031)* (0.052)* (0.002)* (0.078) (0.024)** (0.033)* (0.070) (0.124) (0.095) (0.050) 
Average Teacher Salary 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)* (0.000)** (0.000)* (0.000)** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)** 
Constant -22.277 -43.640 8.019 -29.492 -3.284 -3.519 -8.154 3.004 1.856 -3.527 
 (4.233)** (5.531)** (1.693)** (7.302)** (2.399) (3.220) (6.368) (10.966) (9.816) (4.292) 
Observations 5618 2848 4906 2212 4255 2696 2920 752 885 2125 
R-squared 0.65 0.80 0.60 0.56 0.43 0.58 0.36 0.63 0.63 0.38 
(Robust standard errors clustered by district in parentheses)  ‡ significant at p<.1 (0ne-tailed)  † significant at p<.05 (0ne-tailed) * significant at p<.05(two-tailed); ** significant at 
p<.01(two-tailed) 
  
205 
VITA 
 
Name: Daniel P. Hawes 
Address: Department of Political Science, 4348 TAMU, Texas A&M 
University, College Station, TX 77843-4348 
 
Email Address: dhawes@politics.tamu.edu 
 
Education: B.A., Political Science, The University of Texas–Pan American, 2003 
 Ph.D., Political Science, Texas A&M University, 2008 
 
 
